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Bilateral intelligence cooperation has received increased attention in recent years, 
thanks in part to its publicly acknowledged role in supporting sovereign states in their 
efforts to counter transnational threats.  Until recently most of the scholarship on this 
topic has been descriptive and atheoretical, with a tendency to treat known examples 
of cooperation as unique occurrences, rather than as instances of a broader 
phenomenon.  The aversion to theory surrounding bilateral intelligence cooperation 
has inhibited efforts to develop generalized and contingent explanations about it, such 
as why it occurs in the first place and under what conditions it is most likely to 
flourish and atrophy.  This dissertation seeks to address these gaps in the Intelligence 
Studies literature by leveraging insights from two theoretical traditions from 
International Relations—the dyadic democratic peace and relational contracting 
perspectives—to develop candidate explanations of why certain pairs of states engage 
in greater degrees of intelligence cooperation over time than others. Two historical 
case studies—the Anglo-Soviet and Anglo-American military intelligence 
  
relationships during World War II—are presented and analyzed with a view to 
assessing the relative strengths and weaknesses of each explanation.  Through the use 
of qualitative research methods (i.e., the congruence method and testing of observable 
implications) and the development of new numeric measurements to capture the 
depth of intelligence cooperation over time, the author finds that the normative dyadic 
democratic peace hypothesis and its posited causal mechanism of the regime 
recognition dynamic are largely corroborated in both cases, thus suggesting that they 
warrant further consideration as an explanation of the depth of bilateral intelligence 
cooperation.  By contrast, the relational contracting hypothesis and its posited causal 
mechanism of willful hierarchy are not well supported in either case, thus raising 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
What’s missing in the ‘missing dimension’ of international politics? 
Bilateral liaison arrangements are a defining characteristic of the intelligence 
world. …They usually cover a wide range of issues, including the sharing of 
assessments, raw data, or training facilities and the conduct of joint 
operations, some of which could lay dormant at any given time. While traces 
and discussions of particular bilateral relationships can be found in the 
historical literature, key questions such as "How does such cooperation arise? 
How frequently and what form does it take? Who authorizes it and arranges 
it?" are not always easily answered (Lefebvre 2003, 533). 
 
International intelligence cooperation has long played an important behind-
the-scenes role in international politics.  Over the past century sovereign nation states 
have formed intelligence alliances against a diverse array of common adversaries, to 
include international anarchists, the Axis powers, the Soviet Union and transnational 
criminal and terrorist organizations.  That much is evident in the multidisciplinary 
Intelligence Studies literature,1 which has shed much light on what Sir Alexander 
Cadogan, the distinguished British diplomat, once famously described as the 'missing 
dimension' of diplomatic history (Andrew & Dilks 1984, 1).  
Thanks to this literature, we know much more about international intelligence 
cooperation than we did in the mid-1970s, when F.W. Winterbotham’s The Ultra 
Secret first called the public’s attention to the joint cryptologic activities of the UK 
and US militaries during World War II (Winterbotham 1974).  Historians have 
illuminated the role of Anglophone intelligence cooperation in securing Allied victory 
                                                 
1 Even 30 years on, Intelligence Studies remains something of a nomad within the academy.  
As Michael Goodman notes, “intelligence studies is one of those odd disciplines that is comfortable in 





in World War II (Andrew 1995; Smith 1993; Smith 1996; Alvarez 1999; Budiansky 
2000; Warner 2004).  Practitioners have highlighted the importance of intelligence 
sharing arrangements in combating transnational threats and supporting multilateral 
military operations (Boatner 2000; Lefebvre 2003; Clough 2004; Lander 2004).  
Political scientists, for their part, have dissected the inner-workings of intelligence 
alliances—often with a view to diagnosing inefficiencies, deriving case-specific 
lessons learned and prescribing organizational remedies (Richelson 1990; Aldrich 
2002a, 2004; Bensahel 2006; Byman 2006; Reveron 2006; Sims 2006; Zegart 2007, 
2011; Walsh 2010). 
Nevertheless, as Lefebvre suggests, deeper questions about bilateral 
intelligence cooperation remain inadequately explored.  What factors compel such 
arrangements to emerge in the first place?  Why are some relationships more 
vulnerable to cheating and defection than others? And what accounts for varying 
degrees of cooperation within these relationships?   To the extent that these questions 
are addressed in the Intelligence Studies literature, they have tended to be examined 
through a descriptive and functionalist (vice analytic and deductive) lens.  As a result, 
our understanding of bilateral intelligence cooperation as a general phenomenon 
remains somewhat limited and underdeveloped. 
While some might argue that theoretical abstractions have no place in the 
study of such a practical matter as intelligence, a diverse group of intelligence 
scholars argues otherwise.  In an influential essay on this topic, Fry and Hochstein 
encourage the academic community to move beyond “anecdotally rich or even 




contemporary debates in international politics (Fry and Hochstein 1994, 18).  Making 
more of these connections would, in Svendsen’s view, bring a greater degree of 
“explanatory strength” to the study of different aspects of intelligence cooperation 
(Svendsen 2009, 709).   
At the same time, there are consequences to not connecting intelligence 
scholarship more explicitly to theory.  Gill and Phythian argue that a dearth of 
“understandings and explanations of intelligence that transcend particular times and 
places” poses a significant barrier to society’s larger understanding of intelligence 
matters, as well as how we think about intelligence and its applications in the present 
day (Gill and Phythian 2004, 24).  
Research question 
To those who view intelligence as an instrument of national power, the idea 
that states would be willing to share such a precious commodity with others—let 
alone participate in joint or combined intelligence activities—may seem 
counterintuitive.  As it turns out, no state is capable of gathering unilaterally all of the 
intelligence that it requires.  This is especially true of foreign intelligence, given the 
wide range of potential topics and geographic regions involved.  As a coping 
mechanism, states reach out to foreign counterparts to fill gaps and, in certain cases, 
reap the benefits of comparative advantage.  Thus it becomes possible to reconcile the 
notions of sovereign nation states simultaneously acquiring foreign intelligence 
information for selfish reasons (e.g., in order to gain a relative information advantage 
over their opponents) and sharing some of this information with other states in select 




A potentially more intriguing question is why certain groups of foreign 
intelligence services engage in greater levels and degrees of this activity than others.  
A cursory review of the past 60 years reveals a diverse set of historical cases that 
relate in one way or another to this question.  Some relationships, such as the US-Iraq 
and Israel-Palestinian Authority partnerships of the 1980s and mid-1990s, proved to 
be relatively short-lived and involved the sharing of specific types of sanitized, 
operational intelligence against common enemies and intelligence targets (National 
Security Archive 1983, 7; Gwertzman 1986, A1; Battersby 1996, 1; Horovitz 1996, 
9).  Other relationships, such as the early 1960s US-Canada foreign intelligence 
efforts against Cuba, lasted longer and entailed a broader range of foreign intelligence 
activities, to include mutual tasking of one another’s intelligence assets and the 
sharing of finished intelligence (Hershberg 2000, 148-155; Munton 2002 and 2009).   
These examples suggest that certain pairs of states engage in greater degrees 
of foreign intelligence cooperation than others.  I’m interested in identifying potential 
factors that account for this variance.  In so doing I hope to make a modest 
contribution to theoretical development in the Intelligence Studies literature, which 
until recently has been relatively silent on this question.  Most explanations of 
bilateral intelligence cooperation tend to focus on the role of ‘cost-benefit’ and ‘quid 
pro quo’ calculations of state actors (Richelson 1990; Lefebvre 2003; Clough 2004; 
Sims 2006; Munton 2009).  I do not dispute that these arguments shed light on how 
intelligence practitioners approach matters of intelligence cooperation.  The problem 
lies in their conflation of preferences over outcomes with preferences over actions 




outcome of any strategic interaction naturally reflects the original goals of the actors, 
when in fact it may have been shaped by complex interaction dynamics.2  Such 
deterministic reasoning often results in truisms (e.g., intelligence services only 
collaborate with partner services when it is in their interest to do so and when the 
costs of sharing outweigh the benefits).  By approaching this question through the 
lens of established IR theories, I hope to identify alternative explanations that can 
more effectively account for varying degrees of foreign intelligence cooperation 
between states.   
Structure and implications 
From a practical standpoint, an examination of bilateral foreign intelligence 
cooperation has much to recommend it.  This is seen first of all in the growing profile 
of foreign intelligence-sharing arrangements in countering transnational terrorism. 
Over two decades removed from the end of the Cold War, Washington and its allies 
have discovered that extant strategic doctrine and traditional instruments of power are 
insufficient to deter stateless, transnational actors such as al Qaeda, which generally 
lack a physical “return address against which retaliation can be visited” (Betts 2002, 
31).  Greater quantities of foreign intelligence—and, by extension, greater degrees of 
international foreign intelligence cooperation—are required to identify, counter and 
neutralize these threats.3  Some have gone so far as argue that the effective pursuit of 
counter-terrorism hinges “largely on the ability of national intelligence services to 
                                                 
2 Frieden refers to this as the sin of commission, which “arise[s] when analysts observe an 
outcome and draw a direct line from it back to the preferences of the actors.” (Frieden 1999, 52)   
3 Derek Reveron attributes the increasing importance of intelligence to a post-Cold War shift 
in the amount of intelligence required to neutralize a typical threat:  “In contrast to the Cold War, 
where the intelligence-to-force ratio was low, the war on terror requires high levels of intelligence to 




collaborate with one another effectively in rooting out international terrorist cells” 
(Scott and Jackson 2004, 162).  The value and substantive contributions of this 
collaboration is seen in numerous real-world examples.  In recent years, foreign 
intelligence liaison relationships reportedly have supplied information contributing to 
the killing and capture of al-Qaeda leaders in Pakistan, the disruption of Taliban 
elements in Afghanistan, and the prevention of multiple transatlantic airline terrorist 
attacks (Ramesh and Glendinning 2006; Markey 2007; Kulish 2007; Dilanian and 
Bennett 2012).   
An examination of this topic may also hold implications for how governments 
such as the United States select and manage their bilateral intelligence alliances 
against a range of transnational threats, to include terrorism, drug trafficking, human 
smuggling and money laundering.  In the years since the 9/11 attacks, scholars and 
government officials have debated the relative merits of engaging in counterterrorism 
cooperation with authoritarian and democratic regimes in the Greater Middle East 
(Windsor 2003; Carothers 2003, 2007; Byman 2006; Hayden 2007; Sheridan and 
Warrick 2011).  In its first National Intelligence Strategy, the US Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) expressed a commitment to “forg[ing] 
relationships with new and incipient democracies” and “establish[ing] new and 
strengthen[ing] existing foreign intelligence relationships” with “like-minded 
nations” (ODNI 2005, 8; 15).  Skeptics have countered that battle-tested authoritarian 
partners should not be abandoned in favor of unproven, fragile democratic regimes 
(e.g., post-Saddam Iraq) and their nascent intelligence services (Byman 2006, 805-




dissertation may shed light on the potential risks and advantages of favoring one 
regime type over the other in matters of international intelligence cooperation. 
Terms of Reference 
Since intelligence is a topic not often studied in the International Relations 
(IR) literature, it will be useful to define several key concepts that appear throughout 
this study. 
Intelligence 
A consensus definition of ‘intelligence’ has long eluded academics.  
Historians, practitioners and political scientists have tended to supply their own 
definitions, rather than building upon each other’s contributions (Warner 2002).   A 
central dilemma in these discussions has been whether to conceive of intelligence as 
an activity, information, process, product, or some combination thereof (Lowenthal 
2005, 1-2; Treverton, Jones et al 2005, 7-10; Scott and Jackson 2004, 141).  Warner 
has helped to bridge these disputes by conducting a broad study of existing 
definitions of intelligence and identifying a core set of attributes.  He ultimately 
concludes that intelligence consists of information, processes and activities that: 
• draw to some extent upon secret (classified) material; 
• involve government officials carrying out government business;  
• concern or are directed against foreign (non-regime) entities; 
• result in, contribute to, or entail the production and dissemination of 
information for government or military consumers; and 




Taking all of these factors into account, Warner argues that an accurate 
definition of intelligence must contain four essential elements:  secrecy, the state, and 
the twin functions of understanding and influencing the Other.  His definition of 
intelligence – “secret, state activity to understand or influence foreign entities” – 
proffers a sensible compromise.  By conceptualizing intelligence as an umbrella term 
encompassing multiple types of activities and purposes, the first-order question of 
‘what is (and what isn’t) intelligence’ is resolved (Warner 2002). 
Bilateral intelligence cooperation 
In his study of democratic control and oversight of EU intelligence activities, 
Thorsten Wetzling conceptualizes inter-governmental intelligence cooperation as any 
of a range of activities undertaken jointly by sovereign state foreign intelligence 
agencies (Wetzling 2005, 11).  He locates these activities along a cooperative 
intensity continuum, illustrated in Figure 1 below: 
 
Figure 1. Inter-Governmental Intelligence Cooperation Intensity Scale 
 
Wetzling’s framework provides a useful starting point for conceptualizing 




from Warner’s definition of intelligence—most notably secrecy, governmental 
activity, and an emphasis on external (vice domestic) entities.  It also attempts to 
distinguish in scalar fashion between different degrees of intelligence cooperation, 
which moves closer to addressing some of the intractable questions in the intelligence 
literature highlighted by Lefebvre at the outset of this chapter.   
There are nevertheless several gaps and inconsistencies in Wetzling’s 
framework.  First, it does not meet the standard definition of a continuum:  “a 
coherent whole characterized as a collection, sequence, or progression of values or 
elements varying by minute degrees” (Continuum 2012).  Rather than representing a 
continuous series of values describing a single concept, his continuum incorporates 
two distinct concepts.  Frequency of contact between intelligence services makes an 
appearance on the left pole but is absent on the right, where the degree of structural 
commitment binding these services together is the salient attribute. This is 
problematic because a given bilateral intelligence relationship could simultaneously 
exhibit different levels of intensity along the same continuum.  For instance, it is 
conceivable that a formally institutionalized intelligence relationship (‘Advanced’) 
could generate only sporadic instances of information exchange (‘Little’).   
Wetzling’s framework also does not address the possibility that some types of 
information are more (or less) valuable than others.  States weigh carefully the degree 
of access that they are willing to afford others to their own intelligence.  Some 
partners may be granted access to highly sensitive and specific information that was 
difficult to acquire, whereas others may receive only summarized information from 




intelligence ‘granularity’ must also factor into any examination of the depth of 
intelligence cooperation between two countries (Clough 2004).4   
Finally, Wetzling’s framework does not account for the possibility of one state 
assuming direct control over another’s intelligence apparatus. More specifically, the 
framework is anchored on one end in the idea of foreign intelligence services 
engaging in ad hoc intelligence sharing and on the other end in surrendering their 
sovereignty to a supranational intelligence apparatus.  There appears to be no place in 
this continuum for a hierarchical relationship in which a dominant state dictates and 
enforces the rules of intelligence exchange and a subordinate state complies in 
exchange for various types of remuneration. 
In an effort to build upon the foundation of Wetzling’s framework while at the 
same time addressing its aforementioned problems, I have chosen to frame the depth 
of bilateral intelligence cooperation – my dependent variable – as a function of three 
distinct sub-components illustrated in Figure 2:  frequency of intelligence exchange, 
granularity of information exchanged and the degree of bindingness observed in the 
relationship. The two theories examined in this dissertation speak to different sub-
components of the dependent variable.  The dyadic democratic peace argument 
addresses the first two, while the relational contracting perspective addresses the 
third. 
                                                 
4 In Chapter Four I operationalize granularity as a function of the specificity, sensitivity and 





Figure 2. Depth of Bilateral Intelligence Cooperation (Subcomponents) 
Democracy and autocracy 
One of the arguments to be examined in this study is the proposition that 
democratic intelligence services are generally more cooperative and conciliatory 
toward one another than they are toward autocratic intelligence services.  If such an 
argument is to be taken seriously, we must be clear on what is meant and implied by 
the root concepts of ‘democracy’ and ‘autocracy.’  While both terms appear 
frequently in the Intelligence Studies literature, they are seldom explicitly defined.  
This may owe to the fact that so many of the well-known cases involve ‘ideal type’ 
intelligence services, such as those of the United Kingdom, the United States and the 
Soviet Union.   When working with such examples, there is a temptation to employ 
the ‘Potter Stewart standard’ in lieu of offering concrete definitions. Simply put, we 
will know a democratic or an autocratic intelligence service when we see one.5 
                                                 
5 Christopher Andrew has drawn highly useful distinctions between democratic and 




The limitations of this approach become apparent when one considers the 
broader universe of political regimes that conceivably could become involved in 
bilateral intelligence relationships.   Middle Eastern monarchies such as Bahrain and 
the UAE, for instance, have begun to implement modest procedural reforms that 
might be characterized as democratic (e.g., holding parliamentary elections and 
extending the suffrage to women).  At the same time, the ruling dynasties in both 
countries continue to govern in ways that are widely considered autocratic.  Both 
monarchies have preserved the hereditary lines of succession and continue to wield 
largely unchecked executive powers.  Such hybrid regimes do not fit neatly within 
simple classification schemes.  It is therefore necessary to define precisely what is 
meant by the terms ‘democracy’ and ‘autocracy.’ 
There is no shortage of definitions of democracy in the American political 
science literature.  In an influential article on this topic, Collier and Levitsky (1997) 
characterize the range of definitions as follows: 
• Classical definitions distinguish in taxonomic fashion among the various 
subtypes of full-fledged democracies, to include parliamentary, multi-party 
and presidential systems. 
 
• Procedural definitions define democracy in terms of its day-to-day functions.  
Perhaps the most well-known procedural definition of democracy is 
Schumpeter’s.6 
 
• Minimal definitions outline the core set of properties that are common to all 
viable democracies.  Such definitions strive for maximal conceptual validity—
i.e., capturing the full range of requisite properties that constitute a democracy 
in its most minimal sense. 
 
                                                 
6 Schumpeter’s definition focuses specifically on the method by which leaders are selected 
and evicted from office:  “the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at 
political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle 




• Sub-minimal definitions convey the extent to which a particular regime falls 
short of being a full-fledged democracy.7   
 
There are likewise numerous definitions of ‘authoritarianism,’ a term that 
seems initially to have been conceived as an intermediate form of government 
(located somewhere between the poles of democracy and totalitarianism) exhibiting 
circumscribed patterns of political competition, no guiding ideology, an absence of 
popular mobilization, and a dominant ruler or ruling clique whose powers are ill-
defined but whose behaviors are relatively predictable (Linz 1964, as cited in Collier, 
ed. 1980, 399).  In an attempt to account for the diversity of authoritarian regimes, 
scholars differentiated among military-bureaucratic, organic statist, post-colonial, and 
neopatrimonial subtypes, among others. 
By the late 20th century, authoritarian regimes had ceased to resemble ideal-
typical autocracies.  Some, such as Poland under General Wojciech Jaruzelski and 
Peru under Alberto Fujimori, attempted to maintain their wide-ranging executive 
powers by making modest political compromises that the leadership deemed 
necessary for its own survival.  Perhaps in a nod to emerging post-Cold War norms of 
appropriateness, these and other ‘competitive authoritarian’ regimes demonstrated a 
limited tolerance for political opposition elements but did not hesitate to use “bribery, 
co-optation, and various forms of ‘legal’ persecution” in an attempt to keep them in 
check (Levitsky and Way 2002, 59).  Thus, despite the fact that domestic opposition 
                                                 
7 Collier and Levitsky refer to these as “diminished subtypes” of democracy.  Examples 
include illiberal democracy, in which leaders are democratically elected but flout constitutional limits 
on their power and deny basic rights and freedoms to their citizens, and neopatrimonial democracy, in 
which a single individual wields disproportionate authority over weak democratic institutions (Zakaria 




elements had been granted limited opportunities for contestation, the strongmen 
continued to wield executive authority largely as they had before.   
These late-20th century examples raise an additional question:  how does one 
distinguish between democracies and autocracies when so many regimes appear to 
exhibit properties of both?  On the one hand, calling these regimes transitional 
democracies betrays a teleological bias towards democratization.  Such a bias is 
unwarranted, as there are no guarantees that an authoritarian regime that implements 
a modest package of liberal reforms (e.g., a temporary relaxation of press restrictions) 
will gravitate toward full-fledged democracy (Carothers 2002, 7).  On the other hand, 
calling these regimes competitive autocracies implies a degree of institutional 
stability and permanence that isn’t necessarily borne out empirically (Levitsky and 
Way 2002).8   
A more useful way to differentiate between the concepts of democracy and 
autocracy is to view them as attributes that may appear simultaneously—and to 
varying degrees—within the same regime.  The Polity Project has employed such an 
approach in its coding of political regime characteristics from 1800 through 2010.  
Each regime is assigned separate annual ‘democracy’ and ‘autocracy’ scores, both on 
10-point scales.  Full-fledged democracies (i.e., those scoring a 10) are defined as any 
political system that:  allows its citizens to express their preferences about policies 
and leaders through established institutions and procedures; curbs the exercise of 
                                                 
8 Some authoritarian leaders have undertaken “controlled openings of political space,” only to 
find themselves ousted by democratic momentum generated by these openings.  Such outcomes are not 
uncommon for competitive authoritarian regimes.  Przeworski (1991), for instance, argues that initial 
compromises made by authoritarian leaders will give rise to popular demands for more substantive and 
wide-ranging reforms.  It is at this point that “moderates” within the government prove unwilling to 
resort to the old methods of repression to curb dissent. Once these fissures emerge within the 




executive power through institutionalized constraints; and guarantees civil liberties to 
all of its citizens.  Full-fledged autocracies, by contrast, limit the extent of 
competitive political participation, select their chief executives through a “regularized 
process of selection within the political elite,” and exercise their power with few 
institutional constraints.  A composite ‘polity’ score is then derived by subtracting the 
autocracy value from the democracy value (Marshall, Jaggers et al 2011, 14-17).   
While the Polity IV dataset is not without its detractors,9 its consistent and 
theoretically informed coding procedures provide a basis for teasing out the distinctly 
democratic and autocratic features of hybrid regimes.  This in turn enables 
researchers to place polities in their appropriate ordinal position “along the supposed 
continuum from tightly closed autocracies to highly open democracies” (Marshall, 
Gurr et al 2002, 45). 
Transaction costs 
A second argument to be explored in this dissertation is the proposition that a 
pair of highly heterogeneous intelligence services (i.e., serving different political 
systems and employing different official languages) is more likely than a pair of 
homogenous intelligence services (i.e., similar political systems and common official 
language) to engage in highly institutionalized forms of intelligence cooperation.   
This argument is rooted in the ‘relational contracting’ branch of economics 
popularized by Coase (1937) and Williamson (1966, 1979).  Relational contracting 
arguments initially sought to explain a longstanding anomaly of neoclassical 
                                                 




economics:  why some groups of utility-maximizing individuals choose to abandon 
the market (i.e., the price mechanism) and organize themselves into firms.   
A central insight of the relational contracting literature pertains to the role of 
transaction costs in classical market exchange.  Transaction costs consist of gathering 
and interpreting information for purposes of exchange (search costs), writing, 
negotiating and re-negotiating contracts (negotiation costs), and enforcing the terms 
of said contracts (enforcement costs) (North and Thomas 1973).  Coase argues that 
entrepreneurs are inclined to create a firm when the costs of doing business in the 
market exceed what they might be in a hierarchical arrangement.  Firms are most 
likely to form “in cases where a very short term contract would be unsatisfactory” to 
the entrepreneur, whether because she prefers to avoid the future costs of negotiating 
and re-negotiating contracts or because, in the face of future uncertainty, she would 
prefer to ‘lock in’ to a relationship with a known entity (Coase 1937, 392).    
Building upon these insights, Williamson argues that buyers and sellers are 
further compelled to organize themselves into firms when they are unable to 
withdraw their respective economic investments (e.g., specialized land, labor and 
physical capital) from the current relationship and redirect them to other activities 
(Williamson 1979, 240).  More recently, scholars have acknowledged that such asset-
specific investments are not limited to traditional factors of production.   In the 
financial sector, for example, investments in social capital (e.g., firms seeking 
financing from middle-market banks) have proven equally sticky (Uzzi 1999, 501; 




 IR scholars have likewise drawn from the insights of relational contracting 
theory to explain a wide range of phenomena, to include international cooperation, 
regime formation and the dynamics of state security relationships (Keohane 1982; 
Lake 1996; Weber 1997, 2001).  More recently, Walsh (2007, 2010) has adapted the 
relational contracting perspective to his study of intelligence sharing among states.   
Such an extension is sensible if one assumes that there is a global intelligence 
marketplace in which sovereign national intelligence services enter and exit ad hoc.  
It is not difficult to envision a scenario in which two of these services—perhaps 
facing a common intelligence problem or threat—are compelled to abandon the 
market in favor of a more institutionalized and continuous form of intelligence 
cooperation with one another.  To extend the analogy further, the transaction costs of 
intelligence exchange can be viewed as the price of conducting ‘arms-length’ ad hoc 
intelligence exchange in the global marketplace.  When two intelligence agencies face 
particularly high levels of uncertainty, asset specificity, and heterogeneity in their 
joint efforts against a common intelligence target, they may be inclined to abandon 
strictly ad hoc modes of intelligence exchange in favor of a more institutionalized 
arrangement.  Consistent with this logic, the degree of institutionalization in a 
bilateral intelligence sharing arrangement (what Weber describes as the ‘bindingness’ 
of a security relationship) could be expected to vary in accordance with the expected 
level of transaction costs borne by the participants.  I expand upon this argument and 





Anticipated challenges and obstacles 
Two challenges loomed large from the outset of this study:  the limited 
availability and suspect reliability of primary source data, and the age of the selected 
cases.  Despite the U.S. Government’s decision to declassify automatically all non-
exempted documents over 24 years of age, the fruits of that policy have proven slow 
to arrive—too slow, as it turns out, for my research objectives.10  I consequently 
chose to draw upon historical cases for which ample and reliable primary source data 
are available:  declassified US and UK Government documents concerning 
cooperative military intelligence activities directed against the Axis powers from 
1939 through 1945.  I accessed these materials at the US National Archives in 
College Park (also known as “Archives II”) and the UK National Archives (formerly 
known as the Public Records Office, or PRO) in Kew, England.  Both collections 
allowed for a thorough examination of Anglo-American wartime intelligence 
cooperation, as well as a partial examination of Anglo-Soviet cooperation. 
A second challenge concerns the applicability of the World War II-era case 
findings to contemporary bilateral intelligence cooperation.   These cases occur 
amidst a vastly different set of background conditions (namely, conventional war and 
the rise of single-party states) than those of the present period (i.e., asymmetric war 
and the rise of stateless, non-hierarchical networks).  It could be argued that this 
divergence in background conditions naturally limits the applicability and 
                                                 
10 The recent development and creation of a United States International Intelligence Behavior 
(USIIB) dataset offers a potentially promising work-around to the problem of data availability.   
Thanks to its generation of machine-coded instances of international intelligence cooperation 
mentioned in wire news releases from 2000 through the present date, scholars may be able to turn to 
this secondary dataset in the absence of anything similar from primary sources (Aydinli and Tuzuner 




‘generalizability’ of my case findings to the contemporary world.  This would be a 
valid criticism, but I contend that it is overstated on two grounds.  First, this 
dissertation examines the question of whether the presence or absence of certain 
independent variables shapes the depth of expected bilateral intelligence cooperation 
against a common threat.  That question is arguably just as pertinent and relevant 
today as it was in the 1940s.  Second, the nature of the common threat or intelligence 
target—whether it be a fascist state, a transnational terrorist group, or even a global 
pandemic—is arguably of less importance than the fact that the threat exists and that 
two states see fit to share intelligence against it.  So while there are differences 
between the current era and World War II, I submit that there are sufficient structural 
similarities to draw limited and typological inferences from the case findings. 
Outline and structure of study 
A prevailing theme in the Intelligence Studies literature is the notion of 
government officials carefully weighing the costs, benefits and national security 
implications of bilateral intelligence cooperation before committing to the exchange 
of sensitive information with others.  While such calculations are undoubtedly present 
on both sides of a given foreign liaison relationship, it is conceivable that they could 
be trumped by additional explanatory factors that have yet to be fully considered.  It 
is in this respect that I believe insights from IR could make valuable contributions to 
the Intelligence Studies literature.  
I expand upon this theme in Chapter Two, which serves as the literature 
review for this dissertation.  I argue that the past emphasis on micro-level calculations 




Studies literature, which has come to be dominated by historians, practitioners and 
political scientists. With several notable exceptions, International Relations theorists 
have been largely absent from these debates. I contend that this needs to change 
because IR offers a rich conceptual toolkit with ready applications to the study of 
intelligence.   After considering some of the principal obstacles to (and arguments in 
favor of) intelligence theorization, I provide a critical review of the existing literature 
and conclude with the presentation of a crude analytic framework.  I then utilize the 
framework to identify branches of IR theory that can be leveraged to explain bilateral 
foreign intelligence cooperation. 
In Chapter Three I develop candidate arguments from two popular strands of 
IR theory:  the dyadic democratic peace and relational contracting literatures.  The 
dyadic democratic peace perspective, as adapted to the study of bilateral foreign 
intelligence cooperation, posits a relationship between the presence of certain regime 
types within a dyad and the intensity (or degree) of bilateral foreign intelligence 
cooperation.  The relational contracting perspective, by contrast, posits a relationship 
between intra-dyad heterogeneity and the intensity and form of bilateral foreign 
intelligence cooperation.  The chapter concludes with a discussion of my small-n 
research design and case selection criteria, followed by an introduction of the two 
cases that are the focus of the ensuing chapters. 
Chapters Four and Five apply the theoretical perspectives introduced in 
Chapter Three against the Anglo-Soviet and Anglo-American cases studies.  The 
Anglo-Soviet case study focuses on the experience of Britain’s 30 Military Mission to 




(SGS).  The Anglo-American case study focuses on the tenure of the Signals 
Intelligence Liaison Unit (SLU) and its interactions with three Washington, D.C.-area 
American SIGINT agencies:  the Navy’s Op-20-G and the Army’s G-2 Special 
Branch and the Signal Security Agency (SSA) at Arlington Hall. 
Chapter Six provides a brief restatement of my central arguments and key 
findings.  I use the remainder of this concluding chapter to suggest theoretical 
implications of my research, highlight some of the contributions this dissertation has 
made to the scholarly literature on intelligence, and identify future directions for 




Chapter 2: Intelligence Studies Literature Review 
 
IR and the neglected colony of Intelligence Studies 
Merriam-Webster’s dictionary defines a colony as “a body of people living in 
a new territory but retaining ties with the parent state” (Merriam-Webster Online 
2012).  Metaphorically speaking, this seems an accurate description for the growing 
number of topical sub-fields within contemporary International Relations.  Some of 
the better-known IR ‘colonies’ include global environmental politics, globalization 
and international law.  Intelligence Studies does not yet represent an IR colony, 
however.  As Fry and Hochstein observe, the traditional view among IR theorists is 
that Intelligence Studies is “a refinement of diplomatic and military history…[that] is 
not necessarily significant intellectually” (Fry and Hochstein 1994, 18).  If that view 
is to change, more IR scholars will need to convince their peers that intelligence-
related research raises “relevant and interesting questions” for the larger field, 
demonstrate that IR theory contributes to answering these questions, and argue 
convincingly that IR-focused intelligence scholarship will “lead to a theoretical core 
that is sound enough to generate cumulative research and that influences the analysis 
of international relations more broadly” (Zürn 1998, 620).   
I am optimistic that these challenges can be addressed.  An important first step 
will be to identify specific intelligence-related research questions that ‘fit’ with 
concepts and theoretical debates within International Relations and political science 
more generally.  The question of why certain pairs of intelligence agencies engage in 




holding direct parallels with IR debates over the purpose and scope of state 
sovereignty, it also touches upon the nature of alliance formation and the structure 
and form of international regimes and security partnerships.  The next step is to 
extend mainstream IR theories and insights to “aid our understanding of intelligence 
liaison,” while at the same time relating these findings back to the IR theoretical core 
(Svendsen 2009, 708).   I seek to do both in this dissertation. 
Given the multidisciplinary nature of contemporary Intelligence Studies, it is 
outside the scope of this study to provide a comprehensive literature review of the 
entire sub-field.  This chapter seeks instead to do three things.  First, it offers a 
rationale for theorizing about intelligence and identifies some of the principal 
obstacles surrounding the theorization and academic study of intelligence.  This 
discussion serves to highlight the role and significance of theory in Intelligence 
Studies, as well as identify some of the structural, historical and cultural barriers that 
have made intelligence an unattractive topic to so many American political scientists 
over the years.  I find that these barriers are not as daunting as they once were, thanks 
to recent geopolitical developments, a more liberal U.S. declassification policy, an 
evolution in the academy’s perceptions of intelligence, and a rehabilitation of 
qualitative research methodologies among IR scholars.   
This discussion sets the stage for the second objective of the chapter:  a 
critical assessment of the relatively sparse and atheoretical literature on international 
intelligence cooperation, accompanied by a closer look at its limited treatment by 
political scientists.  The chapter concludes with the presentation of a crude analytic 




science theory that have potential applications to the study of international 
intelligence cooperation. 
Obstacles surrounding the theorization and academic study of intelligence 
Why theorize about intelligence? 
One IR scholar defines theory as a “disciplined process of world construction, 
whereby a perspective [is] first elaborated in ideal-typical fashion and then used as 
the baseline from which to rigorously produce an account” (Jackson 2004, 31-32).11  
A skeptic might counter that such abstractions play no useful role in the study of 
intelligence because they cannot possibly capture the manifold complexities and 
nuances of buzzing, blooming ‘intelligence reality.’  Those who view theories as 
being synonymous with covering laws would probably be sympathetic to such an 
argument.  But for those who view theory as a means of providing generalized and 
contingent explanations about particular phenomena (not to mention distilling, 
organizing and making sense of said phenomena), the skeptic’s position fails to 
convince.   
As a CIA analyst observed nearly 40 years ago in an internal Agency 
publication, theory imparts cumulative coherence to real-world experiences and 
insights from the intelligence profession that might otherwise “persist only as an 
undifferentiated mass of data and impressions” (Mitelman 1974).  It does so by 
forcing analysts to distinguish between drivers (independent variables), outcomes 
(dependent variables) and linchpins (operating assumptions) of intelligence-related 
                                                 
11 To this, most neo-positivists would probably add that such “accounts” must then be tested 




phenomena (Gill and Phythian 2004, 3; Davis 1999).  Theory also imposes analytic 
discipline and rigor on a field of study that to date has consisted largely of ad hoc 
historical accounts and ‘story-telling’ (Fry and Hochstein 1994, 15; Gill and Phythian 
2004, 24). 
As noted previously, much of the academic literature on intelligence has been 
atheoretical in orientation.  This is reflected in classical intelligence texts, edited 
volumes on the practice and history of intelligence, and in the pages of the leading 
peer-reviewed intelligence journals.12  Historians tend to treat each intelligence-
related episode as a unique event unto itself, rather than as a single instance of a 
broader class of events.   Current and former intelligence practitioners, for their part, 
seek to distill and articulate practical insights gleaned from their years in the field—
often with a view to highlighting ‘what works’ and what does not. Rounding out the 
field is a small group of political scientists whose scholarship has been characterized 
as “mainly empirical and analytical-descriptive” (Fry and Hochstein 1994, 15).  Much 
of the latter group’s work could be described as a mixture of contemporary history 
and traditional social science, in the sense that it employs a combination of traditional 
case study techniques,13 crude schematics (e.g., ‘the intelligence cycle’14) and 
                                                 
12 ‘Classical’ studies of intelligence include Roberta Wohlstetter’s Pear Harbor:  Warning 
and Decision, Harry Howe Ransom’s The Intelligence Establishment and Christopher Andrew’s For 
the President’s Eyes Only.  Some of the more recent edited volumes on intelligence include: Alvarez 
(1999), Stafford and Jeffreys-Jones (2000), and Johnson (2007).  Intelligence and National Security, 
The International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, and the CIA’s Studies in 
Intelligence arguably constitute the ‘flagship’ journals devoted to the study of intelligence.  Each caters 
to a mixed audience of intelligence scholars and practitioners. 
13 These in-depth case studies have addressed a number of contemporary intelligence topics of 
interest, to include: intelligence oversight (Johnson 1985), reform (Zegart 2007), and politicization 
(Cahn 1998). 
14 The ‘intelligence cycle’ is a conceptual model that is often used to describe the process by 
which intelligence functions in service of the nation state.  In the United States, the intelligence cycle 




theoretical frameworks (e.g., bureaucratic politics) to buttress largely inductive 
arguments about particular aspects of intelligence.    
These publications have been instrumental in illuminating ‘first principles’ of 
intelligence, such as what it is (and what it is not), how it is used, why it is important, 
and what its principal limitations are.  But as Gill and Phythian argue, they have been 
arguably less successful in contributing to our understanding of the intelligence 
gestalt (Gill and Phythian 2004, 25).  Rather than constructing and testing hypotheses, 
these authors have focused primarily on highlighting the activities and organization of 
the US Intelligence Community (USIC), describing how certain intelligence 
processes work, conducting ‘post-mortems’ on notable intelligence failures and 
successes, identifying strengths and weaknesses of the USIC, and proposing 
organizational remedies.15  
Fortunately, intelligence scholars are beginning to acknowledge the 
theoretical void in Intelligence Studies.  They are nevertheless of mixed views on 
what should be done to fill it.  This was evident during a 2005 symposium16 in which 
a group of 40 distinguished intelligence scholars and professionals could not reach 
agreement on the definition of intelligence; the nature, purpose, feasibility, and 
desirability of a theory of intelligence; and appropriate starting points for theory 
                                                                                                                                           
(2) collection; (3) processing and exploitation; (4) analysis and production; and (5) dissemination. 
“The Intelligence Process.”  2008.  <http://www.intelligence.gov/2-business.shtml>.  Viewed on 19 
April 2008. 
15 Examples include the works of Ransom (1970), Wirtz (1992), Johnson (1996), Hulnick 
(1999), Berkowitz and Goodman (2000), Lowenthal (2005), Bruneau and Boraz (2007).  A distinct 
exception is seen in the scholarship of Zegart (1999, 2006 and 2007), who has tackled questions related 
to intelligence organization and reform through the lens of organizational theory. 
16 The RAND symposium, entitled “Toward a Theory of Intelligence,” was sponsored by the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and hosted on 15 June 2005 in Washington, 





development.17  Part of the problem may have owed to the title of the symposium:  
Toward a Theory of Intelligence.  The notion that a single, unifying theory of 
intelligence is both possible and desirable is problematic.  For one thing, the pursuit 
of ‘theories of everything’ has bedeviled scholars in far more mature disciplines (e.g., 
mathematics and physics).  For another, such a pursuit is likely to remain hamstrung 
by the dizzying array of analytic puzzles, research agendas, normative commitments, 
levels of analysis, and entry-level assumptions that drive contemporary intelligence 
scholarship.18  An arguably more practical and attainable approach, suggested by Gill 
and Phythian (2004), is to: 
be realistic and accept that there can be no over-arching universal ‘theory of 
intelligence’ because of complexity and the inevitability of the social 
construction of knowledge.  What we can strive for is greater shared 
understanding of the central questions to be asked about intelligence and what 
items from the conceptual toolkit will be useful and/or appropriate for the 
analysis of the phenomenon at the various social levels at which it operates 
(25). 
 
If intelligence is under-theorized and in need of a more robust ‘conceptual 
toolkit,’ political science would appear to have much to contribute in the way of 
support.  The political science sub-discipline of International Relations, in particular, 
offers numerous explanatory paradigms that could be leveraged against intelligence-
related research questions and phenomena (Svendsen 2009, 727). Recent edited 
                                                 
17 According to the final workshop report, “[t]he participants were divided over whether a 
theory of intelligence could be developed in some form and asserted that at best a theory of 
intelligence is ambiguous” (Treverton et al 2005, 10). 
18 Intelligence scholars at the seminar were divided, for example, on whether the elusive 
theory of intelligence should be normative (describing an ‘ideal type’ of intelligence system or 
community against which imperfect practical examples could be compared) or empirical (explaining 
the variance of certain intelligence-related outcomes, such as decision-making).  There was also 
disagreement on whether to focus analysis at the level of individuals, organizations, states, or the 
international system. 




volumes such as Gill, Marrin and Phythian’s Intelligence Theory (2009) suggest the 
beginnings of heightened interest among IR scholars in theoretical treatments of 
intelligence.  Nevertheless, apart from this work and several other notable 
exceptions,19 the canvas has remained largely blank.  So, wherein lies the problem?  
More to the point, why are so many political scientists and IR scholars reluctant to 
study intelligence? 
Why IR and Intelligence Studies haven’t mixed well (yet) 
Among the academic disciplines that comprise contemporary Intelligence 
Studies, political science would appear to be especially well-equipped to tackle 
deeper theoretical questions.   Indeed, the topic of bilateral intelligence cooperation is 
analogous to cooperative phenomena studied in mainstream IR, such as alliance 
formation and behavior (Walt 1987, Snyder 1990, Christensen and Snyder 1990, Lai 
and Reiter 2000, Gibler and Rider 2004, Owen 2005).  IR also offers a rich catalogue 
of conceptual paradigms and methodological approaches that conceivably could be 
leveraged against this topic, to include neo-realism, neoliberal institutionalism, 
constructivism, game theoretical treatments and rational choice perspectives.   These 
parallels notwithstanding, American IR scholars have exhibited a longstanding 
aversion to the study of intelligence.  It is difficult to pinpoint precisely why this is so, 
                                                 
19 In her path-breaking study of the Pearl Harbor attack, Wohlstetter (1962) drew upon 
principles of communications theory to explain why, despite advance warning of a Japanese attack, the 
US was caught by surprise.  Jervis (1968, 1976) and Tetlock and Maguire (1985) have leveraged 
various strands of cognitive theory to explain why decision-makers sometimes process information 
(including intelligence) in a way that avoids value trade-offs and coheres with pre-existing images and 
belief structures.  And more recently, Sims (2006) and Walsh (2007) have employed neo-realist and 
transactional cost economics arguments to explain the conditions that shape and underpin foreign 





but four inter-related factors warrant our consideration:  conflicting value systems, 
historical suspicions, inadequate sources and methodological commitments. 
Conflicting value systems.  IR scholars tend to privilege the traditional tools 
of statecraft (e.g., weapons, trade and foreign assistance) in their study of 
international politics.  They generally pay less attention to ‘non-traditional’ or 
controversial instruments of state power, such as surveillance and covert action 
(Anderson 1998/1999, 404, as cited in Scott and Jackson 2004, 142).20  Loch Johnson 
suggests that this may owe to a visceral aversion among political scientists to 
unsavory subjects:  “…[T]hey often say, ‘Well, I don’t want to study something as 
nasty as intelligence: these agencies are overthrowing governments and stealing 
secrets, and sometimes even trying to kill people. I just don’t think it’s a very good 
topic to study’” (Johnson 2007, 423).  According to this logic, it is the unpleasant 
nature of intelligence—part of what Max Weber once called “the “morally dubious 
means or at least dangerous ones” employed by the state—that renders it unfit for 
scholarly examination (Weber 1946).   
This rationale is puzzling, given the robust political science literature that 
already exists on far more violent and unpleasant phenomena in international politics, 
such as great power wars, military intervention, genocide and state terror.  If it is not 
the inherent ‘nastiness’ of the topic that bothers political scientists, then it must be 
some other set of factors.  Two that readily stand out are the conflicting value systems 
                                                 
20  Between 2002 and 2012, only three articles concerning intelligence appeared in the leading 
peer-reviewed scholarly journals of American International Relations.   This finding is based upon an 
electronic database query conducted on all non-book review articles that: (a) contained the term 
“intelligence” in the title; and (b) were published in any of the following peer-reviewed journals:  
American Political Science Review, International Organization, International Security , or World 





and entrenched suspicions of the intelligence community that date back to the early 
Cold War period.  The potential for a values clash is seen first of all in the contrasting 
missions of the academy and the intelligence community.  At the risk of 
oversimplifying:  whereas the academy privileges the open pursuit and public 
dissemination of knowledge in the service of humankind, intelligence organizations 
— acting on behalf of sovereign state governments — privilege the acquisition and 
protection of information (both through clandestine and open means) while at the 
same time seeking to influence others.  It is arguably this combination of secrecy and 
influence that represents the primary ethical dilemma for political scientists.  How 
does one undertake an objective study of the state and its secret activities without 
becoming complicit in (or being manipulated by) them?  According to one scholar, 
the subtle risks of manipulation — and accordingly, contamination of one’s own 
research — are real and ever-present for anyone who studies intelligence: 
The CIA is not an ordinary government agency; it is an espionage agency and 
the practices of espionage … are diametrically opposed to those of 
scholarship. Scholarship is supposed to favor objective analysis and open 
discussion. The close relationship between intelligence agencies and scholars 
thus poses a conflict of interest” (Gibbs 2001).   
 
Historical suspicions.  Concerns about secrecy and manipulation first came to 
a head in the mid-1960s, when Ramparts magazine, The New York Times and The 
Washington Post exposed the CIA’s clandestine funding of U.S. students, academics 
and private organizations dating back to the early 1950s.21  A more comprehensive 
                                                 
21 In fact, the relationship between the U.S. intelligence establishment and the academy 
predates the Cold War.  The Office of Strategic Services (OSS), for example, employed a number of 
university professors to staff the Central European section of its fledgling Research and Analysis 
Branch.  This diverse group of economists, historians, sociologists and German intellectuals supported 
the Allied war effort by assessing day-to-day developments in Nazi Germany and, later, attempting to 




and official accounting of these activities surfaced in the 1976 Church Committee 
Reports,22 which chronicled the CIA’s covert funding of the National Student 
Association from 1952 through 1967 and called attention to its continued operational 
use of American academics in “over 100 American colleges, universities, and related 
research institutions.”23  According to the committee, these scholars were used for a 
range of intelligence purposes, to include making introductions, collecting foreign 
intelligence and “publishing books and other material to be used for propaganda 
purposes abroad” (U.S. Senate 1976, 185-190).   
Against this historical backdrop, it is not difficult to understand why scholars 
might be reluctant to study or associate themselves with intelligence organizations—
particularly when they fear the possibility of becoming accomplices in or apologists 
for the very activities that they purport to examine objectively.  While the U.S. 
Intelligence Community has worked to repair its relationships with American 
universities (e.g., through open awarding of competitive research grants, overt 
participation in employer recruitment events, and increased sponsorship of scholars-
in-residence programs), the perceived risks of academic manipulation and its 
implications for one’s scholastic integrity may continue to deter some from studying 
intelligence. 
                                                 
22 The Church Committee is the informal name for the United States Senate Select Committee 
to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, chaired by the late senator 
Frank Church (D-ID).  The committee was established in 1975 to investigate the legality of 
intelligence activities conducted by the CIA and FBI, among other government agencies. While 
evidence of some of these activities had been exposed earlier in a series of investigative journal 
articles, the Church Committee’s hearings and ultimate findings are generally credited with giving 
impetus to the intelligence oversight reforms of the late 1970s. 
23 The committee defined “operational use” of individuals as the “recruitment, use, or training, 
on either a witting or unwitting basis” for involvement in “covert action, clandestine intelligence 





Insufficient and inadequate data.  Academics may also be reluctant to study 
intelligence because it is a topic for which very little primary source information is 
available.  The fact that so much of what is available is supplied selectively—and 
perhaps self-servingly—by governments may pose an additional deterrent (Jervis 
1986, 143; Aldrich 2002b, 148).24  Faced with such daunting research obstacles, 
many intelligence scholars have turned to alternative sources, to include interviews 
with former officials, retiree memoirs and even their own first-hand experiences.  
Reliance on these sources places the state and its agents (the objects of study for 
many political scientists) in the position of information gatekeeper.  Since the 
provenance and accuracy of this information can seldom be independently 
corroborated, scholars who rely upon it are vulnerable to the charge that they are 
“legitimizing and perpetuating the ideology of the state” (Scott and Jackson 2004, 
152).  Such accusations may have particular resonance among political scientists—
particularly those who recall similar charges leveled by critics of the ‘Bringing the 
State Back In’ movement of the late 1970s and 1980s in Comparative Politics 
(Abrams 1977; Cammack 1989).   
Methodological commitments.  In the absence of robust and independently 
acquired intelligence datasets, much of the early intelligence scholarship took the 
form of intensive small-n case studies.25  This methodological approach, described by 
Harry Eckstein as ‘configurative-ideographic,’26 came under fire during the 1990s 
                                                 
24 Aldrich argues that, by relying on declassified intelligence documents as their primary (and 
in some cases, sole) source of information, intelligence scholars unwittingly limit their research to a 
“pre-selected menu” of the state’s choosing (Aldrich 2002b, 148). 
25 Two well-known examples include Ransom (1970) and Johnson (1985). 
26 Eckstein elaborates:  such case studies contain a “configurative element [that] aim[s] to 




from proponents of more rigorous and scientific methods of inquiry (Keohane, King 
and Verba 1994; Bates 1997; Martin 1999).27   While these methodological criticisms 
were not leveled explicitly at intelligence scholars, it is certainly conceivable that 
they have had an effect on the number of political scientists who study intelligence, as 
well as where the subject of intelligence is taught within the academy.28 
* * * * * * * * * * * 
Recent developments suggest that each of the aforementioned obstacles to the 
study of intelligence is beginning to recede.  In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, 
American universities have expanded their curricula to address topics that previously 
had not received much scholarly attention in their own right, such as transnational 
terrorism, radical Islam and intelligence.29  Vocationally-oriented departments have 
also begun to offer coursework and degree programs that focus specifically on the 
history and conduct of intelligence (May 1995; Goodman 2004).30   Political 
                                                                                                                                           
systems, and so on” and an “idiographic element [that] …either allow[s] facts to speak for themselves 
or bring[s] out their significance by largely intuitive interpretation, claiming validity on the ground that 
intensive study and empathetic feel for cases provide authoritative insights into them” (Eckstein 1992, 
136). 
27 A defining text of this movement is Designing Social Inquiry, whose authors argue that all 
social science research, whether quantitative or qualitative in nature, must by definition exhibit the 
following four characteristics:  a shared goal of inference beyond the immediate data; the use of 
transparent and explicitly codified testing procedures; conclusions couched within a “reasonable 
estimate of uncertainty”; and a set of rules on which a given argument’s validity depends (Keohane, 
King and Verba 1994, 7-9). 
28 At least initially, these criticisms were directed primarily at area studies specialists.  For a 
crystallization of the key arguments on both sides of this debate, see Bates (1997) and Johnson (1997). 
29 This has been fueled to a certain extent by U.S. ‘academic centers of excellence’ (CAE) 
programs such as those sponsored by the National Security Agency and the ODNI.  CAEs typically 
receive funding, resources and post-graduate recruiting opportunities in exchange for their 
development of curricula that promote professional competencies defined by the sponsoring 
organization. 
30 Some of these programs include:  the Institute for Intelligence Studies at Mercyhurst 
College (Erie, PA), the University of Georgia’s School of Public and International Affairs (Athens, 
GA), the University of Maryland’s School of Public Policy (College Park, MD), and Tennessee State 




scientists teach many of these courses.  Meanwhile, the Intelligence Studies Section 
of the International Studies Association (ISA) continues to provide a forum for 
intelligence scholars across multiple disciplines to share and discuss their ideas on the 
practice and theory of intelligence. 
There have also been positive developments on the methodological front.  
Proponents of qualitative methods have argued for the continued use of case studies, 
process-tracing, fuzzy-set logic and the congruence method.   They contend that these 
techniques can be leveraged effectively against policy-relevant small-n research 
questions, provided that researchers adhere to broadly accepted standards of scientific 
inquiry and rigor (George and Bennett 2005; Brady, Collier and Seawright 2004; 
Bennett and Elman 2006).  There are also encouraging signs that political scientists 
are beginning to find creative uses for some of these methods in their treatment of 
intelligence-related topics.31   
There are likewise preliminary indications that data availability—perhaps the 
most intractable obstacle—may be beginning to recede as well.  This is seen in the 
development and creation of the aforementioned USIIB dataset, which could serve as 
a powerful tool for quantifying international intelligence cooperation, as manifested 
in secondary source data (Aydinli and Tuzuner 2011).  It is also seen in the recent 
efforts of the US Government to liberalize its once-dilatory declassification regime.  
All non-exempted secret documents older than 24 years of age are now automatically 
                                                 
31 See, for example, two papers presented at the ISA’s 49th annual convention: "Reforming 
U.S. Intelligence: When and How Should Intelligence Be Centralized?" (Durbin 2008); and  





declassified.32  It remains to be seen what impacts these exemptions will have on the 
pace, quantity and topical diversity of released materials.  At the very least, however, 
the new policy appears to bode well for future historical and political research on 
American intelligence matters (Shane 2006a). 
Assessing the sub-literature on international intelligence cooperation 
There is a small but distinct ‘sub-literature’ within Intelligence Studies 
devoted specifically to the subject of foreign intelligence liaison.33  This sub-literature 
consists primarily of historical studies from the Second World War and the early Cold 
War period, ‘lessons learned’ from current and retired intelligence professionals, and 
what might best be described as ‘stock-taking’ publications that highlight the risks, 
benefits, challenges and strategic significance of foreign intelligence cooperation in 
the contemporary era.  Only recently have IR theorists begun to address the topic of 
foreign intelligence liaison.  
Historical contributions 
The historical literature on international intelligence cooperation defies easy 
characterization.  The sheer diversity of perspectives and sources has contributed to 
an uneven landscape of accounts (Charles 2000, 259).  A common focus of many of 
these publications concerns Anglophone intelligence links during World War II and 
the early Cold War.  The disproportionate academic coverage of these relationships 
                                                 
32 This occurred in spite of the Clinton and Bush Administrations’ reported reclassification of 
thousands of historical intelligence community documents at the U.S. National Archives from 1999 
through at least 2006 (Shane 2006a). 
33 ‘Foreign intelligence liaison’ is a term often used by intelligence practitioners. It refers to 




most likely owes to their historical uniqueness, as well as to the increasing 
availability of information about them—whether in the form of oral histories, first-
person narratives, archival information or declassified in-house studies.   The gradual 
declassification and release of these sensitive materials is perhaps attributable to the 
democratic political systems of the Anglophone governments, each of which has 
sought to balance the needs of national security with those of open government. 
Some of the initial historical accounts of World War II-era Anglophone 
intelligence sharing, such as The Ultra Secret (Winterbotham 1974) and A Man 
Called Intrepid (Stevenson 1976), were written primarily from a first-person 
participant perspective.  An oft-cited weakness of these publications was their 
tendency to dramatize, if not embellish or misrepresent, the contributions and 
achievements of the protagonists (Charles 2000, 260).  More detached and 
authoritative accounts, such as Bradley Smith’s The Ultra-Magic Deals and the Most 
Secret Special Relationship, 1940-1946 and edited volumes such as David Alvarez’s 
Allied and Axis Signals Intelligence in World War II, did not appear until the 1990s.  
That decade marked an unprecedented, albeit limited, opening of government 
archives.  This archival glasnost was driven largely by London’s Open Government 
Initiative of 1993 and a Clinton Administration Executive Order (EO 12958) issued 
two years later.34  These initiatives resulted in the declassification and release of 
                                                 
34 The UK’s Open Government project was launched in 1993.  Also known as the Waldegrave 
Initiative (so named for its chief sponsor, Civil Service minister William Waldegrave), it called upon 
the British Government to adhere to three themes in its control of official information:   “handling 
information in a way which promotes informed policy-making and debate; providing timely and 
accessible information to the citizen to explain the Government's policies, actions and decisions; and 
restricting access to information only where there are good reasons for doing so” (Norton-Taylor 1993, 
2).  The Waldegrave Initiative has led, among other things, to the annual declassification and release of 
national security and intelligence-related documents through the auspices of the National Archives in 




archival materials in both countries from the pre-1945 period, thereby affording 
historians new windows into some of the key Allied decisions taken during the 
Second World War (Aldrich 2002b, 135).   
While new materials from this period continue to be released, there are limits 
to both countries’ archival largesse—particularly when sensitive matters of foreign 
intelligence liaison are concerned.  Neither the UK nor the US Government seems 
particularly keen to divulge details of whatever foreign intelligence-sharing 
relationships may or may not have persisted after V-J day.  In this regard, Smith’s 
observation from over 15 years ago remains apropos:  “In nearly every archive one 
chooses to explore, a very restrictive policy immediately shows itself as soon as one 
seeks to look at events that occurred in September 1945 or the following months and 
years” (Smith 1993, xi).35 
Practitioner contributions 
In the pages of professional journals such as Intelligence and National 
Security and the CIA’s Studies in Intelligence, current and retired intelligence 
professionals have reflected on their own experiences in the realm of foreign 
intelligence liaison.  This practitioner literature provides rich insights into the 
everyday mechanics of foreign intelligence liaison, as well as its perceived benefits, 
challenges and risks.  A brief review of these insights will help to inform our 
                                                                                                                                           
exempted national security information dated more than 25 years old.  It is probably no coincidence 
that both initiatives emerged in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War.  In fact, the Clinton 
Administration specifically highlighted the “dramatic changes” of this period (e.g., the disintegration 
of the Soviet Union and the reunification of Germany) as catalysts for EO 12958. 
35 As recently as 2002, Aldrich echoed these sentiments in his lament of the “constabulary” 





understanding of international intelligence cooperation more broadly, as well as 
highlight basic principles that constitute the ‘conventional wisdom’ surrounding it.  
For purposes of simplicity, I find it useful to divide the practitioners’ insights into two 
over-arching thematic categories:  incentives to cooperate and additional 
considerations. 
Incentives to cooperate.   From an intelligence practitioner’s perspective, the 
decision to engage in intelligence cooperation with a foreign partner may be 
motivated by a variety of considerations.  Perhaps the most obvious of these is selfish 
operational need.  As Sims observes, states sometimes struggle to realign their 
collection systems to target rapidly emerging threats in ‘denied’ areas.36  Leveraging 
a trusted partner’s intelligence assets in the short term (usually in exchange for some 
other intelligence good) can increase the recipient’s access to these areas, thereby 
increasing the timeliness of information flow to key decision-makers and avoiding the 
short-term risks and costs associated with a unilateral ‘ramp-up’ of intelligence 
collection (Sims 2006, 206).   
There are also cost-efficiency incentives for undertaking longer-term bilateral 
intelligence cooperation.  As several practitioners have noted, few states are in a 
position to collect, process, and analyze efficiently all of the intelligence that they 
require.  For this reason, a state might choose to cooperate with trusted partners that 
have access to geographic “areas… where its own reach is limited” (Lander 2004, 
490).  In the long run, such geographic divisions of effort can promote intelligence 
economies of scale, thereby reducing operational costs for each participant and 
                                                 
36 A denied area refers to any geographic region or locale against which a particular agency is 




augmenting the overall intelligence effort against commonly perceived threats, such 
as narcotics trafficking, human smuggling and terrorism (Lefebvre 2003, 534; 
Richelson 1990, 311; Boatner 2000, 88).   
A foreign intelligence service may also pursue bilateral cooperation as a 
means of extracting rents.  For instance, a service with highly sought-after geographic 
access may be more inclined to cooperate in intelligence matters if its prospective 
partner is a well-funded, technologically advanced intelligence service that offers the 
promise of exposure to specialized skills and cutting-edge technologies that would 
otherwise prove difficult to acquire.  Rents may also take the form of non-intelligence 
goods, to include any number of economic, political and military benefits (Sims 2006, 
197).  As noted below, these types of ‘asymmetric’ intelligence exchanges can 
present troublesome implications for the recipient—particularly when the provider is 
an authoritarian regime. 
States also have come to view intelligence cooperation as an alternate inter-
state communication channel, as distinct from the traditional mechanisms of 
government-to-government and military-to-military exchange (Lander 2004, 482).  
An example of this ‘intelligence diplomacy’ was seen during the implementation 
phase of the 1998 Wye River Peace accords, when the CIA was called upon to 
monitor the Palestinians’ domestic terror crackdown and facilitate a trilateral 
intelligence dialogue with the Palestinian and Israeli security services (Tenet 1998, 
A23).  It was hoped at the time that the professionalism of the intelligence services 
and their mutual respect for one another would enable them to tackle politically 




Another variant of intelligence diplomacy is seen in the Trojan Horse analogy.  
In this scenario, one government leans upon its intelligence services to forge 
cooperative ties with its counterparts in another country.  While the relationship is 
initially presented as a means of working together on mutual problems of interest, the 
initiator has a more strategic objective in mind:  laying the groundwork for an 
‘entangling alliance’ that binds the two governments together against a common 
threat or adversary.  Christopher Andrew has suggested that the UK harbored such a 
motive during its cultivation of intelligence ties with the United States during the late 
1930s and early 1940s.  Eager to draw the ostensibly neutral United States into the 
war effort against Hitler, London saw an enabler in the person of William J. 
Donovan, a close FDR associate with strong pro-British sympathies.  Andrew has 
gone so far as to argue that “the primary British intelligence objective in the United 
States during the spring and summer of 1941 was to create an Anglo-American 
intelligence alliance with Donovan as U.S. intelligence coordinator” (Andrew 1995, 
98). 
Additional risks and considerations.  Practitioners are careful to note that, for 
each potential benefit conferred by foreign intelligence liaison, there is always an 
accompanying risk.  The most commonly cited risk involves the disclosure of 
sensitive information to unauthorized third parties.  There is a common perception 
among intelligence practitioners (or at least, among those who have written publicly 
on the subject) that the risk of unauthorized disclosure is compounded within 
multilateral arrangements, where the sharing procedures become more complex and 




Clough 2004, 602). When sensitive information is leaked outside authorized 
channels, the damages can range from international embarrassment to circular 
intelligence reporting37 to the compromise of sources and methods used to gather 
intelligence (Richelson 1990, 318). 
An additional consideration relates to the issue of ‘granularity,’ or what 
Clough defines as “the degree of [one party’s] access to [another’s] package of 
intelligence” (Clough 2004, 603).  States are understandably discriminating in their 
selection of what types of intelligence they share with others.  The degree of access 
therefore ranges from the highly general to the highly specific.  While practitioners do 
not dismiss out of hand the potential value of low-granularity intelligence goods (e.g., 
finished intelligence assessments), they are generally keener to acquire high-
granularity goods (e.g., ‘raw’ and single-source reporting) because of the potential for 
increased precision, accuracy and proximity to the objects of collection (Lander 2004, 
492).  Whether a government is willing to share highly granular information is 
thought to be dependent upon the structure and formality of the bilateral intelligence 
relationship.   For the sharing of highly sensitive intelligence, governments seem to 
privilege formalized bilateral arrangements because more effective controls can be 
exercised over the dissemination, handling and protection of information (Clough 
2004, 603). 
A third consideration involves the risk of being deceived and manipulated by 
a foreign partner with a hidden agenda.  In agreeing to share intelligence with another 
intelligence service, one government (the recipient) assumes the risk that its 
                                                 
37 A well-known example of circular intelligence reporting is the Curveball episode, which is 




counterpart (the provider) will deliberately and selectively supply (or even fabricate) 
information with a view to influencing the recipient’s foreign policies.  If one accepts 
Warner’s definition of intelligence (‘secret, state activity to understand or influence 
foreign entities’), it becomes evident that this risk is present in all types of 
intelligence liaison relationships, regardless of the regime types involved.  
Nevertheless, it could be argued that the risk is particularly high (and perhaps highest) 
in relationships involving an intelligence service of an authoritarian regime.  I submit 
that an intelligence recipient’s risk of being ‘snowed’ by an authoritarian provider is 
theoretically greatest when the following three conditions are present in a liaison 
relationship: 
1) The recipient specifies up front its desire for certain types of 
intelligence against a particular target. 
2) The authoritarian regime has its own agenda (independent of and 
separate from the recipient’s) to pursue vis-à-vis said target.  
3) In exchange for its cooperation, the authoritarian regime receives an 
uninterrupted flow of intelligence and non-intelligence rents from the 
recipient.38     
 
This phenomenon, which I call the ‘snowing effect,’ may hold implications 
for bilateral intelligence sharing.  As illustrated in Figure 3, transactional intelligence 
sharing arrangements involving authoritarian regimes have the potential to degenerate 
into a vicious cycle.  This is seen in the flow of non-intelligence rents — in particular, 
goods such as military and economic assistance that are supplied outside of 
intelligence channels — that contribute directly to the survival of the authoritarian 
regime and the ruling clique.  I argue that this flow of goods can create a powerful 
                                                 
38 All three conditions are conceivably present in the USIC’s current intelligence relationships 
with authoritarian regimes of the Greater Middle East. The second condition is particularly relevant in 
the context of the current counter-terrorism campaign, given that some of Washington’s counter-
terrorist allies (e.g., Ethiopia and Uzbekistan) have a record of conflating domestic political opposition 




and additional set of pressures (not present in relationships with democratic 
intelligence services, whose masters’ survival is dependent upon the outcomes of 
elections) that ultimately increases the likelihood of biased intelligence being 
supplied to the recipient. 
 
Figure 3. The Snowing Effect 
 
Such patterns of behavior are inherently difficult to detect in any transactional 
intelligence-sharing relationship.  This is because intelligence supplied through 
foreign liaison channels is often stripped of its sourcing information—thus leaving 
the recipient unable to assess the provenance, reliability and completeness of the 
intelligence, not to mention the conditions under which it was extracted (Tenet 2004, 
21; Scheuer 2007).  This puts the recipient in a precarious position:  it must pay its 
supplier for potentially biased intelligence that may ultimately corrupt the judgments 




policy decisions.  To be clear, I am not suggesting that these risks are necessarily 
unique to transactional relationships involving authoritarian intelligence services.  
The consequences of biased (and indeed, false) intelligence and their associated 
impacts on foreign policy decision-making have also been observed within 
democratic intelligence sharing relationships, as the ‘Curveball’ example illustrates.39 
I am merely suggesting that, to the extent that authoritarian regimes receive a steady 
flow of rents outside of intelligence channels in exchange for providing certain 
information, they will be more inclined (relative to democracies) to distort that 
information in a manner that sustains the cycle. 
Political science contributions 
It has already been noted that American political science has largely neglected 
the study of intelligence, whether out of scholars’ concerns for their own professional 
reputation, personal misgivings about the ethical implications of studying such a 
controversial topic, or the absence of sufficient and reliable sourcing.  There are even 
                                                 
39 Over the course of several years in the early 2000s, Germany’s intelligence service supplied 
their American counterparts with information concerning Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) program.  Some of the more incriminating information reportedly came from a since-
discredited German informant and Iraqi exile named Rafid Ahmed Alwan, who claimed to have 
worked during the 1990s for a team responsible for building mobile laboratories to manufacture 
biological weapons.   Information attributed to Rafid, who was known to the U.S. Intelligence 
Community as ‘Curveball,’ was subsequently cited by the U.S. Government as evidence of Saddam 
Hussein’s continued pursuit of a WMD capability (CBSNews 2009).  That allegation became a 
primary justification for the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.  In its 2004 report, the Iraq Survey Group 
formally discredited Curveball’s allegations.  The manner in which Curveball’s allegations were 
passed to and used by the U.S. Government does not appear to have mirrored the ‘snowing effect’ 
described above.  The German intelligence service seems to have been relatively forthcoming with its 
American counterparts in expressing concerns about Curveball’s reliability as an intelligence source.  
Likewise, there is no evidence to suggest that Germany deliberately ‘cherry picked’ information from 
Curveball and provided it selectively to the United States in order to influence US foreign policy 
towards Iraq (Drogin and Goetz 2005).  The Curveball episode is perhaps better explained as a 
consequence of poor counter-intelligence exercised by both the U.S. and German intelligence services.  
I thank an anonymous reviewer from Intelligence and National Security for reminding me of this 




fewer political scientists who have studied the specific topic of bilateral intelligence 
cooperation.  Security studies specialists are among those select few.  They have 
addressed the importance, challenges, risks and tradeoffs of foreign intelligence 
relationships in the context of countering transnational terrorism.  More recently, a 
smaller group of IR scholars has begun to apply concepts and principles from 
international relations theory to the study of this topic. 
If the 9/11 attacks elevated terrorism to the top of the security studies research 
agenda, international intelligence cooperation has not been far behind.  Several 
security studies scholars, pointing to the global reach of transnational terrorist 
networks and the increased amounts of intelligence required to identify and track 
them, have argued that the demand for foreign intelligence cooperation has never 
been greater (Aldrich 2002a; Reveron 2006, 455).  Byman goes a step further, 
suggesting that a country’s “ability to provide intelligence on al-Qaeda” has become a 
crucial factor in determining the operational value of America’s counter-terrorism 
alliances (Byman 2006, 769-771).  Bensahel makes perhaps the boldest claim, 
asserting that the international ‘intelligence coalition’ (relative to the financial, law 
enforcement, military and reconstruction coalitions) is of paramount importance to 
global counter-terrorism efforts because it is the only coalition that can “provide 
warning of impending attacks, which can enable countries to take preemptive and 
preventive actions against those planning such attacks” (Bensahel 2006, 40).  A 
recurrent theme in these studies is the notion that, with regard to bilateral intelligence 
cooperation, the end generally justifies the means.  In other words, cooperation with 




and Syria) will remain worthwhile and necessary so long as it yields actionable 
intelligence against Al Qaeda.    
A second group of political scientists has begun to leverage competing 
branches of IR theory to explain international intelligence cooperation dynamics.  
Jennifer Sims and James Igoe Walsh are among the leading scholars in this group.  
Sims views the formation of foreign intelligence liaison relationships as one of 
multiple self-help strategies that a state can employ under conditions of anarchy 
(Sims 2006, 196).  She argues that the nature and frequency of information exchanges 
within these relationships will shift in response to the varying structural conditions of 
the international system.  Sims also devises a four-tiered conceptual framework to 
measure the costs and benefits of intelligence sharing under varying international 
conditions.  In so doing, she strikes a balance between meeting the needs of 
practitioners (who are faced with managing, justifying and paying for these 
relationships) and contributing to theoretical development within Intelligence Studies.   
There is nevertheless a theoretical tension in Sims’ argument.  She appears to 
move from a neorealist theory of international politics, in which system-level anarchy 
cultivates balancing behavior as a means of satisfying the state’s ‘drive to survive’ 
(Waltz 1979), to a rationalist theory of foreign policy that privileges any number of 
unit-level considerations in a state’s decision to enter, exit, or modify a foreign 
intelligence relationship.  A key question therefore remains unresolved:  is 
international intelligence cooperation properly conceived as a form of balancing 




made by rational, utility-maximizing states pursuing their own parochial interests?  
An orthodox neo-realist position generally cannot have it both ways.40 
 Walsh also focuses on the costs and benefits of intelligence sharing, but in 
contrast to Sims he relaxes the assumption of systemic anarchy.  He leverages 
insights from the relational contracting and transaction cost economics literature to 
argue that, under certain conditions, states will abandon the anarchy of quid pro quo 
intelligence cooperation in favor of a hierarchical arrangement.   Walsh defines a 
hierarchical relationship as one in which a dominant state makes all of the key 
decisions and monitors compliance with agreed-upon rules of sharing.  The 
subordinate state, in return, submits willfully41 to the dominant state and receives a 
range of benefits (to include foreign assistance) in exchange for its compliance. 
Walsh expects that a hierarchical relationship will be formed when a given pair of 
states has strong and compelling incentives to share intelligence but fears the 
consequences of defection.  The degree of hierarchy is expected to vary in accordance 
with the fear of defection.   Walsh explores two case studies from the early Cold War 
to illustrate how varying degrees of hierarchy are employed as a hedge against 
defection (Walsh 2007; Walsh 2010).  
By relaxing the assumption of anarchy and presenting a straightforward 
argument with falsifiable hypotheses and clearly articulated causal mechanisms, 
                                                 
40 Waltz (1979) has argued that any theory that predicts system-level outcomes (e.g., pursuit 
of a foreign liaison relationship) on the basis of unit-level attributes (e.g., utility-maximizing 
calculations of states) is ipso facto ‘reductionist’ (47).  In outlining a theory that focuses on the system-
level, Waltz revivified realism by moving the emphasis from unit-level activity to the effects of the 
international system.  This has been cited as one of neorealism’s chief contributions to IR theory 
(Keohane 1986, 175). 
41 Walsh’s notion of willful hierarchy resembles the ‘client-server’ arrangement described in 




Walsh has supplied political scientists with an invaluable theoretical baseline for the 
future analysis of international intelligence cooperation.  Having said that, his 
argument does not (yet) offer a test of competing paradigms.  If his stated objective is 
to explain hierarchical variations in intelligence sharing, then it stands to reason that 
the competing claims of rival theories should also be considered.  Another problem 
relates to underspecified causal mechanisms, such as the process by which role 
assignments are made (or taken) in a hierarchical relationship.  Walsh’s argument 
implies that this is a function of intelligence capabilities and know-how, but it is not 
apparent how this would flow from a relational contracting perspective.  Lastly, it 
remains unclear whether the type of hierarchy that Walsh is describing—a scenario in 
which two parties vertically integrate their intelligence activities—is a common or 
infrequent case outcome.42 
An analytic framework 
The preceding discussion has revealed a dearth of theoretical explanations for 
bilateral intelligence cooperation.  In an effort to identify candidate theories, I have 
constructed an analytic framework that “organiz[es] the knowledge accumulated to 
date and provid[e]s abstract representations of that knowledge” (Druckman 2005, 31).  
Since the field of Intelligence Studies remains in a pre-paradigmatic phase of 
theoretical development, this framework will be necessarily crude and incomplete.  
This will be an acceptable weakness, however, if the framework succeeds in 
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that bilateral cooperation occurs largely under conditions of anarchy, where neither party exerts direct 






identifying variables and relationships (and in turn, established IR theories) that can 
be leveraged to explain variance in the depth of bilateral intelligence cooperation. 
 In developing an analytic framework, I emphasize factors related specifically 
to the dependent variable (bilateral intelligence cooperation) and possible 
independent variables—that is to say, factors that might conceivably shape the depth 
of bilateral intelligence cooperation.  This information is captured in the conceptual 
matrix displayed in Appendix I, which contains a sampling of well-known cases of 
bilateral intelligence cooperation from World War II through the present date.  I do 
not claim that these cases are necessarily representative of the broader universe of 
bilateral intelligence sharing arrangements.  They do, however, cover an extended 
time period and encompass diverse geographic regions, to include North America, 
Western Europe, the former Soviet Union, and the Middle East.  It is hoped that a 
superficial comparison of these cases will shed light on possible causal relationships 
that merit further exploration.    
In the ‘background characteristics’ component of the table, I characterize each 
case in terms of the countries involved and when cooperation occurred.  In the 
‘possible drivers’ component of the table, I seek to identify plausible causal variables 
(each anchored in an established branch of IR theory) that might account for the 
outcomes in each case.   Several case features that immediately stand out are regime 
composition, heterogeneity (a type of transaction cost) and structure of the 
international system.  Each of these attributes corresponds to distinct and competing 
IR paradigms.  Regime type is generally associated with the democratic peace 




structure of the international system is a key explanatory variable for neorealism.   
Turning to the dependent variable, I considered additional factors that might 
prove useful in measuring or understanding this concept.  Sims (2006) identifies at 
least two features of interest:  relationship symmetry, which captures the extent to 
which one party derives greater benefits from the relationship relative to the other, 
and relationship complexity, which refers to the terms of intelligence exchange.  
Clough’s (2004) notion of granularity also warrants inclusion, to the extent that it 
captures the extent of sensitivity (and secrecy) of collaboration in a given intelligence 
sharing arrangement. 
In the next chapter I assess the applicability of two theoretical traditions that 
are suggested by this framework:  dyadic democratic peace theory and relational 
contracting.  From these theories I deduce hypotheses that offer unique and specific 
predictions about bilateral intelligence cooperation under the scope condition of war 




Chapter 3: Theory and Method 
 
 In this chapter I examine the theoretical foundations of two IR paradigms – 
dyadic democratic peace and relational contracting — and illustrate their potential 
applications to the study of bilateral intelligence cooperation under conditions of war.  
I begin by exploring the central arguments of (and counter-arguments against) each 
perspective, as well as the types of phenomena that they have been leveraged to 
explain.  Next, I consider how each perspective could be applied to the study of 
bilateral intelligence cooperation.  I then formulate hypotheses for each perspective 
and devise a methodology for testing them against my selected cases.  The chapter 
concludes with a description of procedures that I will use for measuring both the 
dependent and independent variables. 
The dyadic democratic peace argument 
If one were to identify a single empirical claim that entertains broad support 
among IR theorists, it would probably be that liberal democracies do not go to war 
with one other.43  This so-called ‘dyadic peace’ proposition44 posits that there is 
something intrinsic to liberal democracies that makes them “less likely to fight 
                                                 
43 One scholar famously called this claim “as close as anything we have to an empirical law in 
international relations” (Levy 1989, 88).   
44  A separate ‘monadic’ argument has received weaker and more qualified empirical support 
than its dyadic counterpart (Chernoff 2004, 59; Kinsella 2005, 453).  There are two distinct claims 
within the monadic camp.  The bold claim asserts that democracies are not likely to engage in conflict 
with other countries, regardless of their regime type.  This position was first advanced in the writings 
of Schumpeter (1919), but fell out of favor when it became apparent that democracies are vulnerable to 
involvement in aggressive external behavior, such as war.  A more modest monadic claim is that 
democracies are either slightly less or no more likely than other types of countries to engage in wars.  
This latter claim has gained limited but weak support in statistical tests conducted by, for example, 





interstate wars against each other than pairs of states that are not both democratic” 
(Ray 2003, 211).  The dyadic democratic peace has been corroborated in numerous 
statistical studies over the years (Babst 1964; Babst 1972; Rummell 1983; Maoz and 
Russett 1992; Maoz and Russett 1993; Dixon 1993; Rousseau et al 1996).  
Furthermore, as a strictly empirical phenomenon, the absence of war between liberal 
democracies is widely accepted by even the most outspoken critics of the democratic 
peace research program (Rosato 2003).45   
The fact that democracies do not go to war with one another has compelled 
some IR scholars to consider whether a regime’s democratic character (or lack 
thereof) may hold implications for its behavior in other areas, to include alliance 
formation, trade negotiations, covert intervention, and foreign policy decision-making 
(Doyle 1995; Lai and Reiter 2004; James and Mitchell 1995; Young and Urlacher 
2007).  This dissertation explores whether the dyadic democratic peace argument 
holds implications for the conduct of democracies that are members of bilateral 
intelligence alliances.  Consistent with the writings of Imre Lakatos (1970), such an 
extension could form the basis of a progressive research program—specifically by 
adding new content, “point[ing] the way to new facts and explain[ing] phenomena 
that the theory was not specifically formulated to explain” (Chernoff 2004, 60).   
Before such aspirations can be entertained, however, we must first consider 
some of the competing explanations of the dyadic democratic peace and determine 
whether it makes sense to extend and adapt them to the study of bilateral intelligence 
                                                 
45 Some of the most vocal critics have come from within the realist tradition. Early examples 
include Mearsheimer’s (1990) initial skepticism about the durability and basis of the dyadic peace. 
Subsequently, realist scholars have cited a number of alternate explanations for the absence of war 
between democracies, including geopolitical factors, the relative distribution of capabilities and 




cooperation.   Arguments traditionally have fallen into one of two camps:  
structuralist and normative.  The following discussion provides a high-level overview 
of these arguments and considers their applicability to bilateral intelligence 
cooperation. 
Structuralist arguments 
According to one popular line of argument, the absence of war between 
democracies can be explained by the constraining effects of democratic structures. 
These structures—which consist of a free press, a domestic political opposition, an 
electorate, competing branches of government and a large winning coalition, among 
others—compel democratic decision-makers to proceed with caution as they consider 
whether to initiate war (Fearon 1994, 577-592; Shultz 1999, 829-844; Siegel 1997, as 
cited in Shultz; Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson et al 1999, 791-807).  Most of these 
constituencies must be brought on board in advance if the ensuing war is to be viewed 
as legitimate.  Mobilizing these constituencies can be a difficult and time-consuming 
process (Maoz and Russett 1993, 626).  Also weighing on the minds of democratic 
decision-makers are the perceived odds of military victory. Unlike their authoritarian 
counterparts, democratic decision-makers face the prospect of being removed from 
office in the event of a disastrous outcome (Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson et al 1999, 
802).  In sum, the structuralist view holds that democracies will avoid initiating war 
unless the public deems the cause legitimate, victory appears imminent and the 
government is fully invested in victory. 
The structuralist view posits that democracies exhibit additional caution in 




adversaries that they are at once likely to defeat and strongly committed to defeating. 
This suggests that when democracies go to war, they select relatively weak enemies, 
mobilize more resources and fight harder than other types of regimes. Because 
democracies are relatively transparent in communicating their intentions and the 
extent of their capabilities, any two democracies involved in a dispute are unlikely to 
escalate towards war. Neither can be sufficiently assured of prevailing because each 
understands the other’s commitment to mobilize for victory and fight hard (Ibid., 
802).   Under these circumstances, war becomes a prohibitively expensive option that 
could cost each side its popular support, and thus its leadership’s hold on power. 
Democracies consequently have compelling incentives to negotiate with one other. 
By the time that each side has made military preparations for war, so the reasoning 
goes, the diplomats will have had sufficient time to resolve the conflict peacefully 
(Shultz 1999, 236; Maoz and Russett 1993, 626).  
Authoritarian decision-makers, by contrast, are less inclined to choose their 
opponents carefully, fight hard and invest large portions of state resources in military 
victory. In contrast to democracies, they are more willing to risk war because if the 
battlefield outcomes are not to their liking, they can simply cut their losses without 
fear of electoral penalty. This by no means implies that authoritarian leaders are 
entirely free to do as they please. They too face the risk of being removed from office, 
particularly if they are unable to satisfy the demands of their small circle of private 
backers. One implication of this rationale is that authoritarian leaders, when forced to 
choose between financing an increasingly expensive war and placating their 




Given these attributes of authoritarian and democratic regimes, how does one 
account for the occurrence of war between them? One possible explanation is that 
authoritarian regimes view crises in zero-sum terms. In contrast to democracies, 
which are accustomed to ‘splitting the difference’ on contentious issues, authoritarian 
regimes may perceive any gain by the other side as a threat to their own survival. 
They consequently have an incentive to conceal private information and misrepresent 
their true preferences to their opponents (Shultz 1999, 236).  This absence of 
transparency creates significant complications for democracies, which can never 
know for certain what type of adversary they are dealing with (i.e., friend or foe) 
(Chan 1997, 53).  This in turn can fuel misperception in democracies, whose decision 
makers are inclined to assume the worst about their authoritarian counterparts, regard 
negotiations as futile and mobilize the public for war (though it remains unclear why 
war occurs in some of these instances but not others). 
Many of the structural perspective’s underlying assumptions about democratic 
decision-making structures appear ill-suited to the phenomenon of bilateral 
intelligence cooperation. This is seen first in the fact that foreign intelligence agencies 
are instruments of the permanent national bureaucracies that they support. The 
personnel (intelligence elites) that comprise these agencies are not concerned about 
losing the next election or alienating members of a fickle winning coalition.46  
Intelligence elites also conduct much of their business in secret, which to some extent 
insulates them from the intense public scrutiny facing elected officials and democratic 
                                                 
46 Nevertheless, democratic intelligence agencies can ill afford to alienate their patrons in the 
legislative branch, lest restrictions or holds be placed on funding of their activities. As Mark 
Lowenthal argues, such “control over the budget…is the most fundamental lever of congressional 




decision-makers.47  The degree of insulation from popular opinion is even greater at 
the international level, where bilateral intelligence exchange is said to resemble a 
hidden “world within a world, governed by its own diplomacy and characterized by 
elaborate agreements, understandings and treaties” (Aldrich 2004, 737).  It therefore 
seems unreasonable to expect that the structural properties of democracies would 
shape the bilateral conduct of foreign intelligence organizations to the same degree 
that they influence the foreign policy behavior of democratic decision-makers. 
Normative arguments 
Normative arguments are rooted in the writings of Immanuel Kant (1795), 
who argued that universal human aspirations for peace, limited government and 
freedom of association would provide the impetus for an “ever-widening pacific 
union” of liberal republics.  Kant also cautioned that the march toward perpetual 
peace would be difficult and uneven.  He predicted that liberal republics would feel 
threatened by closed societies whose leaders did not enjoy the popular consent of 
their subjects.  Such suspicions would, in Kant’s view, provide the spark for violent 
conflict between liberal and nonliberal states (usually initiated by the former) prior to 
the onset and consolidation of perpetual peace (Doyle 1986, 1155-1162).48 
                                                 
 47 This is not to downplay, deny or in any way underestimate the importance of press exposés, 
congressional oversight hearings, and Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuits in informing the 
general public about intelligence abuses and poor performance. I am merely suggesting that 
information about intelligence matters is diffused to the public at a lower rate, relative to other, more 
transparent domains of government activity. 
48 On this point, Kant anticipated by over 200 years an argument made by Kenneth Waltz 
against the dyadic peace argument.  Waltz argues that powerful liberal democracies such as the United 
States are often tempted to ‘save’ oppressed peoples living under authoritarian rule.  These ‘wars of 




Drawing from Kant’s insights, a separate group of IR theorists has 
emphasized the role of democratic decision-making norms in managing domestic-
level disputes and regulating political competition. They posit that democratic 
decision-makers adhere to the implicit norms of non-violent compromise, tolerance 
and respect for the “rights and continued existence of their opponents” (Russett 1993, 
35).   These norms are presumed to govern interactions at both the domestic and 
international levels (Maoz and Russett 1993, 625).  This predisposition toward 
tolerance and peaceful compromise can dissolve, however, when democracies interact 
with authoritarian regimes. This is because the former harbor deep suspicions about 
the latter, whose authority is presumed to rest upon violence and oppression (Risse-
Kappen 1995, 37).  
Normative explanations of the dyadic peace generally highlight the role of a 
central causal mechanism:  the capacity of democratic regimes to recognize, identify 
with and trust one another. This democratic regime recognition dynamic has two key 
dimensions. First, liberal democracies benefit from an inherent presumption of amity 
when dealing with one another. Second, authoritarian regimes face an inherent 
presumption of enmity and suspicion when dealing with liberal democracies (Doyle 
1986, 1161).   
Scholars are of mixed views on how this Janus-faced recognition actually 
occurs. Most explanations proceed from the assumption that democratic competition 
at the domestic level is governed by implicit ground rules, or what Schmitter 
describes as “the contingent consent of politicians acting under conditions of bounded 




gentleman’s agreement:  each side agrees to respect transactional outcomes that favor 
the other side, but only on the condition that the ‘winner’ agrees not to exploit its 
temporary advantage over the ‘loser’ in subsequent interactions. Bounded 
uncertainty refers to a “predictable and mutually acceptable range” of behaviors that 
constitute fair play between the actors (Ibid., 185; Dixon 1994, 15-16).   
When disputes arise within democracies, participants reach peaceful 
settlements by adhering to non-coercive norms of conflict resolution. This comes 
naturally to democratic policy elites, who by virtue of their recruitment and 
professional training are inclined to favor conciliation over coercion.49 Democratic 
policy elites know at least two things about each other going into a head-to-head 
confrontation:  neither will resort to violence or coercion and each will be amenable 
to forging "at least some procedural accommodation" with the other. Taken together, 
these ground rules and norms constitute a menu of shared understandings that governs 
intra- and inter-democratic exchange. This creates an atmosphere of mutual trust that 
provides a resolution to the classic security dilemma. In sum, neither party fears that 
the other will cheat—and relative gains by one party will not be perceived as 
threatening to the other’s existence (Ibid.).50 
No such menu of shared understandings is presumed to exist in a ‘mixed 
dyad’, however. This again owes to a perception, commonly harbored by democratic 
                                                 
49 Dixon elaborates:  “…[T]he competitive institutional structures of democratic states usually 
entail a recruitment path limiting such positions to seasoned politicians, career government officials, or 
experienced elites accustomed to operating in the public realm within the normative standards of 
bounded competition” (Dixon 1994, 16). 
50 Offensive realists see it differently. Given an international competition between two great 
power aspirants, both can be expected to “tak[e] active measures to gain advantage over their 
opponent” regardless of its regime type. According to this school of thought, each aspirant will 





policy elites, that authoritarian regimes are “predisposed toward belligerence, since 
their domestic rule is based on oppression and violence” (Risse-Kappen 1995, 37).  
Authoritarian regimes are also thought to favor ‘winner-take-all’ outcomes, which 
“deny the loser the power or opportunity to rise again” (Maoz and Russett 1993, 625).  
These perceptions compel democracies to behave more selfishly and take a harder 
line with authoritarian opponents than they would with fellow democracies, although 
the degree and intensity of confrontation varies from case to case.51  Under these 
conditions, fears of cheating and concerns about relative gains dominate the actors’ 
calculations. The security dilemma thus remains alive and well in mixed dyads. 
The normative perspective offers a seemingly more plausible fit for bilateral 
intelligence cooperation. Its insights about democratic policy elites seem particularly 
well-suited to the decision-making behavior of democratic intelligence elites, who 
tend to resolve their disputes peacefully through bureaucratic competition. The 
normative perspective also holds that implicit ground rules and conflict resolution 
norms govern interactions at both the domestic and international levels.  This insight 
may prove applicable to the behavior of democratic intelligence agencies as well. 
The US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) process, while not illustrative of 
all types of inter-organizational interactions in the United States Intelligence 
Community (USIC), provides a useful example of how implicit ground rules and 
conflict resolution norms govern behavior among participants in a democratic 
intelligence community: 
                                                 
 51 For one possible explanation of this variation, see Müller and Wolff (2004, 32).  The 
authors contend that a given democracy’s bellicosity towards non-democracies can be explained by its 





In the United States, national intelligence officers are responsible for 
preparing estimates. They circulate the terms of reference (TOR) among 
colleagues and other agencies at the outset of an estimate. The TOR may be 
the subject of prolonged discussion and negotiation, as various agencies may 
believe that the basic questions or lines of analysis are not being framed 
properly. ... Once drafted, the estimate is coordinated with other agencies, that 
is, the other agencies read it and give comments, not all of which are accepted, 
because they may be at variance with the drafter's views. Numerous meetings 
are held to resolve disputes, but the meetings may end with two or more views 
on some aspects that cannot be reconciled. The DNI chairs a final meeting, 
which is attended by senior officials from a number of agencies. After the 
DNI signs the estimate, signifying she is satisfied with it, the estimate 
becomes hers (Lowenthal 2005, 133-134). 
 
The NIE process represents an example of distinctly democratic rules and 
norms shaping strategic interaction within the USIC. Implicit ground rules stipulate 
how the NIE is to be drafted and coordinated. These rules fulfill the role of bounded 
uncertainty by establishing an acceptable and predictable range of behaviors by the 
participants. Contingent consent is also on display in the NIE process.  Each agency 
agrees up front to participate, provided that at least two conditions are met:  there will 
be universal adherence among the participants to the aforementioned ground rules, 
and all will be guaranteed the right to participate in future estimates. Substantive 
disputes over final language are addressed through a variety of non-coercive conflict 
resolution mechanisms, to include meetings, footnotes (to accommodate dissenting 
views) and the DNI’s role as final arbiter.52   
                                                 
52 As one anonymous reviewer reminds me, the NIE process has been “criticized for leading 
to group think, log-rolling and the watering down of sharp insight.”  In light of these criticisms, some 
might question my use of this example. Here it is worth drawing a distinction between the perceived 
analytic value of NIEs as a finished intelligence product, on the one hand, and the process by which 
they are drafted, on the other.  My interest lies in the latter.  To reiterate:  I am not saying that the NIE 
process necessarily leads to superior analytic products (and by extension, better decision-making), but 
rather that it provides a useful example of how mutually agreed-upon ground rules and procedures 




Can the normative perspective also shed light on interactions between 
authoritarian and democratic intelligence agencies (i.e., mixed dyads)? To extend the 
analogy properly, it will be helpful to recall the process by which decisions are made 
within an authoritarian regime. Competition is typically zero-sum, disputes are 
resolved through resort to violence and/or coercion, and one individual (the 
authoritarian leader) has disproportionate influence over final decisions (Young and 
Urlacher 2007, 57).  By extension, let us assume that similar norms govern domestic-
level competition within authoritarian intelligence systems.53  Recognizing the 
potential threat posed by these powerful ‘states within the state’—and in the absence 
of norms of bounded uncertainty and contingent consent to regulate their behavior—
the authoritarian leadership has an incentive to play the various security and 
intelligence organs against each another.  As Knight argues, this is more or less what 
happened in the Soviet Union, where the Soviet intelligence and security services 
reportedly engaged in unregulated and often adversarial competition with one another 
(Knight 1988, 85-86).54 
What might these normative properties of authoritarian and democratic 
intelligence services tell us about the nature of their interactions?  One implication 
seems clear:  they are likely to exhibit high levels of mutual distrust.55  Unable to 
                                                 
53 The plausibility of such an assumption is supported by the experience of the former Soviet 
Union, whose secret police and intelligence services were “central to the structure of the one-party 
state and to the systems of repression and social control which [sought] to suppress all challenges to its 
authority” (Andrew 2004b, 177). 
54 To cite one example, GRU Colonel and western intelligence asset Oleg Penkovsky 
reportedly informed his handlers that the GRU and KGB “constantly compete[d] with each other in 
espionage” during the early 1960s and regarded each other as ‘the enemy’ (Ermarth 1965). 
55 Of course, some level of mutual distrust is arguably present in all bilateral intelligence 
transactions, regardless of the regime types involved. My contention is merely that there is a 




assess confidently the motives of the other side—and in the absence of a menu of 
shared understandings—each can be expected to gravitate toward strategies that 
ensure absolute and immediate gains for both sides or no gains for either.  
This loss-averse and transactional approach to intelligence cooperation, 
widely known among intelligence practitioners as ‘quid pro quo’, is predicated on the 
assumption that one side will not share anything of value unless it is assured of 
receiving something of greater or equal value in return (Clough 2004, 601; Lefebvre 
2003, 537).  These concerns become more salient in an atmosphere of mutual 
distrust—particularly when one considers the sensitive nature of intelligence goods, 
the significant costs of acquiring and protecting them, and the potential risks to 
national security if they get into the wrong hands (Reveron 2006, 467-468).  In such 
an atmosphere, it seems likely that neither party will be inclined to share intelligence 
(or cooperate in intelligence matters) ‘on credit.’ 
Figure 4 suggests several potential implications of the normative perspective 
for bilateral intelligence cooperation. It illustrates a hypothetical one-off scenario 
involving two foreign intelligence organizations from different countries (A and B) 
that share a common adversary. A asks B to share an unspecified intelligence good 
concerning this adversary.56  Given this set of circumstances, what cooperative 
strategies are available to B? Drawing upon insights from the normative dyadic peace 
argument, I suggest that the answer may well depend on what type of intelligence 
dyad is involved. 
                                                                                                                                           
democratic and authoritarian services, on the other. 
 56 In making this request, A assumes—or has reason to believe—that B possesses the 






Figure 4. Bilateral Intelligence Cooperation Heuristic 
 
Mixed intelligence dyads are presumed to take a relatively narrow view of 
what constitutes acceptable terms of intelligence cooperation.  In the hypothetical 
one-off example, I submit that B is likely to insist upon receiving something specific 
in exchange for its cooperation (quid pro quo) or reject the request outright 
(categorical defection). Accordingly, B will be unwilling to supply x1 ‘on credit’ or 
with ‘no strings attached’ to A.  This will be the case regardless of which regime type 
in the mixed dyad is playing the role of B.  While it is possible that either party (or 
both parties) might be willing to consider the possibility of extending this game into 
the future, neither will give much thought to the implications of the one-off outcome 
for the ‘shadow of the future’.  All things being equal, mixed dyads will tend to focus 
on the transaction at hand, rather than the prospect of future transactions. 
Fully democratic intelligence dyads, by contrast, are presumed to take a more 




cooperation.  Consequently, there is a greater likelihood that B will gravitate towards 
cooperative strategies that ‘keep the game going’ to one another’s mutual benefit.  To 
the extent that the shadow of the future enters B’s calculations, B will be more 
inclined to consider strategies that do not necessarily guarantee it direct and 
immediate payoffs.   The dyadic democratic peace argument provides a possible 
explanation of why this might be the case. The aforementioned menu of shared 
understandings (i.e., bounded uncertainty and contingent consent) will help to 
dampen B’s suspicions about A’s motives.  B may consequently be willing to consider 
cooperative strategies beyond an immediate quid pro quo, such as a counter-offer or 
conditional cooperation.   
Hypothesis 
Democratic peace arguments are often leveraged to explain dichotomous 
‘snapshot-in-time’ phenomena, such as the outbreak of war or the formation of 
alliances.  I depart from this approach to trace the ebb and flow of intelligence 
cooperation over time between different pairings of regime types under common 
background conditions.  I expect that an examination of bilateral intelligence 
cooperation under conditions of war will enable me to test for the presence of 
contingent consent and bounded uncertainty, which in my view are the principal 
signatures of the regime recognition dynamic.  
Framed in this context, my research question becomes:  to what extent does 
the democratic composition of a wartime cooperative intelligence dyad (WCID) 
shape the depth of bilateral cooperation between the two members during the course 




• Bilateral intelligence cooperation has already commenced.  This 
assumption enables me to focus on the dynamics of intelligence exchange 
after a liaison relationship has been established, rather than on the factors 
that may have led to the formation of the relationship in the first place. 
 
• While there may be a large number of conceivable WCID regime 
permutations, each of them falls somewhere within a bounded property 
space.  The property space can be conceptualized as an x-y graph whose 
axes mirror the Polity Project’s ‘polity2’ variable, which assigns a single 
score between -10 (autocracy) and 10 (democracy) for a regime (Marshall, 
Jaggers et al 2011).  This property space is illustrated in Figure 5.  This 
assumption enables me to define the range of potential WCID 
combinations and therefore place boundaries upon the universe of cases.57 
 
• Each foreign intelligence organization is by definition subordinate to a 
single national government.  A given foreign intelligence agency will 
therefore carry out functions consistent with the expressed will of its 
government.  This assumption allows me to treat foreign intelligence 
organizations as extensions of the governments that they serve, thus 
excluding (for purposes of this argument) the possibility of ‘rogue 
agencies’ operating under their own institutional prerogatives.58 
 
• Foreign intelligence organizations are ‘hard-wired’ to proceed with 
caution and size up their counterparts during the early stages of bilateral 
intelligence cooperation.59  By necessity, this period will be characterized 
by mutual suspicion and a certain amount of conflict and 
misunderstanding—regardless of the regime types involved.  For instance, 
one state may accuse the other of ‘free riding’ off its intelligence (i.e., 
getting something for relatively nothing) or suspect the other of sharing 
privileged information with third parties.   
 
From these assumptions I deduce the following hypothesis: 
 
                                                 
57 Despite their appearance in the WCID property space, I am consciously excluding ‘fully 
autocratic’ WCIDs from my analysis.  The question of why autocratic nations might engage in varying 
degrees of intelligence cooperation, though interesting, falls outside the scope of my current research 
aims, not to mention the claims of dyadic democratic peace theory.   
58 It is important to note that this assumption does not always hold in reality.  For example, 
some regimes operate as ‘independent security states’ in which intelligence services are so autonomous 
and removed from the day-to-day operations of government that they are effectively answerable to no 
one (Keller 1989; Boraz and Bruneau 2006, 38). 
59 According to Sims, most experienced intelligence services engage in preliminary 
counterintelligence activities against their foreign partners.  This tendency to ‘run the traps’ is a useful 
means of determining whether unknown third parties are benefiting from an intelligence relationship 




H1:  The democratic composition of a WCID is expected to shape the depth of 
bilateral governmental intelligence cooperation observed between the two 
parties.  More specifically, a fully democratic WCID is expected to reach and 
maintain higher levels of cooperation during the war than a WCID consisting 
of a democracy and an autocracy. 
 
Figure 5. Regime Type Property Space for WCIDs 
In sum, I expect to see in each case an initial period of ‘sizing up,’ regardless 
of the WCID’s regime composition.  This initial period will be characterized by a 
certain degree of mutual suspicion and limited intelligence cooperation.  In fully 
democratic WCIDs, this period should eventually give way to an increase in the depth 
of observed intelligence cooperation as the recognition dynamic takes hold.  By 
contrast, when the WCID is composed of a democracy and an autocracy, I expect 
‘sizing up’ to persist indefinitely throughout the war with a negative long-term effect 
on the depth of observed intelligence cooperation.  In both cases I expect to see 
evidence of the purported causal mechanism at work.  Fully democratic dyads, 




uncertainty, will work through their difficulties in the interest of ‘keeping the game 
going’ to one another’s mutual benefit.  Mixed dyads, on the other hand, will operate 
under conditions of unbounded uncertainty and the absence of contingent consent.  
Unable to anticipate the expected range of their authoritarian partners’ behaviors and 
unwilling to foreswear the use of coercive tactics against them, democratic members 
in such relationships are expected to become increasingly preoccupied with relative 
gains and the risks of partner defection. 
The relational contracting argument 
An alternative explanation posits that states enter into binding cooperative 
arrangements when they are no longer able to obtain sufficient amounts of national 
security at an acceptable price through their default strategies of self-help.  This line 
of argument, inspired by the transaction cost school of economics popularized by 
Coase (1937) and Williamson (1979), views cooperative arrangements as analogous 
to firms.  In other words, alliances will emerge in response to rising transaction costs 
faced by unitary actors (states) seeking to survive.  Another term for this is relational 
contracting.  IR scholars have subsequently invoked relational contracting arguments 
to address the creation, persistence, and rational design of international institutions.60  
Collectively, thinking about international cooperation as a contracting problem has 
helped to move the field beyond the question of why cooperation occurs in the first 
place to a more complex puzzle:  why states choose institutional arrangements that 
vary in terms of their bindingness and structural commitments. 
                                                 
60 A comprehensive review of this scholarship is not within the scope of this study.  Each of 
the aforementioned questions is treated in much greater depth by Keohane (1984); Abbott and Snidal 
(1998); and Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal (2001).  Gilligan (2007) also offers a comprehensive and 




After providing a brief overview of the relational contracting perspective and 
its origins within the economics literature, the following section examines the causal 
claims of two complementary explanations within the relational contracting literature 
and then considers their potential applications to the study of bilateral intelligence 
cooperation. 
Origins within the economics literature 
A common starting point for most relational contracting arguments is the 
notion of rational, independent and utility-maximizing economic actors engaged in 
arms-length transactions.  In this default mode of economic organization, buyers pay 
no heed to the identity of the supplier.  They seek only the optimal price for a 
particular good or service.  In select instances, however, a specific buyer and seller 
may see fit to contract with one another exclusively over an extended time period, 
such that the price mechanism is superseded in favor of maintaining the relationship 
“for its own sake” (Coase 1937, 390).    
These types of arrangements can prove difficult to sustain in the long run due 
to the zero-sum self-interests of buyer and supplier.  Changing circumstances 
inevitably present new opportunities for each party to maximize its individual gains 
through haggling and the threat of defection (Williamson 1979, 242).  Failure to curb 
this sort of behavior can lead to undesirable results for both parties, to include 
forfeiture of the asset-specific investments and unique economic benefits upon which 
the relationship was forged.   
Relational contracting provides a mechanism for attenuating this sort of 




preserving, they may choose to exit the market and form a more binding relationship.  
This generally occurs when buyer and supplier decide that their transactions yield 
sufficient benefits to warrant the abandonment of the default organizational mode 
(classical contracting) in favor of dedicated long-term cooperation (relational 
contracting).   
Williamson refers to these benefits as “idiosyncratic economies,” which 
accrue exclusively to participants in transaction-specific exchange.  Idiosyncratic 
economies consist of communication economies (e.g., specialized language, standard 
operating procedures, shared knowledge, and trust) as well as cost economies (e.g., 
lower production costs enabled by special purpose production equipment) that do not 
and cannot exist outside of the special relationship.  The only way these benefits can 
be maintained is through the assurance of a continuing relationship.  Idiosyncratic 
economies will vanish when and if the transactional relationship is dissolved, since 
the assets (which by definition represent sunken costs) cannot be reinvested or 
redeployed to other activities (Williamson 1979, 241). 
Within the economics literature, relational contracting arrangements typically 
assume the form of a bilateral or a unified governance structure.  Bilateral structures 
preserve the autonomy of both buyer and seller and are premised on the notion that 
the complete range of transactional contingencies cannot possibly be anticipated in a 
single contract.  Both parties thus reconcile themselves to negotiating any future 
modifications through follow-on agreements. Typically these modifications will focus 
on the less contentious issues of quantity and delivery, as opposed to price.   The goal 




“restricting adjustments to those where the hazards [of defection] are least”. Unified 
governance structures, by contrast, merge the buyer and seller into a single, vertically 
integrated organization.  Integration eliminates concerns of opportunism and trust, 
since all decisions concerning quantity, delivery, and pricing are made internally by 
an overarching authority (Ibid., 251-253).61 
Most relational contracting arrangements highlight the role of transaction 
costs in shaping the formality and bindingness of a cooperative arrangement.  Those 
costs, in turn, are decomposed into several elements.  The first and most important of 
these components is typically environmental uncertainty.  The shadow of the future 
and unforeseen dangers compel the parties to craft new arrangements to address 
potential contractual gaps that could arise in the future.  The second component is 
transactional frequency.  When buyer and supplier engage in recurrent transactions 
(or have reason to suspect that they will so engage), both parties are inclined to create 
relational contracting structures to govern exchange.  Such structures are the only 
conceivable means by which they can hope to recoup the initial set-up costs of their 
cooperative arrangement.  The third component is asset specificity, which Williamson 
defines as transaction-specific investments that cannot conceivably be removed and 
redirected to other economic activities.  As asset specificity increases, so too does the 
incentive to engage in relational contracting (Ibid., 240-254). 
Williamson’s writings eventually found resonance within the field of 
International Relations, where scholars began leveraging its insights to explain why 
states would willfully surrender their sovereignty and enter into binding cooperative 
                                                 
61 Unilateral governance structures are outside the scope of this study, which focuses on 
bilateral intelligence cooperation between sovereign state actors (which by definition have not ceded 




arrangements with one another (Keohane 1982).  In relational contracting, IR scholars 
found ready analogies with economic actors (states) and the unique forms of 
cooperation (institutions) that they occasionally create in lieu of adhering to the 
dictates of the price mechanism (anarchy).  In accordance with this reasoning, it was 
often posited that international institutions should arise in circumstances where “the 
relative transaction costs of creating them, amortized over the expected lifetime of the 
regime, [were] ..sufficiently small” (Gilligan 2007, 8).   
Weber’s anarchic argument 
Within the IR relational contracting literature, one popular line of argument 
posits that the degree of bindingness62 observed in cooperative security arrangements 
is shaped by the level of external threat and transaction costs facing the participants, 
which typically are sovereign political actors (i.e., states) acting in an anarchic, self-
help environment.  When the level of external threat and transaction costs is low, the 
participants are expected to pursue relatively informal and non-binding alliances.  By 
contrast, when these levels are high, the participants are expected to enter into more 
binding arrangements such as formal alliances and confederations (Weber 1997).   
Such arguments are exemplified in the writings of Weber (1997, 2000). 
Despite reserving many of the key insights from relational contracting, Weber makes 
several notable departures from the transaction cost economists.  First, she discounts 
the causal effects of transactional frequency in this particular context, arguing that 
                                                 
62 Weber defines bindingness as “curtailment of sovereignty in exchange for greater 
institutionalization” and a “measure [of] the degree of structural commitment [that] allies agree to 
make” (Weber 1997, 322; 324).  Later in this chapter I will offer a slightly different definition of this 
term which highlights the central role of structural commitment but de-emphasizes the role of 




threatened states (in contrast to economic actors in a marketplace) are much more 
concerned with survival than they are with recouping the set-up costs of a cooperative 
security arrangement. Second, she operationalizes her remaining independent 
variables somewhat differently. Specifically:  
• The level of external threat is expected to vary in accordance with 
the states’ perceptions of a potential aggressor’s military capacity and 
the geographic proximity of the adversary to said states. 
 
• Transaction costs further shape the bindingness of cooperation 
through the observable effects of:: 
 Structural uncertainty, measured in terms of the number of 
Great Powers in the international system and the presence or 
absence of clear, consistent signaling between states. 
 Asset specificity, characterized as “highly trained men, 
specialized equipment, or specific sites that states otherwise 
would not invest in or could not readily shift to.”   
 State heterogeneity, seen in the degree to which factors such as 
“language problems, misunderstandings, and disagreements” 
must be resolved through “translation, arbitration, and costly 
coordination” (Weber 1997, 333).   
 
A key strength of Weber’s adaptation of the relational contracting perspective 
is that it defines a specific set of conditions under which states feel compelled to 
abandon exclusively self-help strategies in favor of more binding security 
arrangements.  With subtle modifications, this argument could potentially be 
extended even further as an explanation of bilateral intelligence outcomes.  
Nevertheless, a potential weakness of Weber’s argument is seen in its implicit 
assumption that states facing high levels of transaction costs and external threat have 
only one option available to them:  develop more binding anarchic arrangements 
(e.g., alliances or confederations) or succumb to defection (Ibid., 323).  This does not 
allow for the possibility of hierarchical modes of cooperation in which one state 




the hierarchical mode of cooperation are discussed in greater detail in the next 
section. 
Walsh’s willful hierarchy argument 
Economists and IR scholars have long envisioned scenarios in which states 
might surrender their sovereignty to some external, non-state entity (e.g., in an 
integrated governance structure such as a confederation) or enter into formal 
cooperation on equal terms with each other (e.g., in a bilateral governance structure). 
Less consideration has been given to the possibility of one state voluntarily 
surrendering some of its sovereignty to another.   Such a scenario was long 
considered anathema to IR theorists who subscribed to the neorealist assumption of 
Westphalian sovereignty, in which states engage each other as equals amidst the 
backdrop of international anarchy (Waltz 1979).63   
Walsh was among the first to challenge this assumption in his hierarchical 
account of relational contracting, wherein nominally sovereign intelligence 
organizations enter into binding cooperation with one another voluntarily on less-
than-equal terms (Walsh 2007; Walsh 2010).   Walsh’s argument complements and 
extends upon Weber’s anarchic argument in several important respects.  In addition to 
highlighting a third possible type of binding arrangement between intelligence 
organizations, his argument lends itself well to the generation of observable 
                                                 
63 It was arguably not until the late 1990s that the movement to ‘bring hierarchy back in’ 
began to develop momentum.  At the forefront of this movement was Lake, who articulated a number 
of arrangements (sphere of influence, protectorate, informal empire and empire) in which states 





implications that help to explain why some binding arrangements assume the 
particular forms that they do. 
Walsh accomplishes this by picking up where Weber left off.  Assuming that 
the essential background conditions of Weber’s anarchic argument (viz., high levels 
of external threat, uncertainty and transaction costs) have already been satisfied, he 
seeks to identify additional factors that influence whether the binding arrangement is 
anarchic or hierarchical in nature (Walsh 2010, 99).  An example of an anarchically 
binding arrangement would be one in which formal agreements or institutions are 
created to promote greater efficiencies in information exchange, but no constraints are 
imposed on either party’s decision-making authority (Ibid., 2010, 25).64  An example 
of a hierarchically binding arrangement would be one in which a state assumes direct 
control of another state’s intelligence activities as a means of resolving the problem 
of defection (Ibid., 99-104).65  
Walsh contends that hierarchical arrangements are most likely to emerge 
when both parties expect to derive significant benefits from intelligence cooperation, 
at least party perceives a high risk of defection by the other, and there is a clear 
dominant and subordinate party.   The dominant party generally possesses a greater 
share of material resources and is presumed to have more options at its disposal (i.e., 
alternatives to cooperation) for intelligence gathering against the common enemy. It 
is ultimately the dominant party’s ability and willingness to monitor and enforce 
                                                 
64 Such arrangements are similar in form to the bilateral governance structures described in the 
transaction costs economics literature, in which market actors create institutions to address the less 
contentious issues of quantity and delivery, rather than price. 
65 This offers a distinct departure from the economics literature, in which bilateral governance 




compliance with formally negotiated rules which allows hierarchical intelligence 
cooperation to thrive and persist. 
The dominant party cannot simply will a hierarchical arrangement into being, 
however.  The weaker party must also agree to the proposed terms of cooperation.  
Walsh contends that this is most likely to occur when both parties “stand to gain from 
sharing, have strong concerns about their partners’ reliability, and conclude that the 
costs of creating and maintaining the hierarchy are smaller than the joint gains that 
they could expect” (Ibid., 59-60).  For the weaker state, these gains often consist of 
some tangible risk premium (i.e., rents) that it stands to receive in exchange for its 
compliance (Ibid., 17-25).   
I believe that a hybrid relational contracting argument, built upon both 
Weber’s anarchic and Walsh’s hierarchical arguments, has the potential to explain 
why and how different forms of bilateral intelligence cooperation emerge under 
highly stressful background conditions.  In the next section I attempt to construct such 
an argument by formulating some entry-level assumptions and a testable hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 
To what extent can a synthesis of the anarchic and hierarchical variants of the 
relational contracting perspective shed light on the dynamics of bilateral intelligence 
cooperation?  I proceed by making some entry-level assumptions:  
• The WCID has already been formed and its members (foreign intelligence 
services) act as extensions of the governments that they serve. 
 
• WCID members are inherently pre-disposed to dealing cautiously with 
each other during the early stages of cooperation. 
 
• The decision to engage in (or withdraw from) bilateral intelligence 




times during the observation period (in this case, the duration of a war).   
 
• Any bilateral cooperative arrangement involving the exchange of 
intelligence inherently entails a certain degree of asset specificity.66  Since 
intelligence by definition involves secrecy, a certain portion of its value 
(whether as information, tradecraft, or knowledge of collection 
capabilities) becomes irretrievable once one party has shared it with 
another.  An important implication of this assumption is that all cases of 
intelligence cooperation will entail a certain base level of asset specificity 
which naturally accumulates over time, so long as cooperation continues.67 
 
• The level of external threat will be necessarily high in all WCIDs 
examined in this study, given that they are aligned against common 
wartime enemies.  This assumption enables me to hold constant the 
variable of external threat and explore the causal effects of transaction 
costs. 
 
 From these assumptions I deduce a relational contracting hypothesis and a 
corresponding set of contingent predictions: 
H2:  The bindingness of a bilateral intelligence relationship (WCID) will vary 
in accordance with the level of external threat and transaction costs facing its 
members.  More specifically, relatively greater degrees of bindingness will be 
observed in WCIDs facing significant external threats and high transaction 
costs.   Conversely, relatively lower degrees of bindingness will be observed 
in WCIDs facing weak external threats and low transaction costs. 
 
It is important to acknowledge specifically what is implied by this hypothesis. 
Bilateral intelligence cooperation is expected to become more binding between 
partners facing very high levels of external threat and significant transaction costs.  
The opposite outcome (informal and ad hoc exchange) is expected for WCIDs facing 
low levels of threat and relatively minor transaction costs.  A probabilistic claim is 
                                                 
66 Walsh (2007) argues somewhat differently, asserting that the only intelligence assets that 
meet this definition are those—such as networks of human agents and listening posts—which focus on 
highly specific problems and are incapable of being transferred to other targets or intelligence 
problems (157-158).   
67 Historian Bradley Smith argues that asset specificity played an important role in the 
continuation of UK-US intelligence cooperation after World War II:  “…[O]nce the highly complex 
process of secret-information gathering used by Britain and the United States had been shared between 




also implied in this hypothesis:  given two WCIDs aligned against the same enemy 
during the same war, cooperation will be more binding in that WCID which exhibits 
relatively higher values over the independent variables (external threat and 
transaction costs) during the course of the war. 
Methodology 
Research objectives 
As noted in Chapter Two, the academic study of international intelligence 
cooperation has long suffered from under-theorization and a dearth of empirical data.   
Addressing these gaps in the literature requires a more flexible dissertation structure 
than the somewhat rigidly defined 'ideal types' that are frequently utilized in the 
political science literature (Van Evera 1997; George and Bennett 2005).  When 
existing theories are extended to novel problem domains and leveraged to explain 
different types of outcomes, new variables must often be defined and examined. Such 
an approach is consistent with a ‘theory development’ dissertation design, which 
leverages elements of both induction and deduction to produce a modified theory that 
can be extended against a new problem domain (George and Bennett 2005, 114).  
Once a modified theory has been constructed, its causal claims cannot be accepted at 
face value.  Ideally, they should be tested—if even on a preliminary basis—against 
real-world data and evaluated.  This is more in line with a ‘theory testing’ approach68 
to theory building, in which deliberately selected case studies are employed to 
                                                 
68 Theory testing approaches generally entail at least four tasks:  (1) identifying applicable and 
competing theoretical explanations about a given class of phenomena; (2) selecting historical cases 
about which said theories make strong and unique predictions; (3) ascertaining the extent to which 
each theory’s predictions ‘fit’ with the case outcomes; and (4) determining whether any tentative 




“strengthen or reduce support for a theory, narrow or extend the scope conditions of a 
theory, or determine which of two or more theories best explains a case, type, or 
general phenomenon” (Ibid., 75). 
One potential criticism of this hybrid approach is that the two theories under 
consideration are not directly comparable because they purport to explain different 
features of the dependent variable.  Whereas the dyadic democratic peace argument 
makes predictions about the relative degree and extent of bilateral intelligence 
cooperation over time, the relational contracting argument makes predictions about 
the structure and form of cooperative arrangements.   Such a criticism would be 
problematic if the central objective of the dissertation were to devise and test rival 
hypotheses that make competing (read:  mutually exclusive) claims about the depth of 
bilateral intelligence cooperation.  As noted earlier, however, such a research 
objective is analytically premature because bilateral intelligence cooperation is only 
beginning to receive attention as a study variable within IR.  A certain amount of 
theoretical development must still be done to identify suitable theoretical traditions, 
extend their arguments properly, and construct preliminary tests (we can call them 
plausibility probes) to assess their potential application to the larger universe of cases. 
This hybrid dissertation design is also vulnerable to criticisms that are leveled 
against theory development and theory testing designs, respectively.  Perhaps the 
most commonly acknowledged risk of a theory-development design is confirmation 
bias, which arises when a theory is tested against the same case from which it was 
derived.  In cases when this risk cannot be mitigated through the identification of a 




account for other evidence within the original case.  Theory-testing approaches, for 
their part, are sometimes prone to the emergence of a ‘strawman’ argument in which 
a particular theory is prematurely dismissed because it has been forced to explain 
outcomes that fall outside of its temporal or topical scope.  One can guard against the 
strawman scenario by paying careful attention to the “range of institutional settings, 
cultural contexts, time periods, geographic settings, and situational settings” to which 
a particular theoretical explanation’s findings apply (Ibid., 119).   
To the extent that they make use of small-n case studies, theory-development 
and theory-testing dissertations also incur the risks of confounding and omitted 
variable bias.  These risks can be mitigated through deliberate and purposive case 
selection—in other words, identifying “instances where explanations make unique 
predictions about the process or outcome of the case” (Ibid., 118).  As Sagan (1993), 
Khong (1992) and others have illustrated, an effective case selection strategy draws 
into relief the competing causal claims arguments and case-specific predictions of 
rival theories. 
Case selection criteria 
Intelligence, as previously discussed in Chapter One, is an expansive term 
whose core attributes are thought to consist of secrecy, information, processes, and 
activities.  Each of these attributes is present to some degree in the various 
intelligence disciplines or ‘INTs,’ most notably human intelligence (HUMINT), 
imagery intelligence (IMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT).  Intelligence 
functions are also performed by a broad range of organizational actors, to include 




This multiplicity of attributes, disciplines and actors presents difficulties for case 
selection.  So too does the dearth of available primary source information.  In an 
effort to address these obstacles, I developed the following case selection criteria: 
Strive to hold constant as many competing independent variables as 
possible.  George and Bennett (2005) argue that “confident estimates of causal 
effects…are possible in case studies only when there is a very well-controlled before-
after case comparison in which only one independent variable changes” (25).  This is 
a difficult condition to satisfy in the data-impoverished field of Intelligence Studies.  
Nevertheless, the criterion is worth pursuing for at least two reasons.  First, it can aid 
in the identification of appropriate scope conditions for future intelligence theorizing.  
Second, it can minimize the number of ‘alternate causality’ arguments to be 
considered in the future.  
Incorporate war as a scope condition.  When two countries face the prospect 
or reality of war against a common and mortal foe, their incentives to share 
intelligence against that foe increase dramatically, since each party’s survival 
conceivably lies in the balance.  As an environmental stressor, war should produce 
systematic spikes in the observed ‘amplitude’69 of bilateral intelligence cooperation 
against the common foe during the observation period.  This in turn should facilitate 
measurement of the dependent variable across cases.   
My decision to incorporate war as a scope condition was predicated on several 
additional assumptions.  First, I assumed that bilateral intelligence cooperation is 
conducted primarily through conventional channels during peacetime (e.g., 
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established networks of foreign liaison officers), when the demand for intelligence-
sharing is relatively low.  In the absence of a systematic environmental stressor such 
as war, I expected that it would be difficult to detect fluctuations in bilateral 
intelligence cooperation and conduct cross-case temporal comparisons.  I 
consequently decided against selecting cases of intelligence cooperation that occur 
during peacetime.  Second, I assumed that bilateral intelligence cooperation is 
inherently more salient (and therefore more observable) during war, when the demand 
for intelligence-sharing increases and additional elements of the national government 
apparatus become involved in these efforts out of strategic and operational necessity.   
Control for realism.  In the absence of a prevailing explanatory paradigm, 
many intelligence scholars have anchored their arguments within ambiguously 
defined ‘realist’ frameworks (Fry and Hochstein 1993, 17).70  These arguments 
generally proceed from the functionalist premise that intelligence-related outcomes 
can be explained as a consequence of states acting in their own national interests, 
and/or in response to the pressures of the international system.71  Proponents of these 
types of arguments might object to a research design that does not explicitly develop 
and test a rival realist hypothesis.  In anticipation of such objections, I offer two 
observations.  First, this study incorporates a phenomenon (bilateral intelligence 
cooperation) and unit of analysis (bilateral intelligence alliances) that are 
incompatible with most realist frameworks, which tend to focus on great power 
                                                 
70 Scott and Jackson have picked up on this as well:  “It is interesting to note that, while there 
exists an implicit (and sometimes explicit) assumption that the study of intelligence falls within the 
realist camp, contemporary neo-realist writers have largely ignored intelligence in their reflections 
(Scott and Jackson 2004, 147). 
71 This is seen in the practitioner and security studies literature on foreign intelligence liaison.  
See, for example, the works of Richelson (1990), Lefebvre (2003), Clough (2004), Lander (2004), 




balancing behavior among states.72  Second, the cases in this study effectively control 
for realism because they occur under conditions (namely, war) in which realist 
outcomes and background conditions are already present.  In other words, war has 
already begun and intelligence alliances have been formed against common foes. 
Select cases in which the units of analysis perform similar intelligence 
functions.  In the pre-paradigmatic field of Intelligence Studies, it remains unclear 
whether all intelligence activities can be logically grouped together.  Certain 
dynamics present in bilateral military intelligence cooperation, for example, might be 
inapplicable to or absent from bilateral intelligence cooperation between law 
enforcement agencies.  It therefore seemed prudent to select cases in which the units 
of analysis are roughly equivalent in terms of their intelligence functions. 
Select cases exhibiting extreme variance over the dependent variable.  
Geddes (1990) argues that selecting upon a specific, single value of the dependent 
variable yields an unduly restrictive universe of cases, which in turn can lead to the 
generation of erroneous inferences about the broader population.  She argues that this 
problem can be addressed by identifying the relevant universe of cases pertinent to a 
research problem and then randomly selecting cases from within that universe.  
Nevertheless, as Bennett and Elman (2006) observe, the boundaries of the universe of 
relevant cases are often unknown.  Under these conditions it becomes impossible to 
identify a set of cases that fulfills the statistical ideal of ‘sufficient variation’ on the 
dependent variable.  When that occurs, a suitable (though admittedly imperfect) 
backup strategy is to select cases lying on opposite ends of the (known) dependent 
                                                 
72 While neo-realists have developed arguments to explain patterns of alliance formation more 
generally, they generally have not considered the question of why varying levels of cooperation occur 




variable continuum.  Given the relative dearth of case data on my chosen topic, I 
sought to select cases in which the observed depth of intelligence cooperation was 
either relatively high or relatively low. In doing this, I recognized that subsequent 
empirical measurement could reveal that the expected values were incongruous with 
the actual case outcomes. 
* * * * * * * * * * * 
Working from the above criteria, I selected two instances of bilateral military 
intelligence cooperation from World War II:  the Anglo-Soviet and Anglo-American 
WCIDs.  Both come reasonably close to satisfying the aforementioned case selection 
criteria: 
• Hold constant competing independent variables.  This condition is 
partially satisfied in the sense that both cases occur during the same time 
period, amidst the same set of external threat conditions and against a 
common set of enemies.  There are admittedly several conditions that are 
not held constant across both cases, such as primary spoken language and 
national economic strength.  I will consequently be unable to rule out the 
potential causal effects of these factors, regardless of whether congruence 
testing yields results that are consistent with either of the rival hypotheses. 
 
• Incorporate war as a scope condition.  This condition is satisfied for 
both cases, which occur during a war that clearly threatened the future 
survival of all Allied participants.   
 
• ‘Control’ for realism.  Each case controls for the effects of realism by 
focusing on the period immediately following the first reported wartime 
military intelligence liaison overture.  For the Anglo-American WCID, 
this period probably commences in the summer of 1940, when Colonel 
William Donovan traveled to London on a special liaison visit authorized 
by President Roosevelt.  By this point Germany and the UK were already 
at war and the US, despite its official neutrality, was arguably beginning to 
appreciate the gravity of the Axis threat.73  In the case of the Anglo-Soviet 
WCID, cooperation appears to commence sometime in mid-1941, just as 
the British and Russian militaries were establishing intelligence missions 
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in Moscow and London, following the initiation of Operation Barbarossa 
(Smith 1996, 33).  
 
• Analogous intelligence functions.  Both cases focus on military-to-
military channels of intelligence cooperation.   
 
• Variance on the dependent variable.  With respect to the dyadic 
democratic peace argument, both cases appear to fall on opposite sides of 
the bilateral intelligence cooperation intensity continuum.  Historians 
generally contend that the Anglo-American WCID evolved over time into 
a high-intensity cooperative relationship, whereas the Anglo-Soviet 
WCID—despite getting off to a promising start—lingered primarily on the 
lower end of the continuum for the duration of the war, whereupon it 
ultimately dissolved.   A similar variance is seen in the dependent variable 
of the relational contracting argument for both cases.  Specifically, the 
Anglo-Soviet WCID was not governed by the sorts of binding agreements 
that were negotiated between the UK and US during the course of the war. 
Of course, these preliminary assessments are no substitute for empirical 
measurement, which will occur in the next two chapters. 
Data availability 
An important question to consider, given the inherently secretive nature of this 
topic, is whether sufficient and reliable primary source information is available to 
support systematic scholarly inquiry.  I believe there is.  As previously discussed in 
Chapter One, the quality and availability of intelligence data writ large has improved 
(albeit in fits and starts) since the end of the Cold War. Both the US and UK 
Governments have continued to declassify materials concerning cooperative military 
intelligence activities directed against the Axis powers from at least 1939 through 
1945.   
Vast stores of these materials are available at the US National Archives 
(Archives II) in College Park and the UK National Archives in Kew, England.  
Archives II houses at least three collections of interest to this study:  The Historic 




General and Special Staffs (Record Group 165), and Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs 
of Staff (Record Group 218).  The UK National Archives, for its part, houses a 
complementary collection of records that touches upon various aspects of World War 
II-era military intelligence liaison with British allies.  The records pertaining to the 
Government Code and Cypher School (HW 14 and HW 50), the war diaries of the 
British Military Mission to Moscow (WO 178/25, WO 178/26 and WO 178/27) and 
the off-the-record monthly notes of the Signals Intelligence Liaison Unit (SLU) in 
Washington (HW 57/5) proved to be of particular relevance in this regard.  Both 
collections allow for a thorough examination of Anglo-American and Anglo-Soviet 
wartime cooperation from a British perspective. 
Testing and measurement 
Testing procedures 
Given my research objectives, I felt that it was appropriate to employ a 
combination of the congruence method and observable implication testing.  George 
and Bennett define the congruence method as a technique in which the investigator 
assesses the ability of a theory to explain and/or predict a case-specific outcome.  In 
order for this to work, the theory must “posit a relation between variance in the 
independent variable and variance in the dependent variable” (George and Bennett 
2005, 181).  While the congruence method cannot be used to determine whether a 
posited causal relationship in a given theory is both necessary and sufficient to 
produce a given outcome, it can at the very least shed light on the plausibility (or 




In accordance with these guidelines, I drew from two established theoretical 
traditions—the dyadic democratic peace argument and a relational contracting 
perspective—with the goal of assessing their ability to account for the outcomes in 
both cases.  For each argument I posited relationships between the independent and 
dependent variables.  The congruence method enabled me to determine whether either 
theory offered predictions that were consistent with relationships observed in each of 
the selected cases.  Evidence of consistency and inconsistency, in turn, helped me to 
identify future directions for Intelligence Studies theory development.  
Identifying and testing for the observable implications of these two theories 
offered distinct advantages as well.  First, it helped to guide my collection of primary 
source data by illuminating observations that were relevant (as well as irrelevant) to 
each theory in a given case.  Second, testing for observable implications helped me to 
gain leverage over my small-n research problem.  Despite using only two case 
studies, I was able to ‘increase my n’ by identifying multiple observable implications 
for each theory in each case (Keohane, King and Verba 1994, 220-221). 
Measuring the dependent variable 
 Since the two theories examined in this dissertation purport to explain distinct 
aspects of a single phenomenon (depth of intelligence cooperation), it will be helpful 
to define more specifically how I measured each of these aspects.  The dyadic 
democratic peace argument explains the depth of intelligence cooperation in terms of 
the relative frequency of contact between services and the granularity of intelligence 




the lens of the structural commitments binding the two intelligence services together.  
Bindingness 
 Frequency of contact:  Meeting Opportunity Realization Rate (MORR).  I 
identified several methods for capturing the variability of intra-WCID intelligence 
cooperation as a function of their frequency of interaction.  The first is to simply 
document the number of days per month which face-to-face intelligence exchanges 
occurred.  A second method is to tally the number of days per quarter in which face-
to-face intelligence meetings (DM) occurred, and then divide that figure by the total 
number of calendar days that constitute each quarter (DQ), assuming that each 
calendar day represents an opportunity to meet and share intelligence. The resulting 
quotient provides a ‘Meeting Opportunity Realization Rate’ (MORR), which I define 
as the percentage of total calendar days during a given quarter in which both sides of 
a WCID gather together in the same physical location for any of a variety of 
purposes: 
 
 A relatively high MORR (approaching the score of 1.00 on the scale) is 
consistent with Wetzling’s description of “institutionalized information sharing 
among befriended services.”  By contrast, a relatively low MORR (approaching the 
score of 0.0) is consistent with Wetzling’s description of either “no contact among 
foreign intelligence services” or “occasional information sharing among foreign 
services” (Wetzling 2005, 11).  When meeting frequency was not documented 




of measuring—on a monthly basis, in binary (yes/no) fashion—whether face-to-face 
bilateral intelligence exchanges were known to have occurred.   
 Granularity:  Average maximum granularity of intelligence exchanged 
(AMGIE).  The mere occurrence of intelligence exchange is by itself an insufficient 
indicator of the intensity of bilateral intelligence cooperation.  It is possible that some 
meetings may involve the exchange of more (or less) sensitive information than 
others.  For instance, I may discover that the British Military Mission in Moscow 
exchanged order of battle (OB) information with the Soviet General Staff in one 
meeting, but two weeks later they engaged in a technical discussion of highly 
sensitive methods used to collect and exploit Axis military communications.  Such 
distinctions can be captured by incorporating Clough’s notion of granularity.   In an 
effort to define this concept more precisely, I conceptualized it in terms of three 
variables:   
• Specificity captures the relative precision of the information being 
supplied.  General information, such as operational summaries and 
estimates, will be scored with a value of 1.  More precise information, 
such as the specific locations of enemy forces, will be scored with a value 
of 2. 
 
• Sensitivity is an indirect function of plausible cover.  A particular 
intelligence good becomes more sensitive from the supplier’s perspective 
when the range of plausible (alternative) sources from which it 
conceivably could have been derived diminishes.  Items of low sensitivity 
(read:  multiple plausible sources) will be scored with a value of 1.  Items 
of high sensitivity (read:  few plausible sources) will be scored with a 
value of 2. 
 
• Acquisition costs refer to the initial expense borne by the prospective 
supplier in acquiring an intelligence good.  Items that are relatively 
inexpensive to acquire, such as second-hand impressions of enemy 
morale, will be deemed relatively inexpensive (earning a score of 1).  By 
contrast, items that are relatively expensive to acquire, such as details of 




expensive (thus garnering a 2). 
 
 It is worth noting that I do not allow for intermediate values in my scoring of 
these three attributes of granularity.  This was a deliberate choice on my part.  In an 
effort to systematize the coding process and ensure that incidents of intelligence 
exchange were coded consistently, I opted to conceptualize each attribute as the 
answer to a yes/no question.  Thus, a particular item of intelligence exchanged 
between partners was either:  general or specific; not particularly sensitive or highly 
sensitive; and cheap or relatively expensive to acquire.   
 Recognizing the potential for multiple intelligence exchanges occurring on the 
same day, I chose to select the highest scoring (read: most granular) intelligence good 
for each calendar day in a given quarter (DQ) and calculate the average of these 
maximum daily granularity scores (max(Gi)) over the course of each calendar quarter.  
This provides the basis of a quarterly measurement of Average Maximum Granularity 
of Intelligence Exchanged (AMGIE): 
 
 Degree of structural commitment:  bindingness.  As discussed previously in 
Chapter One, a weakness of Wetzling’s intensity continuum lies in its incorporation 
of two distinct concepts:  frequency of intelligence exchange and the extent to which 
the two parties are bound in their commitment to one another.   Since these concepts 
represent separate aspects of the dependent variable, it is important to disentangle 




can be captured through the MORR measurement.  Bindingness has been studied at 
great length by Weber, who defines it as a function of the member-states’ 
commitment to curtailing their sovereign discretionary powers through such 
mechanisms as arbitration procedures, decision-making structures and the integration 
of national militaries.  Consistent with this view, a tightly bound relationship is one in 
which members face high exit costs and have limited room for maneuver.   A weakly 
bound relationship, on the other hand, is one in which members face few significant 
exit costs and maintain their freedom of action (Weber 1997). 
 
Figure 6. Weber's Continuum of Cooperative Security Arrangements 
 
 Weber’s cooperative security continuum, illustrated above in Figure 6, 
suggests that institutional bindingness increases as a security relationship moves from 
positions on the left toward those on the right.  Locating and measuring those 
positions on the continuum is a more difficult proposition, however.  As Weber does 
not define or distinguish clearly between formal and informal alliances (which 




relationship – a confederation –whose position on the continuum can be plotted with 
any confidence.  This conceptual imprecision is problematic, particularly when 
applied to the study of intelligence, where a broad range of conceivable 
relationships74 exists to the left of the ‘confederation’ position.  How does one 
measure the bindingness of these relationships?  In subsequent writings on this 
subject, Weber and Smith suggest a useful starting point: 
We can often detect this deontological change in terms of rule-making when 
commitments change from a weaker formulation (“ought” or “should” or 
“shall”) to an explicit imperative (“will” or “must”). A more binding 
commitment also often involves greater clarity and formality in terms of the 
rule-specification; in other words, a general “rule of thumb” or “unwritten 
rule” becomes a specific, written rule (or even a law) as one moves along the 
continuum.  Accordingly, rights and responsibilities become far more explicit 
and third-party dispute resolution, monitoring, and sanctions become more 
common (Weber and Smith 2004, 11-12). 
  
 When it comes to evaluating the bindingness of security relationships, clarity 
and formality serve as potentially useful distinctions.  Clarity is defined in this study 
as the semantic precision governing a mutual commitment – perhaps manifested as 
the difference between two parties declaring a mutual commitment to one another’s 
defense, on the one hand, and agreeing to specific details about how that commitment 
will be carried out, on the other.  Likewise, formality is defined as the degree of 
reputational investment that both sides have made in the relationship. Formality 
enables us to distinguish between a verbal agreement between principals and a written 
agreement that has been endorsed by both governments.  In general, it follows that 
written agreements with sunset provisions and specific implementation language are 
indicative of a relatively binding relationship, whereas verbal agreements with very 
                                                 





general (or no) implementation language are less binding.  This is illustrated in Table 
1 below. 
 
Table 1. Bindingness as a Function of Clarity and Formality of Commitment 
 
The distinction between verbal and written agreements is probably less 
significant in the intelligence sphere than in the realm of general security cooperation.  
This owes both to the highly private nature of bilateral intelligence exchange (that 
hidden “world within a world” of intelligence diplomacy described earlier by 
Aldrich) and the corresponding reduction in public reputational investment made by 
the parties.  If either party defects from a secretive intelligence sharing arrangement, 
the public costs associated with that decision will generally be less (e.g., in terms of 
international prestige) than they would be following defection from a publicly 
proclaimed alliance.  Nevertheless, the private exit costs (e.g., in terms of loss of 
capability, forfeiture of fixed assets, etc.) could still be quite significant, which helps 
to explain why some intelligence partners explicitly “structure their commitments to 




Measuring the independent variables 
Polity score.  The dyadic democratic peace argument requires that one 
ascertain whether a WCID is fully liberal democratic or, alternatively, consists of one 
fully liberal democratic country and one fully autocratic country.  These values can be 
ascertained by obtaining the polity scores (derived from the Polity IV dataset 
described above) of the UK, US, and USSR from 1940 through 1945. 
  Level of external threat and transaction costs.  The relational contracting 
argument requires that one measure the levels of external threat and transaction costs 
facing the members of the WCID.  Weber operationalizes the level of external 
threat as a function of the military strength and geographic proximity of a potential 
aggressor (Weber 1997, 331).  This is premised on the long-held assertion that “states 
that are nearby pose a greater threat than those that are far away” (Walt 1985, 10).  As 
seemingly straightforward as this relationship appears, it has proven much more 
difficult to measure in practice. 
This is seen first in the attribute of military strength, which is presumed to 
have some potential bearing on the perceived likelihood of an enemy attack, along 
with the estimated damage that would result from such an attack, on one or both of 
the WCID members’ homelands.  Military strength is typically captured with proxy 
measurements such as relative annual military expenditures and the number of 
standing military personnel.  These measurements tend to “conceal gross 
inefficiencies” and often say very little about the ability of states to harness and 




Military strength is also problematic as a proxy because it lies in the eye of the 
beholder(s), which introduces the problem of misperception on the part of the 
threatened.  Even assuming that a potential aggressor’s military capabilities could be 
accurately quantified, the threatened state must still grapple with the problems of 
uncertainty and intent.  Such concerns can lead decision-makers to “see imaginary 
dangers… that critical observers regard as miniscule” (Jervis 1976, 372-373).  It is 
therefore unlikely that one country’s military strength will present itself as an 
objective and immutable fact to all other countries in the international system.75   
Geographic proximity is likewise presumed to shape the level of external 
threat because, per Walt, “states that are nearby pose a greater threat than those that 
are far away” (Walt 1985, 18).  This is a seemingly more straightforward proxy to 
measure, given that the physical distance separating two countries is generally less 
subject to interpretation. The Correlates of War (COW) project was among the first 
research initiatives to apply standard units of measurements to geographic proximity, 
focusing specifically on direct contiguity relationships over land and water between 
states in the international system (Gochman 1991).   
COW’s traditional measurements represent a sensible approach for dealing 
with contiguous dyads, but they are arguably less useful for dealing with pairs of non-
contiguous countries aligned against a common non-contiguous enemy.  For the cases 
selected in this study, only one stable contiguous relationship existed during the 
period of observation:  the less than 400 miles of water separating Germany and the 
UK from 1866 through 1945.   In accordance with COW’s criteria, none of the other 
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relevant pairings – USSR/Germany, UK/Japan and US/Japan – can be measured, 
since by definition they are not instances of contiguity (Correlates of War Project 
2007). 
 As I shall argue in the ensuing chapters, the role of external threat in my 
selected cases is arguably moot.  While one could debate the extent to which the 
USSR viewed some of the other Axis powers as external threats, by 1940 it appears 
that all three countries (US, UK, and USSR) had come to appreciate the imminent and 
mortal threat posed by the Axis Powers.76  Indeed, by this time all three countries had 
explicitly identified Nazi Germany and Japan as a common target of their respective 
intelligence efforts. 
To the extent that parties involved in ad hoc cooperation are uncertain about 
their future prospects of cooperation and fear defection, that relationship can be said 
to have high transaction costs.   As noted previously, Weber identities transaction 
costs as the second of her two independent variables, and she conceptualizes them as 
a function of three attributes:  asset specificity, environmental uncertainty and 
heterogeneity between states.  The first of these, asset specificity, provides a useful 
mechanism for measuring transaction costs.  As one country invests a greater 
proportion of its asset-specific goods in an ad hoc intelligence relationship with 
another country, the former begins to fear the possibility and associated costs of the 
latter’s defection.  States invested in such a relationship are inclined, per relational 
contracting theory, to abandon the ad hoc market in favor of a more formalized 
relationship that locks in the benefits of intelligence cooperation. 
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IR scholars tend to view asset specificity through the lens of traditional 
economic factors of production.  Just as certain types of economic activities involve 
investments in highly specialized land, labor and physical capital, so too do 
cooperative security and intelligence arrangements among nations.  Weber points to 
the examples of “highly trained men, specialized equipment, or specific sites that 
states otherwise would not invest in or could not readily shift to” (Weber 1997, 333). 
Lake emphasizes the role of specialized divisions of labor and technological 
investments resulting in joint production economies, which in many cases cannot be 
realized by either party outside of the relationship (Lake and Powell 1999, 9).  Walsh 
highlights instruments of “intelligence collection and analysis” focused on highly 
specific problems and not easily transferable to other targets or intelligence problems 
(Walsh 2007, 157-158).    
Not all assets invested in a foreign intelligence liaison relationships map 
neatly to a single side of the transactional ledger, however.   Bilateral intelligence 
cooperation frequently involves personnel from both sides interacting directly with 
one another, as well as sharing and discussing sensitive information.  It is often this 
diverse set of interpersonal relationships that constitute the truly asset-specific goods, 
rather than the “broadly-defined factors of production (labor, capital, and land) that 
feature in standard general equilibrium models of trade” (Hainmueller and Hiscox 
2007, 3). 
Determining whether a particular investment is ‘asset-specific’ requires that 
two questions be answered.  First, can the supplier of that asset easily find other 




In terms of Anglo-Soviet and Anglo-American intelligence cooperation during the 
Second World War, the answer to both questions appears to be a definitive ‘no.’ It is 
difficult to think of any Allied military intelligence asset observed during this 
period—whether Russian Order of Battle data, raw US intercept of Japanese 
communications, or British cryptologic expertise—that conceivably could have been 
obtained from alternative sources or exchanged with alternative partners.  I will 
expand upon this argument in the next two chapters. 
Weber argues further that as levels of environmental uncertainty increase, 
actors that make highly asset-specific investments face high transaction costs, and 
thus have a stronger incentive to lock in the benefits of cooperation through more 
binding arrangements.  Without offering an explicit definition of uncertainty,77 she 
measures this variable as ‘high’ or ‘low’ depending upon the number of Great Powers 
in the international system and the presence or absence of clear, consistent signaling 
between states (Weber 1997, 331-332).  I argue that the level of uncertainty is high 
and constant in both the Anglo-Soviet and Anglo-American cases, given that the ‘fog 
of war’ prevents intelligence organizations from knowing the consequences of their 
actions.  Likewise, the secretive nature of intelligence exchange precludes actors from 
signaling their true preferences in public—a critical mechanism that allows one’s 
counterparts to infer what type of intelligence organization it is dealing with (Morrow 
1999, 86).  I therefore treat uncertainty as an environmental constant in both case 
studies. 
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Weber’s final determinant of transaction costs is heterogeneity—a function of 
linguistic, religious, cultural, and political difference between countries.  According 
to Weber, “the greater the degree of heterogeneity between countries, the greater the 
likelihood of language problems, misunderstandings, and disagreements, and 
therefore the greater the need for translation, arbitration, and costly coordination, 
which increase transaction costs significantly” (Weber 1997, 333).  In sum, she 
expects to see greater institutional ‘bindingness’ between heterogeneous societies 
because the increased costs of doing business will compel such states to ‘exit the 
market’ and enter into a more institutionalized arrangement with one another.   
Weber does not specify how this variable is to be measured, but an intra-
WCID measurement can be derived from a simple comparison of the common 
language of government and the political system (democracy vs. autocracy) of each 
WCID member.  Language differences, as Weber herself has indicated, can create an 
observable demand for translators and language training.  Likewise, the effects of 
political heterogeneity may manifest themselves in the private deliberations of WCID 
participants—who may express reservations about sharing intelligence with an 
authoritarian government or, alternatively, comment favorably on the idea of 
engaging in intelligence cooperation with a fellow democracy (Ibid.). 
Summary 
This chapter began with a discussion of two IR theoretical traditions that I 
have adapted and leveraged to explain different features of the depth of bilateral 
intelligence cooperation:  the dyadic democratic peace argument and relational 




arguments, case selection criteria were devised to facilitate the theory development 
and testing objectives of this dissertation.  I ultimately selected two cases with highly 
similar background conditions:  World War II-era intelligence cooperation involving 
the Anglo-Soviet and Anglo-American WCIDs.  Testing procedures and 
measurement procedures were then developed for both arguments.  With these 








Chapter 4: Anglo-Soviet Case Study 
Setting the Scene 
 The official war diaries of the British Military Mission to Moscow (aka 30 
Mission78) suggest that there was no shortage of “very anxious and dangerous 
moments” that threatened to jeopardize the Anglo-Soviet wartime intelligence 
alliance against Hitler’s Germany.  While it is tempting to view these episodes as 
simple byproducts of the immediate pressures and challenges of the war, one should 
not underestimate the extent to which past experiences also shaped British views of 
the Soviet Union as a foreign intelligence liaison partner (and vice-versa). Indeed, the 
creation of a military and intelligence alliance with the U.S.S.R. cut directly against 
what one 30 Mission official described as “the general legacy of suspicion and 
mistrust inherited from [anti-Soviet British] policies of the [previous] 25 years.”   The 
details of that legacy are important, as they in many ways prefigured the contentious 
dynamics of the Anglo-Soviet intelligence alliance.79 
Inauspicious beginnings 
Anglo-Soviet relations did not get off to an encouraging start.  Britain, having 
backed the anti-Bolshevik ‘White’ forces during the Russian Civil War, became a 
target of Soviet-sponsored sedition, propaganda and espionage efforts as early as the 
1920s.  While Moscow probably viewed other Western capitalist democracies (e.g., 
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Germany) as being more susceptible to communist revolution in the near term, the 
relative significance of Britain in these machinations should not be discounted.  ‘The 
Island’80 epitomized the very capitalist political order that the Soviet Union sought to 
overturn:  a pre-eminent imperialist power that was home to both potential allies (an 
excitable labor movement) and enemies (a sizable ‘White Russians’ émigré 
population,81 not to mention the British Conservative Party) of communist revolution 
(Payne 2004, 29; Malia 1995, 159; West and Tsarev 1999, 45).   
At the same time as it was sponsoring subversive activities against the UK, the 
Soviet Union was also pursuing normalized trade and diplomatic relations with 
London (Bennett 1999, 69).  By 1921, three disastrous years of War Communism had 
resulted in “an extraordinary primitivization of Russian life” in which factory, mine 
and agricultural outputs had dropped to levels well below their historical norms 
(Malia 1994, 129; 143; Payne 2004, 296).  Lenin’s New Economic Policy (NEP) 
sought to regain this lost capacity through the implementation of a mixed economy, 
but the success of that project hinged on the availability of capital that the young 
Soviet state could not muster domestically (Malia 1994, 163).    
Against this backdrop, a normalization of relations with the UK began to 
make sense for the Soviet Union.  The British Government was in a position to 
forgive (or at the very least, restructure) significant portions of Russia’s pre-
revolutionary war debt.  Normalized relations would also afford Moscow access to 
Western technology, credits and grain—assets that potentially could help the USSR 
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grow out of its economic doldrums.  London saw potential value in normalization as 
well.  The British Foreign Secretary speculated that Moscow was in such dire 
economic straits that it was prepared “to pay almost any price” for British 
assistance—including the “cessation of Bolshevik hostility” within Britain’s 
traditional sphere of influence, to include India (Glenny 1970, 65-66).   
Bilateral negotiations ultimately led to the signing of the Anglo-Soviet Trade 
Agreement in 1921.  While the agreement stopped short of conferring formal British 
recognition on the USSR (this would come three years later under the First Labour 
Government of Ramsay MacDonald), it did yield positive returns for Moscow. Most 
notably, Russia went on to enjoy a positive balance of trade with the UK and was 
relieved of its obligation to repay Tsarist war debt (Ibid., 81-82).  
Normalization offered fewer benefits for London.  Contrary to Soviet 
assurances of an end to “hostile action or undertaking against Britain … or the British 
Empire,” the Moscow-based Communist International (Comintern) continued to 
sponsor subversive activities on both fronts (Bennett 1999, 7).  Perhaps the only 
notable difference in Soviet behavior was seen in its increased use of proxies, which 
provided Moscow with plausible deniability of a broad range of illicit activities 
carried out on its behalf.  Evidence of this was seen as early as the mid-1920s, when 
the USSR funneled money through the Communist Party of Britain (CPGB) and the 
National Minority Movement (NMM) to foment British labor disputes (Flory 1977, 
710-711).  The UK Intelligence establishment managed to uncover some of these 
activities, but in most cases the British Government did not act against them because 




Two dramatic and highly publicized episodes also played an important role in 
shaping British views of the USSR.  The first of these, the 1924 publication of the so-
called Zinoviev letter, ignited a political firestorm in Britain through its depiction of 
an ambitious Soviet campaign of subversion and a seeming ignorance of (if not 
indifference toward) this activity by the MacDonald Government.  The letter, 
ostensibly written by the President of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, 
called on the CPGB to agitate within Britain for ratification of the aforementioned 
Anglo-Soviet trade agreement.  According to the letter, ratification would enable the 
Soviet Union to “extend and develop the propaganda of ideas of Leninism in England 
and the Colonies.”82  A copy of this document was leaked to the Daily Mail, which 
published it four days before British parliamentary elections (Bennett 1999, 1-4).   
Questions surrounding the provenance and authenticity of the Zinoviev letter 
would later undermine its credibility as prima facie evidence of Soviet subversion.83 
While it is debatable whether the letter had any tangible effect on the already 
weakened Labour Government’s margin of defeat,84 it seemed to confirm in the 
minds of many British Government officials what the Home and Foreign Offices had 
long suspected:  that the USSR was pulling the strings of the CPGB, coordinating a 
campaign of communist subversion and meddling within the UK, and violating the 
                                                 
82 From Mr. MacDonald to M. Rakovsky. “Enclosure in No. 1.” History of the Zinoviev 
Incident. TNA CAB 24/168. October 24, 1924, 2.  
83 Today the Zinoviev letter is widely regarded as a forgery.  While the true author remains 
unknown, historians have posited a general story line in which White Russian Intelligence Services 
produced the document, which in turn fell into the hands of British Intelligence operatives who already 
suspected the Soviet Union of engaging in this type of behavior and “were on the look-out for 
opportunities to further the Conservative cause in Britain” (Bennett 1999, 92; West and Tsarev, 1999, 
33-43). 
84 It is worth recalling that the Government had already lost a vote of confidence at the time of 




spirit of the normalized diplomatic and trade relationship which it had pledged to 
pursue in good faith (Ibid., 54-55).    
It was precisely these sorts of activities that led high-ranking British officials 
to conclude that the Soviet Union had become a “purely negative and destructive” 
force in international politics (Little 1988, 293).  During the Second World War, a 
number of high-ranking 30 Mission officials would harbor similar suspicions about 
the willingness of their Russian counterparts to cooperate in good faith on such basic 
matters as routine information exchange and repatriation of escaped British POWs on 
Russian soil. 
If the Zinoviev letter constituted the first significant blow to Anglo-Soviet 
relations, then the May 1927 raid of the All-Russian Cooperative Society (Arcos) was 
surely the coup de grâce.  The raid, conducted by the London Metropolitan Police, 
was organized in response to an allegation that a missing British War Department 
document had been secreted to the Arcos facility for photocopying by Soviet agents.  
While the raid was unsuccessful in recovering the alleged document, it yielded what 
may have been the first publicly reported evidence of Moscow’s use of its official 
diplomatic and trade facilities in Britain for subversive purposes.  British authorities 
seized over “250,000 pieces of incriminating evidence [from the raid], including 
secret ciphers, propaganda films and addresses of [Communist Party] members 
throughout the world” (Flory 1977, 716).  This evidence, combined with secret 
information already in possession of the British Government, was cited as rationale 
for severing diplomatic relations with Moscow and expelling the Soviet diplomatic 




stationed in Britain, Moscow delegated responsibility for foreign intelligence-
gathering to a vast and growing network of ‘illegals’ (Russians residing in Britain 
under assumed names and identities) (West and Tsarev 1999, 44-45).   
The Arcos Raid may have had an impact on the conduct of Soviet 
communications security (COMSEC) practices as well.  Until 1927, the Kremlin had 
been under the false impression that Britain was unable to process and exploit its 
encrypted diplomatic communications with Soviet personnel in London.  That 
changed in the aftermath of the Arcos Raid, when the British Government — 
convinced that it had a limited window in which to act — selectively declassified and 
published secret Foreign Office documents in order to buttress its claims that London-
based Soviet diplomats were involved in Russian espionage operations (Flory 1977, 
719-720).    
As the Arcos accusations and supporting evidence were made public, Moscow 
deduced that some of the incriminating information must have come from intercepted 
and decrypted USSR communications.  Moscow responded by switching to a One 
Time Pad (OTP) cipher system which reportedly “defied [British] cryptanalysis for 
some time” (McKay 1997).  The Soviet Union’s reputation for effective 
counterintelligence – coupled with a capacity for exploiting the vulnerabilities of 
open and democratic government — would become a constant source of concern for 
30 Mission, which feared that any indiscretions by its personnel in Moscow would be 
discovered by the Soviet Secret Police and intelligence services. 
Notwithstanding Britain’s decision to renew diplomatic recognition of the 




cooperation during the Spanish Civil War, bilateral relations remained tense and 
confrontational (Smith 1996, 7-8).   During the 1930s British diplomats began to 
attribute the rise of communist party membership in Western and Southern Europe to 
Soviet and Comintern meddling (Little 1988, 293-294).  Perhaps not coincidentally, 
the Comintern became a prime target of British signals intelligence collection efforts 
during this same decade (McKay 1997). 
* * * * * * * * * * *  
These troubled beginnings help to explain how an atmosphere of mutual 
mistrust and unease had instantiated itself in both countries on the eve of Hitler’s 
invasion of Poland.  Grim reports of Stalin’s purges and Russia’s historic fickleness 
as a British ally—exemplified by the Bolsheviks’ abandonment of the Allied cause in 
World War I and the more recent Nazi-Soviet Pact—had contributed to a highly 
negative impression of the Soviet Union among the limited pool of ‘Russia hands’ 
who would be assigned to 30 Mission (Smith 1996, 7; Searle 2008, 77).  During the 
war these anti-Soviet prejudices would occasionally manifest themselves in private 
Mission correspondence. 
The Soviet Union, for its part, was uncomfortable with the prospect of 
capitalist intelligence officers operating openly on Russian soil and interacting with 
Soviet intelligence personnel.  Stalin continued to harbor suspicions of a Western 
capitalist plot to sell out Russia to Hitler.   He seems to have been particularly 
suspicious of Allied initiatives (e.g., Operation Velvet) that threatened to create 




sensitive sphere of intelligence.85   Accordingly, the Kremlin sought to reign in the 
travels, activities and size of 30 Mission during its tenure in Moscow (Choi 2003).   
The road to 30 Mission 
The possibility of a Anglo-Soviet wartime intelligence alliance emerged as 
early as June of 1940, when the Churchill Government put out feelers to Stalin 
regarding the possibility of wartime cooperation against Hitler.  The prime minister’s 
tepidly worded proposal, submitted via the British Ambassador to Moscow, called for 
the creation of an Anglo-Soviet arrangement to counter Nazi expansionism in Europe.  
In exchange, Britain was prepared to maintain the status quo antebellum in its 
relations with Moscow.   
Stalin declined this initial offer of assistance.  Nevertheless, the overture was 
significant because it signaled Churchill’s willingness to set aside decades of anti-
Communist posturing and make common cause with Moscow against Hitler’s 
Germany.  Churchill again reached out to Stalin in April of 1941, this time by sharing 
‘sanitized’ intelligence of an imminent German invasion of the USSR.  In mid-June 
the British foreign minister went a step further, informing the Soviet Ambassador that 
London was prepared to create and staff an inter-service military mission in Moscow, 
should Germany initiate hostile action against the USSR.  The purpose of this mission 
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would be to coordinate the delivery of military supplies to Soviet forces and establish 
intelligence links with Soviet service element counterparts (Smith 1996, 13-18).   
Later that month, the Soviet Ambassador assented to the British proposal on 
the condition that there would be ‘strict reciprocity’ in every detail.  The first 
members of 30 Mission arrived in Moscow on 27 June.86  In early July a parallel 
Soviet Mission was stood up in London.  Thus it came to be that, within a matter of 
weeks following the initiation of Operation Barbarossa, an Anglo-Soviet intelligence 
alliance and military assistance effort was underway. 
London was nevertheless uncertain whether its support would turn the tide of 
war in Stalin’s favor.  During the early summer months of 1941, Britain’s Joint 
Intelligence Council (JIC) had made consistently pessimistic predictions of Russia’s 
prospects in a Soviet-Nazi war.  One JIC assessment concluded that Hitler’s forces 
would defeat the Soviets in less than two months.  Given this bleak outlook, 30 
Mission’s objectives were relatively modest.  Its principal near-term goals were to 
prolong the Russian war effort (and thus “keep the pot boiling” against Hitler) and 
collect as much useful intelligence as possible on Germany and the Soviet Union.  In 
the event of a Soviet collapse, 30 Mission planned to retreat to unoccupied parts of 
the country, gather intelligence and coordinate Russian resistance efforts (Smith 
1996, 13-15).   
Without the benefit of direct access to Soviet archival materials, it is difficult 
to obtain a parallel view into Stalin’s calculus for establishing a military supply and 
intelligence relationship with Britain.  Given the depleted nature of the Russian 
                                                 




military arsenal and the relative dearth of Soviet technological expertise during this 
period, it is possible that he viewed British military assistance as an equalizer in the 
fight against Hitler’s forces.  The prospect of benefiting from the esteemed and well-
sourced British intelligence services was probably a powerful incentive as well.   
The Soviet Union might also have perceived an opportunity to extract certain 
concessions from London.  On several occasions during the summer of 1941, 
Molotov and the SGS sought assurances that the British would act immediately to 
“relieve pressure on the Russian front”–both by launching counter-force air strikes in 
Western Germany and orchestrating the sabotage of Romanian oil fields.87  This 
demand for a second front would become a consistent Soviet refrain during the war.  
So long as it went unfulfilled, Moscow feared that it would be forced to shoulder a 
disproportionate share of the fighting among the Allied partners.  
Description of intelligence cooperation machinery 
30 Mission served as Britain’s central clearinghouse in Russia for military 
supply and intelligence exchange with the Soviet General Staff.  Each service section 
was responsible for coordinating shipments of British military equipment (e.g., tanks, 
munitions and ammunition) to Russia and overseeing their proper use by the 
appropriate Soviet forces.  Each section was also responsible for providing its 
Russian counterparts with various types of enemy and technical information in 
exchange for operational intelligence from the Eastern Front.  In addition, the British 
service sections were responsible for gathering information on the composition, 
disposition and overall performance of the Soviet military.  Figure 7 illustrates how 
                                                 




this division of effort was implemented within a typical 30 Mission military service 
branch section, circa 1944. 
 
Figure 7. Organizational Division of Effort for 30 Mission 
 
With the exception of a brief period in late 1941 when the Mission was 
relocated to Kuibyshev during the Battle of Moscow, 30 Mission was headquartered 
in the Russian capital.  Table 2 lists the rotating cast of senior British officers who 
filled the post of 30 Mission chief, who was responsible for overseeing the three 
military service branch sections (Army, Royal Air Force and Navy) and an 
administrative support staff.88  During the latter half of 1941 and early 1942, an 
Accredited ‘Y’89 (Signals Intelligence) Representative was also attached to the 
                                                 
88 “British Military Mission to U.S.S.R. (Army Section).” 30 Mission War Diary, March 
1944, Appendix DD. TNA WO 178/27. March 1944. 
89 In the 1943 BRUSA Agreement, “Y” was defined as intelligence concerning the 
“intercepting, decoding, interpreting, classifying and dissemination of enemy (and neutral) 
communications, and the use of D/F [direction-finding] and other specialized apparatus for 
establishing locations and identities of enemy transmitters.”  Special Intelligence, by contrast, was a 




Mission.90  Taken together, these four units performed the bulk of Britain’s wartime 
liaison activities in Russia.91  Of these, the Army section appears to have had the most 
expansive and operationally significant liaison role.  With most of the Eastern front 
fighting occurring on land, a significant proportion of related intelligence fell under 
the Army’s purview. 
British Military Mission - Moscow (30 Mission) 
Chiefs of Mission Dates of service 
Lt. Gen. Sir Frank Noel Mason-Macfarlane (B.A.) June 1940 – May 1942 
Rear Adm. G.J.A. Miles (R.N.) May 1942 – March 1943 
Lt. Gen. Giffard LeQuesne Martel (B.A.) April 1943 – Feb. 1944 
Lt. Gen. M.B. Burrows (B.A.) March 1944 – Nov. 1944 
Adm. E.R. Archer (R.N.) Nov. 1944 – May 1945 
Lt. Gen. Sir J.A.H. Gammell (B.A.) May 1945 – Sept. 1945 
  
Soviet Military Liaison Structure – Moscow 
SGS officers assigned to liaise with 30 Mission Dates of service 
Lt. Gen. Golkiov June - July 1941 
Maj. Gen. Panfilov July 1941 – Sept. 1942 
Maj. Gen. Dubinin Sept. 1942 - Nov. 1943 
Maj./Lt. Gen. Slavin Nov. 1943 - Aug. 1945 
   
Chiefs of Otdel V.S. Dates of service 
Lt. Col./Maj. Gen. Evstigneev Aug. 1941 - Sept. 1944 
Maj. Gen. Kutuzov Oct. 1944 - Aug. 1945 
Source:  WO 178/25, WO 178/26, WO 178/27, WO 208/1787.   
Table 2. Anglo-Soviet Liaison Structure and Key Personnel, 1941-1945 
 
Most British meeting requests with the SGS were channeled through the 
Soviet liaison element known as the Otdel.  Direct contacts with the SGS were 
limited and tightly regulated.  Among the few exceptions in this regard were the Nazi 
                                                                                                                                           
difficulty of solution” (Special Intelligence A) or intelligence “derived from the solution of lower 
grade ciphers” that were often used tactically (Sims 1997, 31; 33-34). 
90 “Charter for Lieut. Colonel Crankshaw (Draft).” TNA HW 61/37. July 1942. 
91 Naval liaison activities during this period were relatively decentralized.  British Naval 
Liaison Offices (BNLOs) were established in the south and north of the country.  The northern BNLO 





OB exchanges, which occurred on a fairly regular basis from the summer of 1941 
through early 1945.  In those rare instances in which 30 Mission personnel were 
granted permission to visit Soviet forces on the Eastern front, it was not unusual for 
the Otdel to send along a commissar or staff officer to “act as a break on local 
commanders” who might otherwise be inclined to speak candidly with their British 
guests.92 
30 Mission leadership came to view the Otdel as the principal impediment to 
Anglo-Soviet intelligence exchange.  British impressions of the organization were 
effectively summed up in 1942 by the head of 30 Mission’s Army Section, who 
faulted the Otdel for “imposing intolerable delays on the transaction of business, 
preventing personal contacts between the [British] Mission and the SGS, and 
generally exhibiting all of the worst characteristics of a 'post-office' department.”93  In 
internal correspondence, 30 Mission officials regularly lambasted Otdel personnel for 
their perceived incompetence, inefficiency and ignorance of substantive matters.  
These impressions worsened throughout the war, eventually prompting the Chief of 
30 Mission to protest in writing to his Soviet counterpart that the “officers of the 
Otdel do not fully understand the meaning of the word liaison."94 
                                                 
92 From 30 Mission to Troopers. MIL 6078. 30 Mission War Diary, 28th May to 27th June 
1942, Appendix F.F. TNA WO 178/26. June 26, 1942, 1. This practice continued well after Stalin’s 
official disbandment of the commissar system in October of 1942. 
93 Exham to DMI, WO. 30 Mission War Diary, 28th June to 27th July, 1942, Appendix V. TNA 
WO 178/26. July 17, 1942, 1-2. 
94 From Rear Adm. Archer to Maj. Gen. Slavin. “Requests of a Technical Nature.” 30 Mission 





As discussed previously in Chapter Three, two rival hypotheses will be 
examined in this chapter: 
• The dyadic democratic peace hypothesis (H1) posits a relationship 
between the depth of bilateral foreign intelligence cooperation and the 
regime composition of a WCID.  To wit, fully democratic dyads (those 
consisting of two democratic governments) are expected to reach and 
maintain higher levels of intelligence cooperation during a war than 
mixed dyads (i.e., those consisting of a democracy and an autocracy).     
 
• The relational contracting hypothesis (H2), by contrast, posits 
variance between the bindingness of bilateral foreign intelligence 
cooperation and a combination of two factors:  level of external threat 
and transaction costs facing WCID members.  The higher the level of 
threat and/or transaction costs incurred, the greater the degree of 
bindingness is expected to be. 
 
In this section I explain my rationale for choosing the 30 Mission War Diaries 
as my primary data source.  I then measure values over the posited dependent and 
independent variables with a view to testing the relationships posited by each theory.  
I also consider observable implications for each theory and assess the extent to which 
case outcomes cohere with (or alternatively, depart from) expectations. 
Rationale for data selection 
I recognized early in my research that no single data set would be able to 
cover all wartime intelligence interactions between the UK and USSR.  The sheer 
number of exchange channels—e.g., military, diplomatic and political—made that 
impossible.  In the absence of a master dataset, I settled upon the 30 Mission War 




178/26; and WO 178/27).95  In addition to their relative consistency and level of 
detail over the duration of the alliance, the diaries document the activities of an 
organization that served as the epicenter of the Anglo-Soviet military intelligence 
relationship during the Second World War.  From its inception in 1941 through its 
dissolution in late 1945, 30 Mission served as Britain’s lead intelligence unit in the 
Soviet Union.  I was unable to identify any other single unit or element whose records 
and correspondence would better reflect the nature of Anglo-Soviet military 
intelligence cooperation during this period. 
In none of the above respects did the 30 Mission records disappoint.  I was 
heartened to discover, for instance, that nearly every month of the alliance was 
represented in the dataset.  Most of the monthly records contain detailed records of 30 
Mission’s inter-service activities in Moscow, as well as blow-by-blow accounts of its 
dealings with Soviet personnel and headquarters elements in Britain.  From these 
records I was able to generate a dataset of 854 instances of contact between 30 
Mission personnel and their Soviet counterparts from June of 1941 through August of 
1945.  My working definition of ‘instances of contact’ was deliberately broad.  I 
recorded every reported instance involving at least one member of 30 Mission 
interacting with at least one Soviet counterpart in any of a variety of venues or modes 
of communication, to include meetings and site visits, as well as written and oral 
correspondence. 
                                                 
95 I obtained access to the records during a September 2008 research trip to the UK National 
Archives, as well as through the services of a London-based professional researcher whom I hired to 





Testing the dyadic democratic peace argument 
Measuring the dependent variable 
 
For the dyadic democratic peace argument, I operationalize the depth of 
intelligence cooperation as a function of two key factors:  frequency of contact and 
the nature and granularity of intelligence exchanged.  These provide a longitudinal 
basis for charting the intensity of bilateral intelligence cooperation between the UK 
and USSR during World War II. 
Frequency of contact.  Despite the establishment and staffing of joint service 
military missions in both countries through war’s end, there is no evidence to suggest 
that the Anglo-Soviet WCID ever reached the high and sustained levels of 
intelligence cooperation observed in the Anglo-American WCID.  On the contrary, 
after an initial honeymoon period during the summer of 1941, Anglo-Soviet 
intelligence cooperation diminished at a fairly steady rate.  Following the termination 
of military operations in Europe, the Anglo-Soviet military intelligence relationship 
appears to have dissolved altogether (Smith 1996, 247).   
This reduction in the frequency of Anglo-Soviet intelligence exchange is 
illustrated in Figure 8 and Figure 9.  Figure 8 displays the number of monthly face-to-
face meetings involving participants from both the SGS and the British Military 
Mission in Moscow (aka ’30 Mission’) from 1941 through 1945.  Figure 9 examines 
the relationship from a slightly different perspective, measuring inter-service military 
meeting frequency as a function of quarterly Meeting Opportunity Realization Rate 
(MORR).96  Despite the aforementioned honeymoon period in early 1941 and two 
                                                 
96 MORR was defined earlier as the percentage of total calendar days during a given quarter 




notable activity spikes in 1942,97 the overarching trend in both figures is one of 
diminishing direct interaction – with the 3rd Quarter of 1943 (July to September) 
serving as the proverbial ‘point of no return’ for bilateral intelligence cooperation. 
The only sustained increase in Anglo-Soviet meeting activity appears to have 
occurred during a three-month period in 1943 just prior to the onset of the 3rd Quarter.  
It was during this period that the SGS held a series of unusually detailed discussions 
with 30 Mission personnel on Russian military tactics and the organization of the 
Soviet fighting forces.  The Chief of 30 Mission, Lt. Gen. Martel, was encouraged by 
this unexpected increase in exchange.  In private correspondence with the British War 
Department, he cited these developments as possible evidence of Russia’s willingness 
to “take [30 Mission] more into their confidence.”98 
                                                                                                                                           
purposes. 
97 January and May of 1942 were the only months during the war in which the observed 
change in number of meetings (relative to the previous month’s total) exceeded the standard deviation 
(4.96) of the average observed monthly change (.02) throughout the war. January saw an increase of 12 
meetings relative to the previous month and May saw an increase of 9. 
98 Martel. “Report No. 2 from the British Military Mission in Russia from Lt. Gen. G. L. 
Martel.” 30 Mission War Diary, 1st to 30th June 1943, Appendix B. TNA WO 178/27. June 15, 1943, 3. 
In hindsight, this observation would prove to be premature. From August 1943 through war’s end, the 
average number of face-to-face meetings between 30 Mission and the SGS declined to fewer than six 
per month.  By comparison, the average number of monthly meetings during the preceding period had 





Figure 8. Anglo-Soviet Intelligence Exchanges (Moscow), 1941-1945 
 
How is one to account for Moscow’s uncharacteristic levels of contact with 30 
Mission during this period?   It is worth recalling that in April of 1943, the SGS had 
uncovered Nazi plans to launch a pincer attack on the Kursk salient later that summer.  
Around the same time, British sources came across similar information about German 
intentions at Kursk and relayed the corroborating intelligence to Moscow—thus 
providing a short-term incentive for greater short-term cooperation with 30 Mission 
(Mulligan 1987, 241). There is some evidence to support this position.  In mid-June, 
for instance, General Martel noted that the Chief of the Red Army had “unusual[ly]” 
extended his personal thanks to 30 Mission for sharing information about the German 
forces.  Such direct expressions of gratitude from high-level Soviet military leaders 
were exceedingly rare.   In this case the remark may have been designed to nurture 
good will and encourage the continued supply of information concerning German 
activities and intentions on the Eastern Front.99 
                                                 





Figure 9. Anglo-Soviet MORR, 1941-1945 
Nature and granularity of intelligence cooperation.  The steady decline in 
face-to-face meetings between 30 Mission and the SGS provides one view into the 
state of Anglo-Soviet intelligence cooperation during World War II.  By themselves, 
however, measurements of frequency do not sufficiently capture the depth of bilateral 
intelligence cooperation.  For example, an overall decline in face-to-face exchanges 
could potentially obscure a deepening of cooperation in a single area of critical 
importance to the war effort.  These risks can be mitigated by developing and 
incorporating measurements for the granularity of intelligence exchanged between the 
two parties. 
To do this I first sought to identify a set of discrete intelligence goods that 
were exchanged in at least one calendar year quarter between SGS and 30 Mission, as 
observed in my dataset of 854 interactions.  I then devised a crude ordinal coding 




guidance outlined in Chapter Three, I measured granularity as a function of three 
attributes:  specificity (general vs. specific), sensitivity (innocuous vs. sensitive) and 
its estimated initial cost of acquisition to the supplier (cheap vs. expensive).  Table 3 
below defines each type of intelligence good and the granularity values that I 
assigned to each.100 
 
Table 3. Intelligence Goods and Estimated Granularity Measurements 
 
I chose to measure granularity of intelligence exchanged in face-to-face 
exchanges, which constitute approximately 51% of the 854 interactions in my dataset.  
                                                 
100 For the vast majority of intelligence topics and sub-topics (21 out of 23) listed in the table, 
coding values for all three attributes were applied consistently across cases.  Inconsistencies 
nevertheless surfaced in the coding of cases of ‘Chemical warfare’ and ‘Technical/Enemy.’ 
Intelligence goods falling into either of these categories occasionally varied dramatically in terms of 
their specificity, sensitivity and estimated costs of acquisition.  Rather than attempting to ‘paper over’ 
these discrepancies by assigning them uniform values, I made a conscious choice to code items in 




I did this for two reasons.  First, it provides a common unit of comparison with my 
other proxy variable (frequency of contact).  Second, I have greater confidence in the 
accuracy of the underlying measurements, since most of the face-to-face exchanges in 
this dataset are captured in a greater level of detail than other forms of interaction 
(e.g., letters and summaries of phone calls).    
So as not to dilute granularity scores by ‘averaging out’ multiple instances of 
exchange occurring on the same day, I based my measurements on the average 
maximum observed value of granularity exchanged (AMGIE) for each day in the 
dataset.  All told, intelligence goods were exchanged in face-to-face meetings on 376 
separate calendar days (approximately 21 per quarter).   
As illustrated in Figure 10, the granularity of intelligence goods exchanged 
between the SGS and 30 Mission appears to have followed a fairly consistent, 
downward trajectory—reaching its peak in early 1942 and declining in successive 
quarters from mid-1943 through war’s end.  That said, AMGIE appears to have been 
particularly volatile from mid-1942 through mid-1943.  Perhaps the single greatest 
contributor to this volatility was the sensitive matter of ‘Y.’  During the late summer 
months of 1942, 30 Mission’s newly accredited officer for ‘Y’ matters held a series of 
detailed discussions with the SGS on cryptologic efforts and radio direction-finding 
(DF) against enemy communications.  Just as momentum appeared to be building in 
this area, Moscow inexplicably put the brakes on all further ‘Y’ cooperation.  By the 
end of the year, the SGS had informed 30 Mission that Moscow wished to 
discontinue Anglo-Soviet ‘Y’ cooperation altogether.101  While this particular avenue 
                                                 
101 From Lt. Col. Crankshaw to Chairman, ‘Y’ Committee. MIL.7755. TNA HW 14/60. 




of cooperation did not dry up entirely, it never again reached the peak levels of 
activity observed during the Third Quarter of 1942.102 
When expanding the population to include all instances in which intelligence 
was exchanged (representing a total of 639 calendar days, or approximately 36 per 
quarter), AMGIE assumes a relatively smoother distribution.  As illustrated in Figure 
11, AMGIE gradually rose toward its peak level of 3.0 in the first Quarter of 1941, 
dropped significantly from mid-to late-1942, rose briefly during the Third Quarter of 
1943, and then tapered off sharply and conclusively thereafter. 
 
Figure 10. Anglo-Soviet AMGIE, 1941-1945 (Face-to-Face Meetings Only) 
                                                 






Figure 11. Anglo-Soviet AMGIE, 1941-1945 (All Encounters) 
 
Measuring the independent variable 
 
Testing the dyadic democratic peace hypothesis requires that we next measure 
the value of the independent variable and assess whether the observed values align as 
predicted by the theory.  This can be done by gathering measurements of the polity2 
values (derived from the Polity IV dataset) for the UK and USSR from 1940 through 
1945.  As expected, a comparison of these two countries reveals a pronounced 
difference in polity type.  The UK consistently registers scores of 10 from 1940 
through 1945, whereas the USSR consistently registers scores of -9.  This places the 
Anglo-Soviet WCID in the northwestern quadrant of the property space diagram 
displayed in Figure 5—an ‘ideal type’ mixed WCID, if ever there was one (Marshall, 




The clear separation of subtypes in this WCID — a fully institutionalized 
democracy allied with a near-fully institutionalized autocracy against a common 
enemy — and the erosion of observed bilateral intelligence cooperation are congruent 
with the dyadic democratic peace hypothesis, so far as it goes.  Nevertheless, these 
values by themselves do not explain how or why the level of observed Anglo-Soviet 
intelligence cooperation declined during the war.  To gain such insights, we will need 
to reexamine the causal logic of this argument – the aforementioned regime 
recognition dynamic – and test for its observable implications within the case.  
Testing for observable implications 
One of the underlying principles of the dyadic democratic peace proposition, 
as it has been adapted here, is that democratic members of a mixed WCID are 
expected to harbor suspicion and enmity toward their authoritarian counterparts.  
They are not expected to adhere to the norm of contingent consent because they fear 
the possibility of being exploited.  Under these circumstances uncertainty becomes 
unbounded and there is on longer a predictable range of expected behaviors. 
Democratic intelligence services in such a relationship will be especially alert to 
indications that their authoritarian counterparts are cheating.103  To the extent that 
these suspicions are confirmed (or are perceived as having been confirmed), 
democratic services will behave much as neo-realist theory suggests they should.   To 
wit, they will become increasingly concerned with the relative gains of their partners 
                                                 
103 Cheating, also known as defection, may occur in any number of forms discussed in Chapter 
Two, to include deliberately manipulating shared intelligence, sharing information with unauthorized 
third parties, withholding relevant intelligence or specific forms of intelligence cooperation, and 




and will resort to coercive tactics in their retaliation against perceived imbalances of 
intelligence exchange.  
Observable implications of the dyadic democratic peace proposition 
(1) The Soviet Union will exploit opportunities to tilt the terms of intelligence 
exchange permanently in its favor. 
Contingent 
consent 




(3) The Soviet Union will fail to meet Britain’s minimum expectations of 
expected behavior as an intelligence partner: 
a) British intelligence personnel will have direct access to their Soviet 
counterparts. 
b) Informational requests on matters concerning the common enemy will be 
answered in a prompt and direct fashion. 
c) The Soviet Union will afford British intelligence personnel sufficient 
latitude to carry out their official liaison duties in Russia. 
Table 4. Dyadic Democratic Peace Argument:  Anglo-Soviet Case Predictions 
 
If this application of the dyadic democratic peace proposition is to find 
empirical support, we should see evidence of its purported causal mechanism (the 
regime recognition dynamic) at work within the case.  While it is difficult to identify 
causal mechanisms through direct observation,104 they can be detected and measured 
indirectly through their observable implications.  Table 4 lists three of these, each 
addressing a specific causal mechanism of the dyadic argument. 
Case prediction #1: The Soviet Union will exploit opportunities to tilt the 
terms of intelligence exchange permanently in its favor. From the earliest stages of 
its intelligence alliance with the Soviet Union, 30 Mission stressed the necessity of 
maintaining balanced terms of exchange.  In a late June 1941 meeting with General 
Zhukov, senior Mission officers requested “reciprocal Russian intelligence for British 
use” in exchange for the intelligence and military supplies that Britain was already 
                                                 
104 Causal mechanisms are notoriously difficult to measure.  As one scholar has noted, the 
observed relationship between an independent and dependent variable may well be “measurable and 





providing.105  Later that fall, a visiting representative from Britain’s Government 
Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) informed his Soviet hosts that “none of the 
British material [that they had just discussed] would be handed to them other than on 
a basis of full reciprocity.”106  Well into the final year of fighting, 30 Mission would 
continue to push for reciprocity in its exchange of certain German and Allied 
technical information with the SGS.107    
Unfortunately for 30 Mission, the SGS was seldom authorized to make any 
binding decisions or commitments on such matters.  As noted previously, Stalin was 
concerned that the presence of UK personnel on Russian soil could trigger a ‘political 
contamination’ of the Soviet security services (Ulam 1974, 319 as cited in Choi 2003, 
152).108  In an effort to mitigate these perceived risks to Soviet political stability, most 
decisions concerning intelligence matters were referred to the Kremlin, whose 
“constant shadow” loomed over all variety of Anglo-Soviet exchanges.109  The extent 
                                                 
105 30 Mission War Diary, 21st June to 27th July 1941. TNA WO 178/25. June 28, 1941, 5. 
106 From Gp/Capt. Blandy to Head of R.A.F. Section, GCHQ. “‘Y’ Liaison Visit to Russia by 
S/Ldr. Scott Farnie.” TNA HW 14/20. September 22, 1941, 1. 
107 From 30 Mission to Troopers. MIL 2579. 30 Mission War Diary, 1st to 31st March 1945, 
Appendix I. TNA WO 178/27, 15 March 1945, 1; From Exham to Maj.-Gen. Kutuzov. “Requests of a 
Technical Nature.” 30 Mission War Diary, 1st to 31st March 1945, Appendix J. TNA WO 178/27, 15 
March 1945, 1. 
108 In an April 1944 letter, General Burrows reasoned that the Russians “dislike the idea of 
having a Mission on their doorstep” because it “means extra work for all their Secret Police 
organizations who are automatically bound to keep perpetual supervision of the movements of all 
foreigners; it means that many Russians who come into contact with the British officers and ORs must 
realize our higher standards of living at all levels; it means an inevitable increase in Black Market 
activities…” (From Lt. Gen. Burrows to DMI, WO. “30 Military Mission – Situation in Moscow on 15 
Apr 44.” 30 Mission War Diary, 1st to 30th April 1944, Appendix O. TNA WO 178/27. April 15, 1944, 
3). 
109 30 Mission War Diary, 28th July to 26th August 1941. TNA WO 178/25. July 30, 1941, 2-4. 
The War Diaries contain numerous anecdotes highlighting 30 Mission’s difficulties in establishing 
social relationships with its Soviet counterparts.  While the hand of the Kremlin is not always clearly 
visible in these episodes, the general progression of events – i.e., initial acceptance of an invitation, 
followed by an awkward eleventh-hour rejection – suggests a consistent pattern of intervention by a 




of the Kremlin’s influence is seen in two episodes from September of 1941.  In a 
private meeting between General Macfarlane and General Panfilov, the latter noted 
that neither he nor the Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshal Shaposhnikov, 
“were in a position” to provide their own impressions of fighting on the Russian 
front.  According to Panfilov, all such questions were “for the [Soviet] Government” 
to address.110  Later that month, Captain Scott Farnie participated in a series of 
exchanges with the Soviet ‘Y’ Service in which “no Russian Officer [was able] to 
answer a question when it [was] put to him” and “everything [had to] be referred to 
the Kremlin for a decision.”111   
The steady flow of military supplies and intelligence from the British, coupled 
with the stifling influence of the Kremlin and relative dearth of information provided 
by the SGS, raised concerns among a succession of 30 Mission chiefs that the British 
were falling into a position of relative weakness vis-à-vis the Soviets.  These concerns 
surfaced relatively early in the tenure of the first 30 Mission Chief, General 
Macfarlane.  In August of 1941 he expressed frustration with the Russians’ tendency 
to “pick our brains technically…and get out of us as much material as possible” while 
                                                                                                                                           
After General Martel’s lecture on 31st May …, he invited Colonel Muromtsev and several 
officers of the Otdel to dinner on 1st June.  Colonel Muromtsev accepted; the other officers 
said they would find out whether their duties would permit them to come.  Attempts to obtain 
a definite answer on 1st June failed until some time in the afternoon, when the Otdel 
telephoned to enquire what the dinner was in honour of.  It was explained that it was an 
unofficial dinner, and was not in honour of anything.  About 6.0 p.m. all the Otdel officers, in 
turn, rang up to say that they regretted that their duties prevented them from accepting.  
When, after some difficulty, Colonel Muromtsev was contacted by telephone, he said that he 
also now found that he would be unable to attend (30 Mission War Diary, 1st to 30th June 
1943. TNA WO 178/27. June 2, 1943, 1.). 
110 30 Mission War Diary, 27th August to 27th September 1941. TNA WO 178/25. September 
8, 1941, 14-15. 




at the same refusing to “tell us anything operational beyond providing a general 
picture sufficient to ensure our confidence in their capacity for resistance.”112   
Macfarlane’s successor, Admiral Miles, later questioned the wisdom of 
“giv[ing] the Soviets something for nothing” and argued that any continuation of this 
behavior would make 30 Mission “appear ridiculous” to its hosts.113  General 
Burrows echoed that same sentiment over two years later when he advised the DMI to 
cease providing the SGS with British and American OB dispositions below the level 
of armies.  In Burrows’ estimation, the Russians had no interest on this subject and 30 
Mission was only “degrading [itself] by giving [such information] gratuitously.”114 
While the relatively one-sided nature of enemy intelligence information flows 
was a constant source of frustration for 30 Mission, the British Government was 
generally untroubled by it.  London was more interested in enabling the Red Army to 
wear down and ultimately defeat the common enemy.  Symmetric intelligence-
sharing (as on objective unto itself) was thus deemed less important than providing 
the SGS with whatever intelligence resources and military equipment it required to 
prevail against Hitler’s ground forces. This became apparent in late July of 1941, 
when the British Chiefs of Staff instructed Macfarlane to prepare for sharing 
deciphered German air codes without any “corresponding concessions” from the 
Soviets.  The Chiefs, apparently discounting damage that this might do to 30 
Mission’s negotiating credibility with the SGS, argued that even “[i]f [the] Russians 
                                                 
112 From MacFarlane to C.I.G.S. MIL 234. 30 Military Mission War Diary, 28th July to 26th 
August 1941, Appendix G2. TNA WO 178/25. August 1, 1941, 1-2. 
113 From Head of Mission to DMI. MIL 4843. 30 Military Mission War Diary, 28th May to 
27th June 1942, Appendix K. TNA WO 178/26. June 3, 1942, 1. 
114 From Burrows to DMI. MIL 1419. 30 Military Mission War Diary, 28th May to 27th June 




refuse to reciprocate they will be at least in a better position to defeat [the] common 
enemy.”115  
London would endorse this view well through the Battle of Kursk, a campaign 
in which Moscow is generally credited with having seized the initiative definitively 
from the Germans on the Eastern Front (Mulligan 1987).   In late September of 1943, 
for instance, the Director of Military Operations (DMO) allowed that while “it [was] 
certainly very annoying not to get more intelligence from the Russians, … this was … 
really a minor point so long as they [kept] the war going so well.”  The DMO added 
that the Chief of 30 Mission was “in danger of losing his sense of proportion” with 
his continued complaints concerning the imbalance of Anglo-Soviet intelligence 
exchange.116 
The 30 Mission War Diaries suggest that the SGS did not hesitate to exploit 
this British dependency to its advantage.  As early as August of 1941, General 
Macfarlane expressed frustration with the Kremlin’s policy of “giv[ing] us practically 
no operational news in amplification of official communiqués” and specifically 
refusing “…to let me visit the SMOLENSK front or even to mark a map showing the 
limits of the German thrust.”117  Further evidence of Soviet stinginess was seen in 
Moscow’s tendency to share enemy OB information with the British only after it had 
been exploited for domestic political purposes.  One of the first documented examples 
of this occurred in January of 1943, when the Chief of 30 Mission issued a written 
protest to his Soviet counterpart regarding Moscow’s decision to withhold potentially 
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useful OB information about the Stalingrad campaign.  The SGS had sat on this 
information for over three months, apparently waiting for the occasion of the New 
Year to include it in a ‘big splash’ Soviet press release. 30 Mission interpreted this as 
a cynical Soviet propaganda ploy to buttress Russian support for the war.  Consistent 
with Allied precedent, 30 Mission had expected this information to be conveyed as 
soon as it became available through dedicated military-to-military intelligence 
channels.118   
Moscow was no less stingy in its authorization of operational site visits to 
Russian units on the Eastern Front.  30 Mission viewed site visits as an invaluable 
mechanism for obtaining firsthand information on enemy battle tactics and garnering 
‘lessons learned’ from the Soviet fighting forces.119   The SGS, for its part, seems to 
have viewed them as both a nuisance and a potential security risk for impressionable 
Soviet soldiers.  Accordingly, the SGS took measures to limit the number of site visits 
granted to 30 Mission personnel. 
These actions did not go unnoticed in London and Moscow, where the British 
Chiefs of Staff and 30 Mission (respectively) were monitoring the bilateral 
intelligence cooperation ‘balance sheet’ very closely.  An inter-service report 
concerning Britain’s military relations with the Soviet Union highlighted the 
“manifest disproportion between the visits granted to 30 Military Mission and those 
given to the officers of the Soviet Military Mission and Soviet Trade Delegation 
Engineers” in London.120  General Martel aired his frustrations directly to Soviet 
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Marshal Vasilievski in a December 1943 letter.  According to Martel, Britain had 
granted 105 force unit visits to the Soviet Military Mission in London during 1943, 
whereas the SGS had granted only 5 to Army and RAF officers in Moscow during the 
same time period.  In his letter Martel noted that “no British officer [had] yet been 
allowed to see any active operations on the Russian front.”121 Despite repeated efforts 
to coax and coerce122 the SGS into granting more site visits, 30 Mission personnel 
remained confined to Moscow.  The perception of a ‘visit gap’ would persist through 
the final days of the war.123  
Consistent with the first case prediction, the Soviet General Staff exploited the 
British Government’s dependence upon the Soviet resistance as well as its tendency 
to tolerate significant imbalances in intelligence exchange.  When 30 Mission 
requested greater reciprocity in intelligence matters, the SGS either ignored the 
requests or referred them to the Kremlin, where they often died.   There appears to 
have been much less interest on the Soviet side in ‘keeping the game going’ to one 
another’s mutual benefit than in maximizing gains and minimizing expenses (in terms 
of sharing intelligence with the British).  This put 30 Mission in the difficult position 
of developing an equitable bilateral exchange relationship with a partner that had no 
                                                                                                                                           
on Our Military Relations with the Soviet.” TNA WO 208/1838. November 22, 1943, 3. 
121 From Martel to Marshal Vasilievski. 30 Military Mission War Diary, 1st to 31st December 
1945, Appendix N. TNA WO 178/27. December 31, 1943, 1-2. Further evidence of a ‘visit gap' was 
seen in an end-of-tour report filed by Lt. Col. Exham, who noted that “in spite of our repeated requests, 
no visits were permitted to Soviet tank units [over the proceeding 12 months] nor were we able to 
discuss their organization or tactical doctrine” (From Exham to DMI, WO. July 15, 1943.). 
122 At one point 30 Mission went so far as to threaten the suspension of a planned visit to Italy  
(controlled at that time by Britain) for Admiral Kharlomov, hoping that this would compel General 
Slavin to authorize a visit to the Eastern Front.  This tactic did not work (30 Mission War Diary, 1st to 
30th November 1943. TNA WO 178/27, November 13, 1943, 3.). 
123 From 30 Mission to Troopers. “Personal for DMI from Admiral Archer.” MIL 2931. 30 




inclination – and was under no obligation or pressure – to reciprocate. This is in direct 
contravention of the spirit of contingent consent, wherein each party tolerates 
temporary gains by the other on the grounds that such gains will not be used to 
maintain permanent leverage. 
Case prediction #2: Britain will retaliate against the Soviet Union to rectify 
any perceived imbalances in intelligence exchange.  As noted previously, the 
frequency and granularity of Anglo-Soviet intelligence cooperation decreased 
dramatically following the turn-around at Kursk.  Concurrently, 30 Mission began to 
detect a definitive change for the worse in its treatment by the Soviet Government.  In 
a late September 1943 message addressed to the War Office, the Mission 
characterized its domestic and military relations with the Soviets as “bad” and “poor,” 
respectively.  In response, 30 Mission called for the “application of every form of 
reprisal in domestic relations” as well as “reprisals in connection with military 
relations…applied equally by all three services” in Moscow.124  The British Chief of 
the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) promptly poured cold water on this idea, 
reminding the Chief of 30 Mission that his “task of improving relations in general 
[was] of more importance than the acquisition of improved information, especially in 
a time when the Russians [were] fighting so hard and successfully.”125 
In spite of this admonition, the Chief of 30 Mission was not prepared to let the 
matter drop.  The following month, he elaborated upon his position in messages 
addressed to the CIGS and Deputy CIGS.  General Martel allowed that the Mission’s 
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“persuasive policy” had “met with some success till middle of July” but thereafter it 
had “gradually failed” despite having made “every effort…to recover lost ground.”  
Citing the general lack of Soviet cooperation over the previous three months and the 
need to invoke a “strong line…[to] improve our general relations,” Martel urged the 
CIGS to “stand up to [the] Russians now.” He called specifically for threatening 
significant cuts in the shipment of spare tank parts and limiting the number of 
meetings granted to Soviet liaison officers assigned to the Russian Mission and Trade 
Delegation in London.126   
Following consultations with the British Foreign Minister and the UK 
Ambassador to Moscow, CIGS ultimately decided against instituting these reprisals 
on the grounds that the upcoming Moscow Conference might yet produce unspecified 
“improvement[s] in [Anglo-Soviet] military relations.”127  This may have reflected 
London’s calculation that the risks of Soviet defection in the intelligence sphere were 
acceptable, so long as the Red Army continued its successful prosecution of the war 
on the eastern front.  Rejecting that line of reasoning, Martel and his successors 
continued to advocate taking a harder line “even at risk of temporary adverse effect 
on [the] war.”128  These efforts were similarly unsuccessful.   
Even in the face of these rejections, 30 Mission continued to advocate for 
retaliation through private channels.  30 Mission drew a direct line between London’s 
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perceived policy of “continu[ing] to toady”129 and undesirable outcomes such as the 
rise of anti-British sentiment in Russia and the Soviets’ lack of cooperation in the 
repatriation of British POWs.130   This is seen further in General Martel’s consistent 
calls from mid-1943 through early 1944 for more negative threats (i.e., threatening to 
withhold certain forms of cooperation from the Soviets) in lieu of positive 
inducements (i.e., offers of quid pro quo).  Concurrently, 30 Mission used 
increasingly direct and confrontational language in its dealings with the SGS. The 
British Government remained unconvinced, arguing that the Anglo-Soviet 
relationship should be preserved at all costs so long as larger war objectives were at 
stake.   
Here it seems that the causal logic of the dyadic democratic peace proposition 
did not unfold precisely as expected.  Despite arguing forcefully and consistently for 
retaliation against the SGS, 30 Mission was unable to persuade London to abandon its 
policy of restraint and conciliation vis-à-vis the Soviets.  In this case, the policies and 
preferences of the British Government trumped the parochial considerations of 30 
Mission.  Future studies may wish to consider additional scenarios under which the 
preferences of national governments and their subordinate intelligence services 
conflict—as well as the implications of these clashes for bilateral intelligence 
cooperation. 
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Case prediction #3: The Soviet Union will fail to meet Britain’s minimum 
expectations of expected behavior as an intelligence partner. As seasoned Russia 
specialists and intelligence professionals, 30 Mission personnel had deep knowledge 
of the Soviet authoritarian political system and its potential implications for bilateral 
intelligence exchange.  Upon their arrival in Moscow, they harbored no illusions 
about the largesse of their new intelligence partner.  They focused instead on 
obtaining the ‘bare minimum’ necessary to carry out their assigned mission:   
reasonable access to their military service section counterparts, prompt responses to 
informational requests concerning the common enemy, and sufficient latitude to carry 
out their official liaison duties from within the Soviet Union. 
(a) British intelligence personnel will have direct access to their Soviet 
counterparts. 30 Mission staked its early prospects for successful intelligence liaison 
on gaining direct access to Russian technical and subject matter experts in Moscow. 
Within days of its arrival, each section head was tasked with “establishing contact 
with the [corresponding] Russian Service Ministr[y]” and assembling “all available 
intelligence ready to hand over as soon as contact had been established.”131   General 
Macfarlane also made the case for direct access in a meeting with Soviet Foreign 
Minister Molotov, where he emphasized the “immediate advantages to be gained by 
closer contact and cooperation between the Mission and the Russian Staff.”132  
30 Mission personnel viewed these initial meetings with the SGS as an 
opportunity to bypass perfunctory elements of the Soviet liaison infrastructure (e.g., 
commissars and the Otdel) and directly discuss operational matters such as the status 
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of fighting on the Eastern front.133  This reflected a prevailing point of view within 
the UK military intelligence establishment viz. that liaison works best when 
representatives are free to engage in frank and free-ranging dialogue with their 
functional counterparts.134 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that 30 Mission was seldom satisfied—and more 
often than not, frustrated —with the level and frequency of access that Moscow was 
willing to provide.  From the Mission’s perspective, the Soviet liaison system and the 
Kremlin represented the principal barriers to direct access.  Both factors were on 
display during the late summer and fall months of 1942, when the newly accredited 
representative of the British ‘Y’ Services, Lt.-Col. Edward Crankshaw, returned to 
Moscow.135 Crankshaw was tasked with “induc[ing] the Russians to co-operate with 
[the UK] on ‘Y’ matters” and extracting more valuable Signals intelligence from the 
Russians than they had supplied up to that point.136  
 During his first month back Crankshaw was relatively successful in gaining 
access to his Soviet counterparts.  From late September through mid-October the SGS 
reversed itself and allowed him to share ‘Y’-related materials with the Red Army.  
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September 1941. TNA WO 178/25. September 8, 1941, 14.). 
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detailed questions [to his Soviet counterpart, General Dubinin] without having general discussions to 
lead up to them” (“Record of Meeting with General Dubinin: 23rd September, 1943.” 30 Mission War 
Diary, 1st to 30th September 1943, Appendix K. TNA WO 178/27. September 23, 1943, 1.). 
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The Russians soon reciprocated on a number of fronts, as evidenced by their decision 
to authorize meetings with a variety of technical specialists, provide details on the 
Soviets’ cryptologic capabilities, host bi-weekly meetings to deal with ‘Y’-related 
matters, and speak more freely about the Soviets’ Wireless Telegraphy interception 
efforts.137   
Just as Crankshaw began to consider how he might exploit this newfound 
readiness to cooperate, the Soviets abruptly changed course.  In mid-October the 
Otdel inexplicably suspended Crankshaw’s access to Major Tulbovitch, who up to 
that point had been the former’s primary ‘Y’ interlocutor in Moscow. Crankshaw 
deduced from this that the Russians had “relapse[d] into [their] old bad ways” and his 
suspicions were confirmed at an early December meeting between Admiral Miles 
(Chief, 30 Mission) and General Dubinin (Chief, SGS).  It was at this meeting that 
Dubinin stated with no further explanation:  “The Head of the [Soviet] Department 
dealing with Wireless Intelligence considers that cooperation on this subject should 
be discontinued.”138  At this point Crankshaw saw no further prospects for improved 
Anglo-Soviet cooperation in the area of ‘Y’ cooperation.  Following his return to the 
UK in February, substantive Anglo-Soviet cooperation in this area appears to have 
atrophied.139   
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Crankshaw’s experience during this period was typical of other 30 Mission 
officers who struggled to secure consistent access to their functional Soviet 
counterparts.  During one stretch in the fall of 1942, the overall level of access to 
Soviet officers had diminished to such an extent that letter-writing had become 30 
Mission’s “only means of communicating with the Russians,” who for their part 
seldom responded.140  True to form, 30 Mission pinned much of the blame for this 
state of the affairs on the arcane Soviet liaison system.  In a report characterizing the 
state of intelligence cooperation between 30 Mission’s Army Section and the Red 
Army from May of 1942 to April of 1943, Col. Exham faulted the Otdel for 
“effectively holding the Mission at arms-length from the Soviet staff.”141 
Even when the Army Section was able to establish contact with a particular 
Soviet section (e.g., the Soviets’ German Order of Battle section and Artillery 
Directorate), the ensuing meetings were usually attended and recorded by a member 
of the Otdel staff.  According to Exham, this arrangement ensured that the Army 
Section’s “relations with Russian officers [did] not become too close or too friendly” 
and also prevented Soviet counterpart sections from making decisions or offering an 
opinion on any matter “without previous reference to some vague ‘higher authority’” 
(Ibid.).142   
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The situation worsened as fighting on the Russian front entered its final 
stretch.  In an April 1944 situation report, the newly installed Mission chief stated that 
“[c]ontacts with Russians of any class or type are forbidden – the only exceptions 
being a number of specially chosen ‘hacks’ who are naturally primed for the 
purpose.”  He went on to assert that “Russians who strike up acquaintanceship with 
British or Americans are very apt to disappear and we have evidence of [the Soviets 
meting out] punishments of up to eight years in labor camps for [those exhibiting] 
‘familiarity with foreigners.’”143   
(b) Informational requests on matters concerning the common enemy will 
be answered in a prompt and direct fashion.  From its earliest days in country, 30 
Mission was sensitive to the Soviet Union’s robust counterintelligence capabilities 
and its capacity for detecting any hint of duplicity on the part of officially declared 
British intelligence personnel.144  30 Mission personnel were particularly careful 
about discussing and soliciting information concerning matters other than the 
common enemy (e.g., the internal situation in Russia and the structure and 
composition of the Russian military), lest these gestures be interpreted by Moscow as 
grounds for immediate expulsion.145   
By going out of its way to respect these boundaries, 30 Mission hoped to pave 
the way for a robust exchange of information and perspectives on the common enemy 
and his capabilities, plans and tactics.  High-level assurances from the Kremlin 
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certainly helped to reinforce this initial optimism.  During one July 1941 meeting 
with high-ranking 30 Mission officials, Stalin reportedly promised General 
Macfarlane a visit to the front and told Admiral Miles that he could soon visit the 
Russian fleet.146   
30 Mission nevertheless began to detect a widening gulf between these Soviet 
assurances and reality as the war progressed.   Contrary to expectations, the SGS did 
not provide 30 Mission with regularly updated lists of identifications of units and 
formations of German forces in country.  Instead, much of this information was 
accumulated and held by the Soviet Government until it could be incorporated into 
Russian press releases designed to depict the Soviet war effort in a more favorable 
domestic light.  British frustrations with Soviet information hoarding continued 
through the end of the war.147  By the summer of 1945, 30 Mission leadership was 
bemoaning the Soviets’ refusal to participate in technical exchanges with 30 Mission, 
its failure to acknowledge verbal and written correspondence from 30 Mission, and its 
provision of “unsatisfactory answers” in response to questions about German armies 
in the East.148 
(c) The Soviet Union will afford British intelligence personnel sufficient 
latitude to carry out their official liaison duties from within Russia.   The initial 
contingent of UK military intelligence personnel who traveled to Moscow in the 
summer of 1941 certainly did not expect to have free license to operate within 
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Stalin’s Russia.  As noted previously, War Diaries from this period abound with 
references to the long ‘shadow of the Kremlin’ and its chilling effects on bilateral 
intelligence exchange, scheduling of meetings, Anglo-Soviet fraternization and travel 
of 30 Mission personnel within Russia. 
Mindful of Stalin’s suspicions and the possibility that Moscow could sever the 
nascent intelligence partnership without warning, 30 Mission went to great lengths to 
avoid antagonizing its Soviet hosts.  This was seen above all in 30 Mission’s 
deliberate efforts to minimize the appearance of any intelligence collection efforts 
targeting the Soviet Union.  While 30 Mission gathered and relayed information 
concerning the disposition and morale of Soviet fighting to London, it did so with 
great discretion—as evidenced by its reluctance to solicit this information directly 
from Soviet personnel during routine exchanges, lest such efforts be interpreted as 
domestic intelligence gathering. 
Based upon its historical appreciation for the “incredibly efficient Russian 
internal security authorities” and their robust counter-intelligence capabilities, 30 
Mission also advised London to limit circulation of its reports on internal Russian 
matters and omit all references to Soviet OB information and criticisms of the Red 
Army.149  The possibility of this information getting back to Moscow and its 
potentially devastating effects on Anglo-Soviet intelligence cooperation was clearly a 
significant concern to 30 Mission. 
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These constraints left 30 Mission with limited room for maneuver.  
Nevertheless, to the extent that 30 Mission personnel demonstrated respect for Soviet 
law and worked within the Otdel liaison framework, they had reason to expect a 
certain degree of latitude from the Russians.  At the very least, 30 Mission expected 
minimal interference from Moscow in the execution of its day-to-day liaison 
responsibilities, such as establishing secure communications links with London, 
running transport convoys between the UK and the USSR (carrying mail, personnel, 
weapons and equipment), and obtaining exit and entry visas for departing and 
returning UK military personnel.  
During its first two years in the Soviet Union, 30 Mission experienced 
relatively few setbacks in carrying out its routine functions and responsibilities. This 
began to change in May of 1943, when the Russian Foreign Office (RFO) started 
withholding relief visas from departing 30 Mission personnel stationed in Northern 
Russia, where relations with the Russian Navy had been relatively strong.  In effect, 
this meant that long-serving British personnel (e.g., those nearing the end of their 
rotational assignments) no longer had authorization to leave the country.  Around the 
same time, the RFO stopped granting re-entry visas for British military personnel, 
including six named individuals who were deemed essential to the Mission’s efforts.  
The cumulative effect of these actions was a progressive reduction in the size of the 
UK’s Army and Air Force presence within Russia.150 
As the summer wore on, 30 Mission encountered further problems in carrying 
out its routine liaison duties.  In July, the Moscow civil government demanded that 
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two UK military personnel be tried in Russian courts for their alleged criminal 
conduct in Archangel and Murmansk.  This was in contravention of established 
precedent among wartime allies.  Up to this point the Missions had been entrusted to 
handle such matters internally.  Moscow also took the unprecedented steps in August 
of imposing “delay and obstruction … over the routine formality of [administering] 
passes for [British] personnel in North Russia traveling to Moscow” and demanding 
the removal of named British personnel from Russia for their alleged entry and search 
of “premises occupied by Soviet citizens.”151   
Collectively, these incidents had a chilling effect on foreign intelligence 
liaison. Unable to depart for home leave to the UK (lest they run the risk of not being 
allowed to return to Moscow at a later date), denied authorization to travel inside 
Russia and incapable of evading Soviet censorship of in- and out-bound mail, 30 
Mission found itself increasingly isolated and hamstrung.  As General Burrows 
observed in September of 1944, conditions had deteriorated to the extent that it had 
become “extremely difficult for me and my Mission to obtain any collaboration from 
the SGS in carrying out instructions which I receive from the British Chief of 
Staff.”152  
Over time, these dashed expectations had a cumulative impact on 30 
Mission’s interactions with and perceptions of its Soviet counterparts, as well as upon 
overall levels of bilateral intelligence cooperation.  This is seen first in 30 Mission’s 
increased efforts to pursue reprisals against the Soviet Government for its perceived 
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failure (and in some cases, outright refusal) to honor its intelligence commitments.  It 
is also seen in the extent to which certain channels of information exchange (e.g., the 
‘Y’ and German artillery discussions led by Crankshaw and Firebrace, respectively) 
suddenly and inexplicably ‘dried up,’ apparently at the Kremlin’s behest.  30 
Mission’s preoccupation with the bilateral intelligence exchange ‘balance sheet’ and 
its corresponding concern that the Soviets were benefiting disproportionately from the 
relationship became increasingly evident.  British frustrations were also evident in the 
highly critical statements and language employed by 30 Mission leadership in their 
direct dealings with the SGS and the Otdel over the last 3 years of the war.  It was not 
uncommon during this period for Chiefs of 30 Mission to rattle off litanies of 
complaints during regularly scheduled meetings, as well as in letters directly 
addressed to Soviet leadership. 
Testing the relational contracting argument 
 Measuring the dependent variable 
Bindingness.  The relational contracting perspective seeks to explain the 
bindingness of an intelligence relationship.  This concept was defined earlier as a 
function of the clarity and formality153 of the parties’ expressed commitments to one 
another.  By this measure, the Anglo-Soviet relationship appears to have lacked the 
formal and conceptual underpinnings of the Anglo-American wartime alliance, which 
as we shall see in the next chapter was anchored in the language of several 
cryptologic agreements.   
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This absence of clarity was not a result of indifference or lack of intent on 30 
Mission’s part.  As early as the summer of 1941, General Macfarlane had lobbied 
London for the creation of a joint Anglo-Soviet command structure.  He argued that 
“the time had now come to initiate inter-Allied Joint Planning” lest Britain give 
Russia “the impression that [it] only intend[ed] to help them by the exchange of 
intelligence and the provision of munitions.”154  Colonel Exham made a similar 
argument over one year later in his annual Army Section report, calling for the 
creation of a Joint Charter that would govern the activities of the London and 
Moscow Missions while at the same time ensuring that “both Mission[s] [w]ould 
have direct and easy access” to the appropriate officials in their respective host 
countries.155 
 These aspirations never materialized.  This owed in part to the British 
Government’s reluctance to assent to these proposals, as well as the general operating 
tendencies of the Soviet General Staff. As noted previously, SGS personnel were 
seldom given the latitude to make formal (i.e., written) commitments to the British on 
behalf of the Soviet Government.  Most of their agreements tended to be of a more 
informal (i.e., verbal) nature and addressed ad hoc arrangements for information 
sharing, as opposed to policies governing longer-term intelligence cooperation.  Over 
time, 30 Mission grew frustrated with Moscow’s perceived tendency to make joint 
commitments in principle while stopping short of formalizing and delivering upon 
them. 
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Table 5 provides several examples of intelligence commitments made by the 
UK and USSR towards one another during the war.  Each example is mapped to its 
corresponding position in the bindingness matrix introduced in Chapter Three.  This 
is by no means an exhaustive list of every agreement reached by the Soviets and 
British during World War II.  Nevertheless, it is generally representative of the types 
of bilateral agreements discussed in the 30 Mission War Diaries.  With a few notable 
exceptions, most of these arrangements were reached in private settings without the 
direct involvement of the Kremlin.   
Of those few arrangements for which a written agreement was produced, 
intelligence cooperation was never mentioned specifically.  The Twenty-Year Mutual 
Assistance Agreement of 1942 contains a provision for “affording one another 
military and other assistance and support of all kinds in war” against the Axis 
powers—but it does indicate whether intelligence constitutes part of the “other 
assistance.”   Likewise, the 1942 Agreement on Technical Information addresses the 
sharing of Allied warfare technology but makes no mention of sharing information 
about the common enemy’s warfare capabilities.   These examples suggest that the 
Anglo-Soviet WCID was not particularly binding in terms of its observed clarity and 





Table 5. Bindingness Matrix for the Anglo-Soviet WCID, 1941-1945 
 
Measuring the independent variables 
Examining the Anglo-Soviet WCID through the lens of relational contracting 
requires that we next measure the observed values of the posited independent 
variables that are expected to shape its bindingness.   
Level of external threat.  In Chapter Three I highlighted some of the 
potentially intractable methodological obstacles surrounding the measurement of the 
level of external threat.  These issues can be overcome (or at the very least, 
neutralized) if it can be established that the level of threat facing both WCIDs was 
more or less equal and constant, thus allowing it to serve as a controlled variable.  I 
believe this condition is satisfied for both cases.  The Anglo-Soviet and Anglo-




aligned against the same set of enemies:  the Axis powers.  Perhaps the only notable 
distinction concerned the primary targets of intelligence gathering and sharing.  
Whereas the 30 Mission-SGS partnership in Moscow focused primarily on Germany, 
the US SIGINT Agencies and their British counterparts in Washington (as we shall 
see in the next chapter) were concerned primarily with Japan.156   
The importance of this distinction begins to break down upon further 
examination, however, given that both relationships were focused on a country 
against which each of the WCID member states had already declared war.  By 
Weber’s definition, the very presence of such wartime alliances renders the external 
level of threat ‘extreme’ (as opposed to ‘low’ or ‘high’) for both cases (Weber 2000, 
19).  Given this relative symmetry of the level of external threat, we can treat the 
level of external threat as a controlled variable for both cases. 
Transaction costs.  A key variable in many IR relational contracting 
arguments is transaction costs, which were defined in Chapter Two as the price of 
conducting ‘arms-length’ intelligence exchange in the global intelligence 
marketplace.  To the extent that parties involved in ad hoc cooperation are uncertain 
about their future prospects of cooperation and fear defection, that relationship can be 
said to have high transaction costs.   In Chapter Three I noted that transaction costs 
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would be operationalized in this study as two proxies:  asset specificity and 
heterogeneity. 
Social capital was one of the most significant and highly specific assets 
invested in the Anglo-Soviet WCID, at least insofar as the British were concerned.  
The closed nature of Russian society, limited opportunities for interaction with the 
Soviet military and a significantly scaled-back wartime intelligence effort against the 
Soviet Union157 left the British Government and its intelligence services with few 
dedicated windows into Russia.  Given Britain’s continuous demand for insights into 
Soviet military thinking, the Red Army’s impressions of fighting on the Eastern Front 
and general conditions within Russia, it is not surprising that London came to view 30 
Mission and its military-to-military liaison channels as assets worth retaining.  
The intrinsic value of these social assets hinged directly on the active 
cooperation of the Soviet Government.  Some economists refer to this condition as 
asset co-specificity (Hall and Soskice 2001, 17, as cited in Hainmueller and Hiscox 
2007, 10-11).  Three military liaison channels from the Anglo-Soviet WCID appear to 
have been particularly co-specific:   
                                                 
157 The official history of British intelligence in World War II states that GC&CS ceased all 
work on Russian codes and ciphers on 22 June 1941, the date on which Operation Barbarossa was 
initiated (Hinsley, Thomas et al 1979-1985, as cited in Smith 1996, 17).  This statement may be 
technically accurate, but evidence from the UK National Archives suggests that Britain never fully 
suspended its collection and exploitation of Soviet communications.  Within the British intelligence 
establishment, discussions continued well into the late summer months on such topics as “reducing the 
Russian section to a nucleus,” maintaining a skeletal wireless telegraphy effort from the British 
listening post in Sarafand (Palestine), and delegating continued monitoring of Russian radio 
communications to elements of the Polish Underground Army stationed in Stanmore, near London 
(From C. in C. Mediterranean to Admiralty. 1724C. TNA HW 14/19. September 8, 1941; Peszke 2005, 
51-52).  The British Directors of Intelligence eventually downgraded Russian exploitation efforts to a 
scaled-back ‘watch’ of wireless telegraphy from listening posts in Flowerdown and Cheadle. At least 
one dedicated British analyst was tasked with monitoring Russian naval traffic and keeping the 
Admiralty apprised as to “any drastic changes of method.”  Polish units at Stanmore and Sarafand, for 
their part, were entrusted with maintaining surveillance of Russian radio communications and 
performing some degree of cryptanalysis (From A.G. Denniston to Multiple Parties. Untitled Memo. 




• The ‘Generals’ Channel:’ 142 meetings, June 1941 – May 1945. 
Out of sheer operational necessity, one of the first liaison channels to 
emerge in the Anglo-Soviet WCID was a regularly scheduled weekly 
meeting between the top-ranking officers of 30 Mission and the Soviet 
General Staff.  These meetings provided an opportunity for both sides to 
review significant operational developments on the Eastern Front, as well 
as discuss and submit new requests for information, equipment and 
materiel.  Despite its relative longevity as a Anglo-Soviet military liaison 
channel, the number and frequency of meetings tailed off significantly 
following the Battle of Kursk in July of 1943.  While highly granular 
intelligence was not generally discussed or shared at the Generals’ 
meetings, the channel did serve a valuable coordination function and 
proved to be the most resilient of the Anglo-Soviet WCID.  
 
• ‘The German OB Exchange Channel:  68 meetings, July 1941 – 
January 1945.158 One of the primary founding objectives of 30 Mission 
was to enable the sharing of information concerning the common enemy. 
Accordingly, both parties demonstrated a mutual interest in acquiring and 
sharing intelligence concerning the dispositions, locations and 
identifications of German force units operating in Western and Eastern 
Europe.  By 30 Mission’s own judgment, the semi-regular German OB 
meetings served as a “very useful and regular contact” channel in which 
information exchange was “fairly free.”159  These positive views of the 
German OB channel began to sour as the war moved into its final year.  
This is seen in a reduced frequency of meetings followed by increased 
British complaints of the Soviets becoming “singularly secretive about 
their own and German Order of Battle.”160 Nevertheless, the German OB 
Channel was also among the most resilient of the Anglo-Soviet WCID.161 
                                                 
158 There was also a separate Japanese OB exchange channel, but it receives comparatively 
less mention in the War Diaries.  Only 8 meetings are recorded for the period spanning 4 August 1941 
through 12 September 1942.  Most of the discussion in these meetings focused on information 
concerning Japanese intentions, strategy and future offensive operations. 
159 From Exham to DMI, WO. Untitled final report as head of Army Section, spanning period 
of May 18, 1942 through April 4, 1942. 30 Mission War Diary, 1st to 31st July 1943, Appendix L. TNA 
WO 178/27. July 15, 1943, 9. 
160 From 30 Mission to Troopers. “Following for Gen Ismay from Gen Burrows.” 30 Mission 
War Diary, 1st to 30th June 1944, Appendix Q. TNA WO 178/27. June 23, 1944; From Exham to 
Major-General Slavin. Untitled Letter. 30 Mission War Diary, 1st to 31st December 1944, Appendix F. 
TNA WO 178/27. December 6, 1944. 
161 This is seen specifically in the ability of the channel to withstand frequent personnel 
changes during its first three years of existence.  I noted no fewer than 8 unique pairings of Soviet and 
UK military officers whom together comprised the German OB channel:   
• Captain Birse and Colonel Gusev (28 July 1941 – 19 November 1941, 3 meetings); 
• Captain Birse and Major Masenstein (5 February 1942 – 9 March 1942, 2 meetings); 





• The Enemy Signals Intelligence (‘Y’) Channel:  16 meetings, 
December 1941 – July 1943.   The initial purpose of Signals Intelligence 
cooperation, from Britain’s perspective, was to “establish a full liaison 
with the Russian 'Y' Service and continue the exchange of information and 
documents.”162  In recognition of the promise of early exchanges and the 
potential intelligence gains for Britain, Lt.-Col. Edward Crankshaw was 
named in the summer of 1942 as Britain’s accredited ‘Y’ representative to 
30 Mission.163  Despite achieving a significant breakthrough in the joint 
exploitation of German police communications and at one point meeting 
twice per week with the accredited Soviet ‘Y’ expert, the channel 
effectively closed in December when Moscow declared a unilateral 
suspension of ‘Y’ cooperation. While discussions continued on an 
intermittent and infrequent basis through the end of the war, they never 
again reached the levels and heights of early- to mid-1942.   
 
As co-specific assets, none of these liaison channels could conceivably have 
been withdrawn and reallocated to alternate wartime uses.  From London’s vantage 
point, each channel existed only to the extent that the Soviet General Staff was 
willing to acknowledge and tolerate it.  Likewise, of the few assets listed in Table 6. 
Asset Inventory for the Anglo-Soviet WCID:  British Investments with a potential 
alternate wartime use,164 none could have been removed and reallocated without 
                                                                                                                                           
• Captain Birse and Col. Khlopov (5 July 1942 – 5 August 1942, 2 meetings); 
• Capt. Chapman and Lt. Col. Postnikov (14 August 1942 – 21 November 1942, 8 
meetings); 
• Capt. Chapman and Col. Motinov/Lt. Col. Zakhvatov (23 November – 13 February 1943, 
4 meetings); 
• Capt. Chapman and Lt. Col. Lapkin (4 March 1943 – 5 July 1943, 9 meetings); and 
• Capt. Chapman and Major Pavlov (12 July 1943 – 27 January 1945, 40 meetings). 
162 30 Mission War Diary, 27th August to 27th September 1941. TNA WO 178/25. September 
11, 1941; From Blandy to Head of R.A.F. Section, GCHQ. September 22, 1941, 1.  
163 Charter for Lieut. Colonel Crankshaw (Draft).” July 1942. 
164 In principle, the Russia specialists detailed to 30 Mission could have been recalled from 
Moscow and reassigned to handle Russian liaison duties in London.  Alternatively, these same 
individuals could have been detailed to Britain’s skeletal wartime intelligence effort against the Soviet 
Union.  British military equipment leased to the Soviet Union could also have been put to alternate 
uses.  The hundreds of Churchill tanks deployed to the Eastern Front, for instance, could (in principle) 





significant difficulty.  Over time, the perceived fragility of each channel increased 
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Table 6. Asset Inventory for the Anglo-Soviet WCID:  British Investments 
 
The additional complicating factor of heterogeneity also increased the day-to-
day costs of doing business.  In addition to the aforementioned complications posed 
by regime heterogeneity (i.e., intelligence liaison officers from a democratic regime 
operating overtly within a fully authoritarian country), there was also the matter of a 
pronounced language barrier separating 30 Mission staff and their Soviet hosts.  In 
May of 1942, the SGS was beginning to demonstrate “definite signs of co-operation 





in [Chemical Warfare (C.W.)] matters,” but the absence of a Russian-speaking C.W. 
expert at 30 Mission had resulted in “only written exchange of information [taking] 
place.” This in turn had led to “serious difficulties regarding translation of technical 
terms which [threatened to] produce misunderstandings or even dangerous 
inaccuracies.”  In an effort to address this problem, 30 Mission recommended that the 
British War Department limit its questions about C.W. matters to “short (repeat 
SHORT)” inquiries that “call for short and definite answers.”165  Consistent with the 
relational contracting perspective, such linguistic incompatibilities should have 
provided 30 Mission with powerful incentives to pursue a more formalized (and 
perhaps hierarchical) intelligence relationship with the Soviet Union.  
Testing for observable implications 
As noted in Chapter Three, one of the central contentions of the relational 
contracting perspective is that two states engaged in ad hoc intelligence cooperation 
with one another will feel compelled under certain conditions to develop a more 
binding relationship.  Building upon Weber’s anarchic argument, Walsh’s willful 
hierarchy argument offers an explanation of how and under what conditions this 
bindingness may materialize.  In cases where the expected benefits of intelligence 
cooperation are high, at least one party fears that the other will defect, and there exists 
a clear power disparity between the two parties, a hierarchical arrangement will be 
created in which the dominant party is empowered to “manage and oversee some of 
the other participant’s activities” (Walsh 2010, 17-20; 24-25).  However, before we 
can test for the observable implications of this argument within this case, we must 
                                                 
 165 From 30 Military Mission to Troopers. MIL 4733. 30 Mission War Diary, 28th April to 27th 




first determine whether the Anglo-Soviet WCID satisfies these preconditions.  We 
can accomplish this by addressing three basic questions. 
(1) Did both parties believe that intelligence cooperation against the common 
enemy would be fruitful?  The British certainly did, as evidenced by their repeated 
efforts to cultivate better relationships with various subdivisions of the SGS.  Soviet 
views on this matter are more difficult to assess, but the fact that Stalin agreed to the 
unprecedented establishment of a western capitalist inter-service military mission 
(with overt intelligence functions) in Moscow suggests that he too saw value in this 
arrangement.   
(2) Did at least one of the parties have reason to suspect the other of 
defecting?  Given the troubled history of Anglo-Soviet relations prior to the onset of 
the war (in particular, Britain’s perception of Russia as an unreliable ally and Stalin’s 
reported fears of the ‘contaminating’ effect that British intelligence officers could 
have on their Soviet counterparts), there can be little doubt that each country harbored 
a certain degree of distrust toward the other.   
(3) Was there a clear dominant and subordinate entity in this relationship?  
While the Soviet Union had certain absolute material resource advantages over the 
UK on the eve of war,166 these quickly eroded in the face of horrendous losses 
inflicted upon the Soviet economy and military force levels by the invading Axis 
forces (Hill 2007, 787).  Likewise, Moscow lacked the domestic capacity for 
producing the sort of high-technology and high-quality equipment required to stem 
                                                 
166 Harrison finds that Soviet wartime GDP exceeded British GDP for all years except 1942 
and 1943 (Harrison 1998, 10).  The Soviet Union also had significant advantages on the eve of war in 




the German offensive and regain the initiative by itself.167  Given its bleak outlook at 
this time and a lack of alternate suppliers, Moscow was arguably in no position to 
refuse Britain’s offer of assistance.  If there were a dominant party in the Anglo-
Soviet WCID during this period, then it was almost certainly the UK. 
Observable implications of the relational contracting perspective 
 
(1) The dominant party will assume some measure of control over the subordinate 
party’s intelligence services. 
 
 
(2) In exchange for its cooperation, the subordinate party will receive resources from the 
dominant party that exceed the value of shared intelligence. 
 
 
(3) The dominant party will pursue any of the following measures in its dealings with 
the subordinate party to reduce the likelihood of defection: 
(a) limit intelligence sharing to specific topics of common interest; 
(b) clearly specify the types and/or topics of intelligence that will (and will not) be 
shared; 
(c) monitor the subordinate state’s compliance with sharing arrangements; 
(d) punish any reneging by the subordinate party; and 
(e) restructure and/or encourage reform of the subordinate state’s intelligence 
services, such that they are more inclined to cooperate. 
 
Table 7. Relational Contracting Argument:  Anglo-Soviet Case Predictions 
 
Having determined that all three preconditions of the willful hierarchy 
argument have been satisfied, we can now test it further by considering some of the 
observable implications of this theory within the Anglo-Soviet WCID.  These appear 
in Table 7 above. 
Case prediction #1:  The dominant party will assume some measure of 
control over the subordinate party’s intelligence services.  At no point in the history 
                                                 
167 30 Mission was aware of this advantage and privately viewed its technological strength as 
a bargaining chip in its early dealings with the SGS.  Colonel Exham hinted at this in a September 
1942 memo, in which he assessed the anticipated value of British Signals intelligence to the Soviet 
General Staff:  “I am sure [Crankshaw] has every chance to establish a valuable organization, because 
he has material which the Russians want badly.  He is one of the few soldiers here with good weapons 
in his bag” (From Exham to Head of Mission. Untitled report. 30 Mission War Diary, 1st to 30th 




of the Anglo-Soviet WCID is there any evidence of the UK attempting to assert direct 
control over Soviet intelligence activities. While Britain initially considered using 30 
Mission to coordinate Russian resistance activities from behind enemy lines, this was 
strictly a secondary (fallback) strategy to be employed in the event of a sudden Soviet 
collapse.  The primary objectives of 30 Mission were to prolong and augment the 
Russian war effort against Hitler (Smith 1996, 13-15).  To the extent that the Red 
Army remained in the fight, London had no interest in granting 30 Mission any of the 
coercive levers typically wielded by a dominant party.  Indeed, the Foreign Office, 
CIGS and War Office were generally quite pleased with Russia’s performance on the 
Eastern Front—particularly after the turn-around at Kursk.   
Even in the face of sharp objections from successive 30 Mission chiefs, 
London refused to endorse any actions or behaviors—to include the introduction of 
quid pro quo bargaining postures in intelligence matters—that would detract from the 
Russians’ battlefield performance.168  This effectively neutralized any leverage that 
30 Mission might have had as the UK’s principal conduit for intelligence exchange 
and military supplies with the Soviet Union.  In fact, none of the hierarchical 
arrangements described by Walsh – to include direct management of the weaker 
party’s intelligence service, supervision of its collection activities, or vetting of its 
sources and intelligence personnel – ever materialized in the Anglo-Soviet WCID 
(Walsh 2010, 20).   
The willful hierarchy argument offers two possible explanations for why the 
expected outcome did not occur in this case.  The first is that at least one of the 
                                                 





parties did not believe that hierarchy could be procured at an acceptable cost (Walsh 
2007, 153).  The Soviet Union may have held such a view, given Stalin’s 
longstanding suspicion of British motives and his related fears of Soviet forces being 
politically contaminated by Allied intelligence officers.  The prospect of a western 
capitalist military element directing Soviet intelligence activities was most likely a 
non-starter for Stalin.  Indeed, far from entering into a willful hierarchy with the 
British, he proscribed direct interaction between 30 Mission personnel and Soviet 
intelligence officers in a variety of settings.   
If the above explanation were true, however, we should expect to see evidence 
of similar concerns affecting other intelligence alliances between democracies and 
autocracies.  Such evidence is hard to find.  There are numerous examples of regimes 
with negative polity scores (e.g., South Vietnam, Jordan, Pakistan under Musharraf  
and Mubarak-era Egypt) entering into “hierarchical intelligence-sharing relationships 
that give the United States some ability to directly monitor and control its partners’ 
intelligence activities” (Walsh 2010, 113-114). The willful hierarchy view is silent on 
why so many authoritarian regimes would find these costs acceptable while others 
deem them cost-prohibitive. 
The second possible explanation is that the absence of a dominant party 
precluded the creation of a willful hierarchical relationship in the first place.  Walsh 
notes that hierarchy tends to occur only when one participant’s influence and 
contribution to the WCID is more important to the success of the joint venture than 
the other’s (Ibid., 18).  This role typically falls to the dominant party, given its 




relationship.  If in fact there was no dominant party in the Anglo-Soviet WCID, then 
a hierarchical relationship should not have materialized.   
There might be some merit to this explanation if we were to restrict our focus 
exclusively to the post-Kursk period, when Moscow seized the initiative against the 
Nazis and became increasingly less reliant on the British.  The argument falls apart, 
however, if we expand our consideration to cover the entire period of the alliance.  As 
noted above, the USSR was at a clear resource disadvantage vis-à-vis- Hitler’s Army 
during the crucial period of the First Moscow Protocol, spanning roughly November 
1941 through June 1942 (Munting 1984; Langer 1979).  It is also worth reiterating 
that the UK assumed the role of “senior [Allied] partner in the provision of aid to the 
Soviet Union” during this period, prior to any significant involvement by the United 
States (Hill 2007, 782).  As a key supplier of intelligence and logistical support to the 
Soviet Union, the UK was for all practical purposes the dominant party in this 
relationship.  The second explanation therefore fails to convince. 
Case prediction #2:  In exchange for its cooperation, the subordinate party 
will receive resources from the dominant party that exceed the value of shared 
intelligence.  From the moment that the idea of a British inter-service military and 
intelligence mission was first broached with the Soviet Union in June of 1941, the 
UK made clear its willingness to barter outside of traditional intelligence channels.  










(a) Sharing is limited to 
specific topics of common 
interest and around which 
both parties’ interests align. 
True 
Intelligence cooperation was limited to 
topics concerning the common enemy, with 
specific emphasis on OB intelligence.  30 
Mission pushed for the inclusion of 
additional topics (e.g., enemy ‘Y’ and 
Soviet battlefield dispositions), but met 
with only sporadic and limited success. 
(b) The parties clearly 
specify the types and/or 
topics of intelligence that 
will be shared. 
False 
Despite infrequent verbal commitments to 
share specific types of intelligence (e.g., at 
the weekly Generals’ and OB Meetings), 
the UK and USSR never managed to reach 
a formal agreement governing intelligence 
cooperation in specific spheres. 
(c) The dominant state 
monitors the subordinate 
state’s compliance with 
sharing arrangements. 
False 
Such monitoring did not occur because an 
explicit Anglo-Soviet intelligence sharing 
arrangement was never reached.  In fact, 
there is evidence that 30 Mission actively 
discouraged all forms of monitoring and 
intelligence gathering against the Soviets, 
given the latter’s reputation for detecting it. 
(d) The dominant state 
introduces explicit 
punishments for reneging. 
False 
30 Mission argued passionately for a policy 
of harder bargaining with the SGS.  
General Burrows went so far as to urge 
Churchill’s top military adviser to “hold up 
sufficient information from the Soviet 
Mission in London to make them 
squeal.”169  As noted above, however, 
London declined to authorize retaliatory 
measures on the grounds that they might 
jeopardize Anglo-Soviet relations. 
(e) The dominant state 
restructures and/or 
encourages reform of the 
subordinate state’s 
intelligence services, such 
that they are more inclined to 
cooperate. 
False 
30 Mission leaders initially supported ideas 
such as creating a Joint Planning Staff and 
persuading the Soviets to replace the Otdel 
with a “charter to cover the activities of our 
respective Missions in London and 
Moscow” (WO 178/25, September 1941; 
WO 178/26, December 1942). London did 
not find these arguments compelling. 
Table 8. Expected Anglo-Soviet Defection-Avoidance Strategies 
                                                 
169 From 30 Mission to Troopers. “Following for Gen Ismay from Gen Burrows.” 30 Mission 




In response to several Soviet requests in early July for an intensification of air, naval 
and bomber attacks on German concentrations in both Russia and Western Europe, 30 
Mission instructed its Naval and Air experts to “immediately work out the details.”170 
Case prediction #3:  The dominant party will attempt to reduce the 
likelihood of the subordinate party’s defection through any of a variety of 
measures.  Having established that the Anglo-Soviet case meets the pre-requisites for 
Walsh’s willful hierarchy argument, we may now consider some of its additional 
observable implications in this case.  There is perhaps no better set of these than 
Walsh’s list of “five ways [that dominant states can] minimize the chances and costs 
of defection by other participants” (Walsh 2007, 162).   These claims are presented 
and tested in Table 8 above. 
Conclusion 
 Despite a troubled history rooted in mutual distrust, the UK and USSR formed 
an alliance against Hitler’s Germany for the greater part of five years.  Intelligence 
exchange played a significant role in this relationship.  Nevertheless, with the 
exception of an initial honeymoon period and the several months leading up to the 
Battle of Kursk, cooperation in the intelligence sphere never lived up to 30 Mission’s 
initial aspirations.  This was evidenced by 30 Mission’s steadily diminishing degree 
of interaction with the SGS, as well as in the absence of a formally binding agreement 
to facilitate bilateral intelligence exchange.   
The two exploratory hypotheses examined in this chapter addressed slightly 
different but related aspects of the dependent variable, depth of intelligence 
                                                 




cooperation.   The dyadic democratic peace argument made predictions about the 
anticipated degree and granularity of intelligence cooperation, as mediated through 
the regime recognition dynamic.  Consistent with our expectations for a mixed 
WCID, the SGS violated the norm of contingent consent by demonstrating no interest 
in ‘keeping the game’ going to one another’s mutual benefit.  Likewise, by failing to 
adhere to any of 30 Mission’s bare minimum expectations of liaison partner behavior, 
the SGS created an environment of unbounded uncertainty.  30 Mission was unable to 
determine what constituted ‘acceptable behavior’ for its fickle foreign intelligence 
liaison partner.   
Perhaps the only unexpected outcome in this case was 30 Mission’s failure to 
retaliate against the SGS.  This had less to do with 30 Mission’s own preferences, 
however, than it did with the British Government exercising its prerogative.  As much 
as 30 Mission saw redemptive value in (and argued passionately for) employing 
coercive measures in its dealings with the SGS to “make them squeal,” London felt 
otherwise.  So long as the Red Army continued to hold its own against Hitler’s forces 
on the Eastern Front, the British Government was unwilling to authorize any actions 
or behavior by 30 Mission that might risk poisoning the relationship—regardless of 
its impact on bilateral intelligence cooperation. 
The relational contracting argument made predictions about the bindingness 
of intelligence cooperation, as mediated through the level of external threat and 
transaction costs facing the participants.  Here the relationships between the 
dependent and independent variables did not play out as expected.  Despite fairly 




variable), 30 Mission and the SGS never reached any binding agreements to govern 
intelligence cooperation.  Even so, a handful of relational contracting predictions did 
bear true. For instance, 30 Mission provided the SGS with a net package of goods that 
clearly exceeded the value of the intelligence that was being exchanged—perhaps as a 
means of reducing Moscow’s incentive to defect.  Both parties also seemed to focus 
on a select subset of topics (e.g., German OB) throughout the war, thus suggesting a 
degree of specialization that is consistent with the relational contracting perspective. 
These examples notwithstanding, 30 Mission at no point attempted or even came 
close to assuming hierarchical control over the SGS intelligence services, as 
suggested by the willful hierarchy view.   
Of the two theories examined in this chapter, the dyadic democratic peace 
proposition seems to do a better job of explaining the Anglo-Soviet case outcomes.  
The relationship between the dependent and independent variables is consistent with 
my predictions, and nearly all of the observable implications of this explanation were 
corroborated.  Most of the claims derived from the relational contracting perspective, 
on the other hand, were not corroborated in the case data.  The next chapter will 





Chapter 5:  Anglo-American Case Study 
 
Setting the Scene 
In May of 2011, US President Barack Obama and UK Prime Minister David 
Cameron wrote that ties between their governments constituted “not just a special 
relationship, [but] … an essential relationship (Obama and Cameron 2011).”  The 
official joint statement was very much in keeping with a 65-year tradition in which 
British and American leaders have ritualistically invoked the ‘Special Relationship’—
a term first popularized by Churchill in his wartime speeches and post-war writings—
to describe the cultural, economic, military, political and intelligence ties linking their 
two countries.  
In the decades since World War II, the notion of ‘special-ness’ has not gained 
much traction among scholars. This probably owes as much to the term’s conceptual 
imprecision as it does to the tendency of some to equate “Churchill’s compelling 
rhetoric...[with] the sober language of historical description” (Reynolds 1981, 166-
167).  Nevertheless, certain aspects of the Anglo-American relationship were indeed 
unique among alliances of the World War II era.  Perhaps the most distinct of these 
aspects was the “unusual number of contacts between officials, soldiers and ordinary 
citizens” from both countries (Ibid., 244).  
These wartime contacts grew especially deep in the intelligence sphere, where 
elected leaders, top government officials, and military and civilian representatives 
participated in numerous informational exchanges, technical discussions and 




integrated intelligence operations, as revealed in this personal reflection from a US 
non-commissioned officer detailed to Hut 6 at Bletchley Park: 
During the entire period of operations Americans worked alongside British 
personnel, carrying out the same tasks under the same direction.  There were 
no purely American sections. … There was not merely inter-allied 
cooperation but complete fusion of effort.171 
 
Anglo-American intelligence cooperation persisted beyond the war as the two 
countries entered into more binding arrangements, beginning with the 1946 British-
U.S. COMINT Agreement (also known as the UKUSA Agreement).172  Facing the 
prospect of a new Soviet threat on the immediate horizon, neither party was willing to 
forfeit the gains of the previous five years and return to the status quo ante bellum:  a 
period of ad hoc, intermittent intelligence cooperation between strategic competitors.  
The details of this history are also important, as they highlight some of the obstacles 
that both parties overcame on the road to deeper intelligence cooperation. 
World War I:  A Beginning  
Following its decisive victory at the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805, Britain 
enjoyed nearly a century of unchallenged naval supremacy through adherence to the 
two-power standard.173  Nevertheless, by the early 1900s cracks had begun to surface 
                                                 
171 From Lt. Colonel Roy D. Johnson to Director, SSD (Sig. Section). “Technical History of 
the 6813th Signal Security Service.” Item 2943. Box 970. NACP RG 457. October 20, 1945, 11. 
172 UKUSA helped to put Anglo-American intelligence cooperation on a more permanent 
footing by defining the terms of “exchange of foreign communications-related intelligence” and 
associated “methods and techniques” between “the United States, the British Empire, and the British 
Dominions” (“British-U.S. Communication Intelligence Agreement.” TNA HW 80/4. March 5, 1945, 
4). 
173 The two-power standard, which Britain had pursued informally for much of the 19th 
century, was formally codified with the passage of the 1889 Naval Defense Act.  The legislation 
“mandated that the Royal Navy should always possess more modern battleships and battle-cruisers 





in the Pax Britannica.  Reports of an accelerated German shipbuilding effort gave rise 
to fevered public speculation that Berlin, buoyed by its growing economy and 
industrial base, would soon overtake London in its possession of modern battleships.  
These concerns were fueled in part by reports from Britain’s Naval Intelligence 
Department (NID) that “ships of the 1909 German programme had been ordered in 
advance, with materials being collected and keels being laid months before the 
designated time.”  Top British officials deduced from these reports that Germany was 
rapidly and covertly accelerating its ship production schedules in order to overtake 
Britain (Seligmann 2010, 38-56).174 
Contrary to expectations, Berlin did not seize the mantle of naval supremacy.  
Nevertheless, public concern over Germany’s great power ambitions and intentions 
vis-à-vis the UK continued to grow.  This was seen not only in increasingly alarmist 
British news bulletins, but also in the growing popularity of the German “invasion-
scare” literature.175  In an effort to neutralize these perceived plots and gain greater 
                                                 
174 In an effort to head off these efforts and preserve its two-power standard, London 
responded by launching an accelerated construction program of its own—thus triggering one of the 
first naval arms races of the 20th century. 
175 One of the first known German “invasion-scare” novels was Lt. Col. George Chesney’s 
The Battle of Dorking:  Reminiscences of a Volunteer, first published in 1871.  While the invasion 
literature included additional would-be conquerors (principally France and Russia), Germany was its 
primary focus during the early 20th century, with Ernest Childers’ Riddle of the Sands (1903) being 
among the most popular and influential during this period of British history.  In an analysis of over 100 
of these novels published in Britain from 1871 to 1914, Matin identifies 10 representative motifs:  
(1) near-future settings…for hostilities or narrowly averted hostilities…and corresponding 
displays of the wisdom of hindsight; (2) demonstrations of the vulnerability of the territories 
of the British Empire in addition to that of England or Great Britain; (3) depictions of 
invading or occupying troops and/or subversive foreigners…on British soil; (4) blendings of 
documented fact with fiction… (5) denunciations of incompetent (usually Liberal) British 
politicians…(6) governmental and public underestimations of the capabilities and 
nefariousness of Britain’s enemies; (7) appeals to the reader’s senses of patriotism and shame; 
(8) failures to support strategic and tactical innovations…; (9) geographical specificity and 
depictions of familiar local detail, such as English national landmarks… (10) decisive 




insight into the activities and aspirations of the German Navy, the British 
Government created the Secret Service Bureau (later spun off into MI5 and MI6) in 
1909.  
The creation of the SSB signaled Britain’s movement toward a 
professionalized intelligence system composed of specialized agencies.  This marked 
a departure from the largely informal and personalized intelligence system that had 
existed up to this point (Ferris 2008, 532-533).  This UK intelligence overhaul would 
reap significant dividends during World War I, when London leveraged “the most 
sophisticated and wide-ranging intelligence assessment activities ever done to that 
date” to effect a global “strangulation of the enemy industrial mobilization capacity,” 
as well as influence the foreign policies of neutral parties that it hoped to coax over to 
its side (Kennedy 2007, 699 and 716).  
Central among these neutral parties was the United States, a rising economic 
and naval power in its own right.  Similar to Britain during the 19th century, the 
United States had leveraged intelligence to varying degrees, albeit never in any 
systematic or professionalized fashion.  That remained true well into the early 20th 
century, a period during which it did not experience any galvanizing episodes like the 
German Naval Scare that might have provided the impetus for systemic intelligence 
reform (Spence 2004, 515).   
US intelligence capabilities during this period were comparatively limited and 
weak.  Near the end of Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency, for instance, US foreign 
intelligence gathering efforts reportedly consisted of a handful of “naval and military 
                                                                                                                                           
nation and empire strengthened by the experience of actual or threatened invasion (Matin 




attaches collecting mostly unclassified information on other armed services, 
supplemented by the spasmodic use of frequently unreliable part-time agents” 
(Andrew 1995, 29).  US counter-espionage capabilities were similarly immature.  
During the early years of World War I, for example, foreign intelligence services 
regularly exploited America’s inability to track and monitor foreign operatives on US 
soil (Spence 2004, 512). 
Some of the first documented Anglo-American intelligence encounters can be 
traced back to this period, when Britain began to increase its intelligence presence in 
the United States while at the same time engaging in limited cooperation with US law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies.  Britain had several motivations for doing this.  
Chief among these were a need to assure the continued flow of US-manufactured 
goods and capital (specifically, shipments of munitions, raw materials and foodstuffs 
threatened by German sabotage and U-boat attacks), neutralize the outbound flow of 
enemy contraband and counter German spy recruitment activities in the United States 
(Warner 2004, 77; Spence 2004, 515-516; Landau 1937, 150).  Through a 
combination of intelligence gathering, counter-intelligence efforts, and the application 
of direct pressure on prospective buyers and sellers of enemy contraband, Britain 
managed to maintain its North American supply line while at the same time denying 
Germany the same advantage.  
Britain also leveraged its intelligence services to bring the United States into 
the war “by fair means or foul” through an intensive campaign of anti-German 
influence operations (Jeffreys-Jones 2000, 9).  Notable examples include the 




US Government176 as well as its aggressive disinformation campaign waged in the 
pages of American national media outlets such as the Providence Journal and the 
New York Times.177 By focusing the attention of the US Government and the 
American public on anecdotes and actions that painted Germany in an unfavorable 
light, British Intelligence helped to tilt US foreign policy in favor of the Allies and 
against the Central Powers (Kahn 1999, 147; Spence 2004, 522-523; Warner 2004, 
78). 
America’s official entry into the war in 1917 as an associate power ushered in 
a new phase of Anglo-American intelligence relations.  Britain began to look upon 
the United States as not merely a useful target of intelligence collection and influence 
operations, but also a potential intelligence partner. Section V, a heretofore secretive 
New York outpost of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS/MI6), came out of the 
shadows to cultivate working relationships with the NYPD’s Intelligence branch, US 
Naval Intelligence and Secret Service to counter German-backed Indian and Irish 
                                                 
176 Following the Admiralty’s interception and decryption of the Zimmermann telegram, the 
British Director of Naval Intelligence immediately saw the potential impact that the document could 
have on US neutrality.  Captain Reginald ‘Blinker’ Hall recognized that if anything could persuade 
Washington to rally to the Allied cause, it would be the revelation of a secret German proposal to form 
an alliance with Mexico against the United States.  Before this information could be shared with the 
United States, however, Hall had to find a way to mask the manner in which Britain had acquired the 
information (read:  covert monitoring of US diplomatic cables, on which Germany had sent the 
encoded message).  After developing a plausible cover, Hall shared the encoded message, solution key 
and its solution with the US Embassy in London.  Convinced of the message’s authenticity, the US 
Embassy forwarded it directly to President Wilson.  By early March the story had become first page 
material for US newspapers, helping to cement anti-German feeling in the United States and leading to 
a congressional declaration of war the following month (Kahn 1999; Von Zur Gathen 2007). 
177 The New York-based British Naval Attaché, Guy Gaunt, famously fed false information 
about German espionage and sabotage efforts within the United States to John R. Rathom, the 
Australian-born editor of the Providence Journal.  Rathom published many of these stories in his paper 
as part of a series of sensational exclusives that were reprinted nationwide by other newspapers.  In 
1918 the Justice Department silenced Rathom by securing a confession from him for his role in 
“fabricating sources that did not actually exist.” While it is difficult to assess with any certainty the 
overall impact of Rathom’s exposes on US attitudes toward Germany, historians generally cite the 
Providence Journal articles as emblematic of Britain’s anti-German disinformation campaign during 




separatist movements operating on US soil.  Section V also developed high-level ties 
with the White House during this period (Spence 2004, 521-523). 
British military intelligence organizations also began to engage in limited 
information sharing with their US counterparts.  Notable in this respect was Room 
40’s  sharing of operational intelligence with the US Navy, whose HUMINT-centric 
Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) proved insufficiently equipped to satisfy the US 
military’s growing demand for this information. 178  The United States reciprocated 
with the creation of a Joint Information Council to facilitate the sharing of naval, 
military, scientific, technical, and industrial research information among the Allied 
Powers (Soybel 2005, 12-14).   
Both countries nevertheless maintained significant reservations about taking 
their relationship any further.  The US Navy, for one, was internally conflicted over 
whether to pursue deeper intelligence cooperation with the British Admiralty.  Some 
officials, such as Rear Admiral William Sowden Sims, favored closer intelligence 
ties.  Others, such as Chief of Naval Operations William Shepherd Benson and 
Captain Roger Welles, were leery of tethering the fortunes of US Naval intelligence 
to those of the Admiralty, which they expected to remain as America’s principal 
strategic competitor in the post-war period (Ibid.). 
Similar reservations were evident within the British Intelligence 
establishment.  Sir William Reginald “Blinker” Hall, the British Director of Naval 
Intelligence (DNI) and chief of the aforementioned Room 40, preferred to share 
information with foreign governments only when he was assured of receiving items 
                                                 
178 Room 40 was the name of the Royal Navy’s legendary codebreaking operation. It was run 
out of Room #40 in Britain’s Admiralty Ripley building under the auspices of the Naval Intelligence 




of greater or equal value in return.  Given the relative dearth of intelligence supplied 
by the United States to Britain during World War I, it is not surprising that Hall’s 
department was highly selective in what it was willing to share with Washington on 
German U-Boat attacks.  By war’s end, Britain had little incentive to pursue deeper 
intelligence ties with the United States.  As Soybel notes, “[r]emaining constant from 
World War I was the British belief that there was not much they could gain from the 
Americans when it came to the gathering and analysis of…intelligence” (Ibid., 14-
15).  
* * * * * * * * * * * 
In the absence of a common military adversary, the United States grew less 
tolerant of Britain’s postwar intelligence presence within the country, as well as its 
perceived efforts to manipulate US foreign policy. US Government agencies 
complained of British intelligence officers forcing their way into Espionage Act-
related interrogations, pressing for access to official reports on Irish nationalist 
groups, and ramping up domestic operations against US-based Communist 
organizations.  The matter came to a head in January of 1920, when the State 
Department formally called on London to terminate its intelligence gathering efforts 
on US soil.  Soon thereafter, Britain shuttered Section V, scaled back its US 
intelligence presence and quietly relocated to the New York Consulate (Spence 2004, 
530-533).  Over the next two decades intelligence liaison between the two countries 




The road to the special relationship 
 It was not until the late 1930s, when the prospect of war with Germany and 
Japan loomed on the immediate horizon, that Washington and London began to 
consider reactivating their military and intelligence ties.  Britain took the lead.  In an 
influential policy paper published in July of 1940, the Foreign Office (FO) argued, 
“the future of our widely scattered Empire is likely to depend on the evolution of an 
effective and enduring collaboration between ourselves and the United States."  To 
jump-start this collaboration, the FO recommended that Britain relax its quid pro quo 
standard by making “spontaneous offers of co-operation” to the United States 
(Reynolds 1981, 117-122).   
London moved quickly to implement its new policy in the intelligence sphere.  
After failing in June to persuade the US Naval Attaché to provide information on 
Japanese ciphers, the British Government succeeded in convincing President 
Roosevelt to approve its request for “a general exchange of technical information” in 
“the radio field.” (Benson 1977, 1).  Roosevelt was amenable to the request and asked 
the Army and Naval Departments to work out the details.  While the two service 
branches had different views on the desirability of this new policy, 179 the Army 
ultimately convinced the Navy to endorse its proposal for “a general Comint 
exchange with the British” limited initially to cryptanalytic information (and therefore 
excluding information about U.S. codes, ciphers and cryptographic methods) (Ibid., 
2-3; Gladwin 1999, 122).   
                                                 
179 As Benson notes, the US Navy—perhaps mindful of its previous contentious dealings with 
Room 40 and the Admiralty more generally—was considerably less keen than the Army to pursue 





Roosevelt approved the Army proposal in October.  Bilateral intelligence 
cooperation commenced in earnest in January of 1941, when the joint US cryptologic 
mission led by Captain Abraham Sinkov180 arrived at Bletchley Park and the 
inaugural members of the British Joint Staff Mission arrived in Washington, D.C..  
By summer’s end, Britain’s General Code & Cipher School (GCCS) had established a 
regular channel of COMINT exchange with the US Navy’s Op-20-G and had attached 
its first permanent liaison officer to Arlington Hall, home of the US Army’s Signal 
Intelligence Service (SIS), later to be renamed as the Signal Security Agency (SSA) 
(Benson 1977, 3-4). 
Description of intelligence cooperation machinery 
What emerged over the ensuing five years was a complex and complementary 
set of formal agreements between GCCS and its functional equivalents in the US 
Army and Navy.  Two of these agreements warrant special mention for their roles in 
shaping the machinery of Anglo-American SIGINT cooperation:  
• The October 1942 Holden Agreement (Travis-Wenger)181 defined 
the initial basis of Naval SIGINT cooperation between the United 
States and Britain.  It designated Op-20-G as the senior partner in the 
combined Allied effort against Japanese communications and called 
for a significant reduction of GCCS’s involvement in this sphere.  The 
agreement also outlined the conditions under which Op-20-G would 
send Japanese Naval intercept and cryptographic materials to GCCS.  
                                                 
180 The Sinkov Mission consisted of four junior cryptologic officers from SIS (Arlington Hall) 
and Op-20-G.  During their two-month visit, the men gained an in-depth view into the inner-workings 
of GCCS and several of its intercept and radio direction finding stations.  The Sinkov party also 
received information on certain Axis and neutral cryptographic systems, as well as current GCCS 
exploitation efforts conducted against these countries’ commercial and meteorological codes. The two 
sides also shared technical equipment, including two “Purple” (Japanese cipher) machines supplied by 
the Americans.  But as Benson writes, arguably the most significant secret shared during this visit was 
Britain’s revelation to their American visitors that they had solved and were currently exploiting “the 
German Enigma cipher machine, used by all the German armed forces” (Benson 1977, 7; Maj. Sinkov. 
“Report of Cryptographic Mission.” Item 3873. Box 1296. NACP RG 457. February 1941.).  




Finally, the agreement called for “full collaboration” between the two 
agencies on the “German submarine and naval cryptanalysis 
problems.” (Erskine 1999, 192-195).   
 
• The May 1943 BRUSA Agreement182 defined the basis of SIGINT 
cooperation between GCCS and the US War Department.  In addition 
to calling for the “complete interchange of technical data and special 
intelligence” concerning the Axis military and air forces (including 
secret services), BRUSA established a division of effort in which the 
US assumed primary responsibility for Japanese military and air traffic 
and the British “assume[d] a like responsibility for German and Italian 
military and air traffic.”  BRUSA also defined procedures governing 
the mutual exchange of liaison officers, dissemination of SIGINT and 
SIGINT-derived material, training of US SIGINT personnel by GCCS, 
and secure handling of cryptographic material.183 
 
During the summer and fall months of 1943, many of the liaison provisions 
outlined in BRUSA began to fall into place for the Army SIGINT elements in both 
countries.   In Britain, over 250 regular US Army personnel were integrated into the 
SIGINT operations of GCCS as part of Operation BEECHNUT.  After receiving on-
the-job training in intercept operations, machine processing and cryptanalysis, many 
of these US personnel were absorbed into Bletchley Park, where they became “fully 
proficient in British high-grade cipher-breaking techniques” and “significantly 
contributed to the Enigma attack in both intercept and solution” (Smith 1993, 166; 
Benson 1997, 110-111). 
Additionally, US Army intelligence liaison officers were attached to the key 
sections and branches of GCCS, where they reviewed daily decoded messages 
produced by the British, handled ad hoc information inquiries, and cabled unique 
items of immediate intelligence to Washington and US field commands around the 
                                                 
182 The full text of the BRUSA Agreement appears in Appendix IV. 
183 Col. O.L. Nelson and Major General George Strong. “Agreement between British 
Government Code and Cipher School and U.S. War Department in regard to certain ‘Special 




world.  The US liaison officers were also responsible for maintaining productive 
relations with GCCS, developing a working knowledge of the cryptanalytic methods 
and achievements of GCCS writ large, and producing regular reports on the internal 
structure, functions and activities of GCCS.184 
A much smaller number of British GCCS personnel—many of them veteran 
cryptanalysts on loan from Bletchley Park—were sent to Washington, D.C. to form a 
Signals Intelligence Liaison Unit (SLU) responsible for performing similar functions.  
The SLU consisted of a senior GCCS representative and detachments deployed to 
each of the three primary US military SIGINT organizations:  Op-20-G at the Naval 
Communications Annex, the Army G -2 Special Branch at the Pentagon, and the 
Army Signal Security Agency (SSA) at Arlington Hall.  A senior British Liaison 
Officer (BLO) was attached to each of these detachments and reported to the Senior 
GCCS representative.  These senior BLOs, listed in Table 9 below, were 
complemented by additional technical specialists and intelligence officers from 
GCCS.   
Some of these integrated GCCS personnel were assigned to work on specific 
cryptanalytic topics of interest and produce periodic reports on their involvement in 
these projects.  These reports were frequently shared both with the American heads of 
their assigned organizations and GCCS leadership in Britain. 
                                                 
184 Maj. Louis T. Stone, Jr. “Memorandum Describing American Liaison.” Item 9002. SRH 
153. NACP RG 457. 1945; From Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett to Colonel Harold G. Hayes. 
“Memorandum for Colonel Harold G. Hayes: Duties of the liaison officer at GCCS.” Item 2741. Box 





British Signals Intelligence Liaison Unit (SLU) Detachments in Washington, D.C. 
Senior GCCS Representative  
in United States Dates of service 
Capt. Edward G. Hastings May 1942 – July 1943 
Col. H. M. O’Connor July 1943 – July 1945 
Group Capt. Eric Malcolm Jones July 1945 – End of War 
  
Senior GCCS Representative to  
SIS/SSA  
Maj. G.G. Stevens Dec. 1943 – Sept. 1944 
Maj. J. R. Cheadle Oct. 1944 – End of War 
  
Senior GCCS Representative to  
G-2 Special Branch  
Lt. Col. Godley Feb. 1944 – End of War 
  
Senior GCCS Representative to  
Op-20-G  
Mr. H.R. Foss Feb. 1944 – July 1944 
Mr. Bodsworth July 1944 – End of War 
  
US SIGINT Organizations – Washington, D.C. 
Chiefs of US Army Signals Intelligence 
Service/Signal Security Agency  
(SIS/SSA; Arlington Hall) 
Dates of service 
Col. W. Preston Corderman July 1943 – End of War 
  
Chief of G-2 Military Intelligence Service (MIS) 
Special Branch 
(Special Branch; Pentagon)  
Brig. Gen. Carter Clarke May 1942 – June 1944 
   
Chiefs of the Office of Chief Of Naval 
Operations, 20th Division of the Office of Naval 
Communications, G Section 
(Op-20-G; Naval Communications Annex) 
 
Cdr. John R. Redman Feb. 1942 – Oct .1942 
Capt. Earl E. Stone Oct. 1942 – Mar. 1944 
Capt. Phillip R. Kinney April 1944 – Nov. 1944 
Cdr. Joseph N. Wenger Nov. 1944 – End of War 
  
Sources:  HW 57/2; HW 57/5; Benson 1997   
Table 9. Anglo-American Liaison Structure and Key Personnel, 1942-1945 
 
Given the constant bureaucratic reshuffling that occurred within the US SIGINT 
agencies during this period, the SLU gave its personnel relatively broad issue 




Meteorological’), rather than assigning them to specific sections.  This flexible 
arrangement, depicted in Figure 12, enabled the BLOs to work with the appropriate 
US personnel for their assigned portfolio, regardless of their location within the 
evolving US SIGINT bureaucracy.  It was therefore not unusual for the BLOs to visit 
and interact with many different sections and branches of their assigned host 
organization.  As British Lt. Col. Godley wrote in one of his monthly reports, such 
flexibility was “necessary since in no other way [could] I follow ULTRA185 through 
all its processes here and obtain all the results of the various sections working on 
it.”186 
Compared to 30 Mission, the members of the Washington-based SLU had 
significantly greater access to their hosts and their intelligence activities.  
Nevertheless, it would be inaccurate to suggest that the Anglo-American intelligence 
relationship was devoid of complications and inefficiencies.  Britain’s official 
unpublished “History of Liaison with Op-20-G,” for instance, contains numerous 
examples of the Navy’s unwillingness to share certain intelligence publications with 
GCCS, as well as perceptions of a highly bureaucratic, anti-British mindset taking 
hold among the US Naval leadership.187 
                                                 
185 ULTRA was the name assigned by British military intelligence to “highly secret 
information obtained by cryptographic means from enemy high grade ciphers.”  Per the 1943 BRUSA 
Agreement, the ULTRA designation was to be reserved exclusively for material that met the above 
definition and “emanate[ed] from the United Kingdom and [was] transmitted to Commands abroad” 
(Sims 1997, 35-36). 
186 Lt. Colonel C. G. A. Godley. “Japanese Military Section Notes.” Monthly Letter Series:  
June 1944. TNA HW 57/2. July 1944. 
187 “History of Liaison with Op-20-G (Washington) as carried out by Representatives of 






Figure 12. Organizational Division of Effort for British SLU in the USA 
Hypothesis Testing 
Rationale for data selection 
 Similar to the Anglo-Soviet case study, there is no single dataset that could 
possibly encompass the full array of Anglo-American intelligence exchange channels 
that existed during World War II.  In addition to the SIGINT channel described 
above, intelligence cooperation also occurred between American and British domestic 
law enforcement agencies (e.g., the FBI-BSC channel) and special operations 
organizations (e.g., the OSS-SOE channel), as well at the level of the Combined Joint 




intelligence goods were exchanged within these channels, and the quantity and 
quality of primary source documentation varied between them.188    
I selected the monthly off-the-record notes and accompanying documentation 
sent from Britain’s Washington-based SLU to the Director of GCCS, as captured in 
record sets HW 57/2 and HW 57/5 in the UK National Archives. I selected this 
dataset for several reasons.  First, the express purpose of these notes was to provide a 
continuous view into the “general tendencies and off the record information” of the 
SLU’s interactions with Arlington Hall, the G-2 Special Branch and Op-20-G during 
the post-BRUSA period, circa 1943-1945.189  I felt this type of information would be 
conducive to my goals of testing the observable implications of the dyadic democratic 
peace and relational contracting hypotheses. 
Second, the monthly SLU notes provide a degree of structural symmetry with 
the War Diaries of the previous chapter.  Both are written from the perspective of 
British military intelligence liaison officers operating in an allied country during 
World War II.  Third and finally, the notes also serve as a source of fresh primary 
source material for testing the democratic peace and relational contracting 
hypotheses.   Most of the historical literature concerning Anglo-American SIGINT 
cooperation during World War II has tended to focus on the American presence at 
Bletchley Park.  By contrast, relatively little has been written about the British 
SIGINT presence at the Naval Department, the Pentagon and Arlington Hall. 
                                                 
188 Bailey 2000.  KV 4/447; V. Dykes and W.B. Smith. “Directive by the Combined Chiefs of 
Staff for Combined Intelligence.” TNA CAB/122. February 11, 1942. 
189 From W. Bodsworth to Director, GCCS. “Op-20-G Notes for July 1945.” TNA HW 57/5. 




Testing the dyadic democratic peace argument 
Measuring the dependent variable 
 
Frequency of contact.  As seen in the previous chapter, frequency of contact 
can be a useful proxy for measuring the depth of intelligence cooperation in highly ad 
hoc and transactional relationships such as the Anglo-Soviet WCID.  The members of 
30 Mission were physically walled off from their Soviet counterparts and the vast 
majority of their interactions were tightly regulated by the Otdel.  Against this 
backdrop, all face-to-face meetings were ipso facto noteworthy events that warranted 
explicit mention in the 30 Mission War Diaries.   
Frequency of contact is a more problematic proxy for measuring the depth of 
intelligence cooperation in continuous and tightly integrated relationships, such as the 
Anglo-American WCID.  When both intelligence partners are working directly with 
one another on a continuous basis, the participants have less incentive to record each 
face-to-face exchange as a discrete event.  This was certainly the case for the British 
SLU, whose personnel were far more focused on reporting the general state of affairs 
within their host organizations and conveying the status of ongoing joint cryptologic 
efforts. 
 This is not to suggest that the monthly SLU notes contain no evidence of 
direct, face-to-face interactions between British and American intelligence personnel.  
Figure 13, for example, illustrates the monthly ebb and flow of British visitors to Op-
20-G, G-2 Special Branch and the SSA.  An important point to consider when 
viewing this figure is that a vast majority of the recorded events were non-recurring.  




Bletchley Park.  Figure 13 is thus an imperfect measurement of contact frequency 
because it under-represents the total number of face-to-face encounters that occurred 
between the SLU BLOs and their American counterparts. 
 
Figure 13. Anglo-American Intelligence Exchanges (Washington), 1943-1945 
 
Two additional aspects of Figure 13 are worth noting.  The first is the upward 
trajectory of encounters from December of 1944 through March of 1945.  This is 
perhaps best explained as a function of an increased Allied need for detailed 
intelligence on Japanese commercial shipping during the final months of the war.190  
Indeed, many of the visits organized during this period relate in some way to joint 
US-British efforts to exploit Japanese commercial and shipping ciphers.  A second 
notable aspect of Figure 13 is the pronounced decline of encounters from April of 
                                                 
190 See, for example:  From Godley to Director, GCCS. “Japanese Military Section Notes for 
January 1945.” HW 57/5. February 1945, 3; From Maj. Cheadle to Director, GCCS. “Arlington Hall 




1945 through war’s end.  The potential causes of this decline are less evident.  One 
possibility is that there was simply a diminishing need for UK personnel to visit US 
SIGINT installations as the Japan campaign drew to a close. Another is the degree of 
negative fallout resulting from Britain’s under-classification of an Admiralty 
document containing sensitive information derived from material shared by the 
United States.  As discussed later in this chapter, this security violation sparked a 
minor crisis in Anglo-American intelligence relations because it resulted in the 
disclosure of sensitive information concerning Anglo-American SIGINT in non-
Special Intelligence (SI) channels. 
While Figure 13 offers a partial view into the ebb and flow of Anglo-
American wartime intelligence cooperation, it is potentially misleading because it 
does not reflect the numerous daily interactions between the permanently attached 
GCCS personnel and their co-located American colleagues.  As one participant made 
clear, the period of late 1943 through 1945 was characterized by “direct 
communication between working members of all the cryptographic sections and 
subsections in Washington and their opposite numbers in G.C. & C.S.”191  Also 
missing from Figure 13 are the numerous inter-departmental exchanges that occurred 
during the war, wherein GCCS liaison officers attached to one US military SIGINT 
agency (e.g., Arlington Hall) met with US personnel stationed at another (e.g., Op-20-
G).192   
                                                 
191 “History of Liaison with Op-20-G in Washington.” TNA HW 8/49. 1946, 25-26. 
192 I noted at least two cases of this occurring in June of 1945. It was unclear in each instance 
how long the inter-departmental liaison arrangements had been in place, as well as how long they 
persisted.  Specifically: 
• Maj. J.R. Cheadle, a permanently attached GCCS Liaison officer to SSA (Arlington Hall) 





Table 10. SLU Presence at Select US Military SIGINT Agencies, 1944-1945 
  
In an effort to compensate for the limitations of the ‘frequency of contact’ 
proxy for this case, I devised a complementary heuristic to measure the extent to 
which members of the SLU interacted on a continuous basis with their US SIGINT 
counterparts.  This heuristic, displayed in Table 10, conveys whether a BLO filed at 
least one off-the-record note from each US SIGINT agency from February of 1944 
through June of 1945.   What emerges in this table is a highly stable and continuous 
SLU presence throughout the study period.193   
                                                                                                                                           
of the cryptographic problems and maintaining useful contacts…” (From Cheadle to 
Director, GCCS. “Arlington Hall Notes for June 1945.” TNA HW 57/5. July 1945, 1). 
• Lt. Cdr. C.J.B. Chalkley, a permanently attached GCCS Liaison Officer to Op-20-G 
(Naval Department), is reported to have visited the Economic Branch of MIS, also known 
as the G-2 Special Branch, approximately twice per week (From Lt. Cdr. Chalkley to 
Director, GCCS. “Op-20-G Notes for June 1945.” TNA HW 57/5. July 1945, 6). 
193 The lone gap in this graphic—a three-month period during which no SLU notes were filed 
for the topic of Japanese Air—is explained by a bureaucratic re-organization within Army Intelligence 




Taken together, Figure 13 and Table 10 provide evidence of a relatively high 
and stable frequency of Anglo-American intelligence cooperation from late 1943 
through war’s end.  Compared to similar measurements recorded for the Anglo-Soviet 
WCID over the same time period (as seen specifically Figures 8 and 9), the Anglo-
American WCID is in certain respects a polar opposite.  While 30 Mission was facing 
a steady decline in the number of face-to-face contacts with the Soviet General Staff, 
the SLU was at best gaining momentum (as seen in the rising number of monthly 
visits from late 1944 through March of 1945) and, at worst, maintaining a fully 
integrated presence in each of the primary US SIGINT organizations. 
 Nature and granularity of intelligence cooperation.  As documented in the 
previous chapter, 30 Mission and the Soviet General Staff exchanged intelligence 
goods of varying degrees of granularity.   By contrast, cooperation between Britain’s 
GCCS and America’s Op-20-G, the G-2 Special Branch and SSA was focused almost 
exclusively on SIGINT.  Given that SIGINT rates as one of the most granular 
intelligence goods (per Table 3)194 and that the ‘Special Intelligence’ exchanged 
between GCCS and its US counterparts was of a higher grade than the limited amount 
of ‘Y’ material (e.g., German police communications) exchanged between 30 Mission 
and SGS, it is reasonable to conclude that the Anglo-American WCID exhibited 
consistently higher degrees of granularity than the Anglo-Soviet WCID. 
Measuring the independent variable 
 
 Consistent with the approach taken in the previous chapter, I measured the 
value of the independent variable and determined whether its observed values aligned 
                                                 
194 SIGINT registers a granularity score of 6—the highest rating of any intelligence good 
listed in Table 4, tied with Targeting, Captured Documents, Enemy Intelligence, POWs: 




with the predictions of the dyadic democratic peace argument.  I did this once again 
by leveraging the polity2 values from the Polity IV dataset for the United Kingdom 
and the United States from 1943 through 1945.  As expected, the polity values are 
very high for both countries. Each registers a maximum score of 10 (Marshall, 
Jaggers et al 2011).  This places the Anglo-American WCID in the northeastern 
quadrant of the property space diagram depicted in Figure 6, thus making it an ‘ideal 
type’ fully democratic WCID. 
 The presence of two fully institutionalized democracies and high observed 
levels of intelligence cooperation between them are congruent with the dyadic 
democratic peace hypothesis.  As noted previously, however, evidence of congruence 
tells us nothing about how or why intelligence cooperation flourished to the extent 
that it did between Britain and the United States.  To gain these insights we must once 
again explore the causal logic of the dyadic democratic peace argument, looking 
specifically for evidence of the regime recognition dynamic and its observable 
implications within this case. 
Testing for observable implications 
 
A key insight of the dyadic democratic peace proposition, as adapted to this 
study, is the idea that fully democratic intelligence services will behave differently 
toward one another over time than they will toward autocratic intelligence services. 
Consistent with this regime recognition dynamic, members of an intra-democratic 
WCID are expected to benefit from a mutual presumption of amity because they both 




bounded uncertainty.195  That presumption is expected to compel each party to 
eschew coercive tactics and turn to institutionalized procedures for resolving disputes 
(Dixon 1994, 16).  More specifically, each party is expected to discount the 
possibility of defection and ‘keep the game going’ to one another’s benefit—even 
during periods of disagreement.  This dynamic is expected to lead to comparatively 
higher levels of bilateral intelligence cooperation over time. 
Observable implications of the dyadic democratic peace proposition 
(1) Britain will respect the outcomes of agreements favoring the 
United States, and the United States will not obstruct Britain 




predictions (2) Where conflicts or disputes arise with the United States, 





(3) The United States will meet Britain’s minimum standards of 
expected behavior as an intelligence partner: 
a) British personnel will be afforded direct, working-level 
access to their American counterparts. 
b) Informational requests on matters concerning the common 
enemy will be answered in a prompt and satisfactory 
fashion. 
c) The US will afford British personnel sufficient latitude to 
carry out their official liaison duties at their assigned 
organizations. 
Table 11. Dyadic Democratic Peace Argument:  Anglo-American Predictions 
 
If this application of the dyadic democratic peace argument is to find 
empirical support, we should once again see evidence of its causal mechanism, the 
                                                 
195 Earlier in Chapter Two, contingent consent was likened to a gentleman’s agreement, 
wherein each party agrees to respect transactional outcomes favoring the other side provided that the 
‘winner’ in a given transaction agrees not to exploit its temporary advantage over the ‘loser’ in 
subsequent interactions.  Bounded uncertainty was defined as a “predictable and mutually acceptable 
range” of behaviors constituting fair play between the parties (Dixon 1994, 15-16). 
196 In this case, peaceful accommodation refers to what Dixon describes as “any written or 
unwritten mutually agreeable arrangements between disputant parties that at least temporarily resolve 
or remove from contention one or more—but not necessarily all—of the issues of the underlying 




regime recognition dynamic, at work within the case.  Table 11 lists two sets of 
propositions, each of which addresses a specific causal mechanism of the argument. 
Case prediction #1: Britain will respect the outcomes of agreements 
favoring the United States, and the United States will not obstruct Britain from 
pursuing greater influence within the Anglo-American intelligence relationship.  
As Britain and the United States developed closer intelligence ties, each side had to 
make sacrifices and cede some of its traditional intelligence prerogatives in the 
interest of defeating the common enemy.  Neither could continue to justify the luxury 
of maintaining unilateral intelligence capabilities strictly for their own sake.  What 
emerged instead was an intelligence division of effort based upon the principle of 
comparative advantage.  Each side focused on the intelligence problems and targets 
that it was best positioned and most well-equipped to address.   
This division of effort was codified in understandings such as the 
aforementioned Travis-Wenger Agreement of 1942, which formally recognized the 
United States and Britain as the “coordinating heads” for naval SIGINT in the Pacific 
and Atlantic theaters, respectively.  Travis-Wenger also clarified the implications of 
this division of effort, as seen in its call for “the British [to] withdraw from active 
cryptanalytical work in the Pacific Area” and the Americans to assume “the general 
direction and control of the effort against Japanese communications” (Erskine 1999, 
194).  In addition to suspending most of its active SIGINT efforts against Japan, 
GCCS agreed to “abandon naval cryptanalysis at [its] Kilindini” station in East Africa 
and “disband the British-Australian naval unit at Melbourne and turn over to the U.S. 




From Britain’s perspective, these were not trivial sacrifices.  It is worth 
recalling that, in a relatively short period during the 1930s, the GCCS Naval Section 
had developed a global SIGINT collection posture against numerous foreign powers, 
to include Japan and the Soviet Union (McKay 1997, 4).  The prospect of scaling 
back the scope of these activities to accommodate the United States—one of its 
principal and historic naval rivals—did not set well with the British Admiralty and 
GCCS leadership (Smith 1993, 127).  Nevertheless, Britain’s thinking on this began 
to change in 1942, when a string of Japanese military advances forced London to 
shutter and relocate its Japan-focused SIGINT units on three successive occasions.   
At the same time as London was scaling back its global SIGINT collection 
posture, the United States was beginning to ramp up its own.  In the months following 
the Pearl Harbor attacks, the Navy’s Op-20-G had begun to overtake GCCS in its 
collection of Japanese naval communications and exploitation of Japanese naval 
codes.  Meanwhile, GCCS found itself without a sufficient number of linguists and 
technical personnel to perform Japanese naval cryptanalysis (Erskine 2006, 2).  
Against this backdrop, Japanese cryptographic exchange was fast becoming a “one –
way-only” affair between the United States and Britain, with the former supplying 
nearly all of the raw material and taking the lead in cryptanalytic work.197  GCCS and 
the Admiralty thus had little choice but to accede to the terms of Travis-Wenger. 
While these developments led some senior British military leaders to conclude 
that Britain had lost all leverage in its larger strategic relationship with the United 
States, the BLOs assigned to the SLU did not see it that way.  The monthly off-the-
                                                 




record SLU notes contain numerous examples of BLOs seeking to exert influence and 
advocate British positions within their assigned US host organizations.  Consistent 
with the dyadic democratic peace argument, the US SIGINT agencies proved 
generally willing to tolerate—and in certain cases, act upon—these recommendations 
in ways that fundamentally reshaped the Anglo-American intelligence relationship, as 
well as the structure and function of the agencies themselves.   
One notable example of this is seen in Lt. Col. Lewis’s efforts to compel 
Arlington Hall to reconsider its highly stratified organizational setup, in which 
individual sections (Cryptanalysis, Cover Control and Traffic Analysis) worked in 
isolation from one another without considering the collective implications of their 
activities. As Lewis observed in one of his monthly SLU notes, the Arlington Hall 
leadership was not only willing to listen to his recommendations, but also seemed 
amenable to implementing some of them: 
Last month I mentioned that there was a real need for a co-ordination or 
fusion process here and for some sort of combined directive for cover. … I 
brought up the question with [S.S.A. Chief, Col. W. Preston] Corderman and 
[Col. Harold G.] Hayes and they agreed that there was a need for a regrouping 
of effort.  My main points were that there was room for closer working 
between the three main branches (Crypt, Cover control and T.A.), that a 
system of individual liaison officers between one section and another was not 
sufficient and that the whole co-ordination should be built on an area basis. … 
After an initial discussion of the proposal it was decided to call a meeting to 
discuss the suggestions.  This took place on July 24th and was attended by 
Corderman, Friedman, O.C. B Branch, E. Branch, B II, B IV, and a dozen or 
so other representatives.  I was asked to put forward the proposals and after 
doing so asked for comments.  I was prepared for some dissent, but 
fortunately further arguments were not necessary as the scheme was accepted 
by the section heads. … I was then asked if I would write up the scheme and 
circulate it to the parties concerned.  The proposals have been put forward in 
draft form and … Hayes…has asked me if I would suggest by name the 
members of the fusion party.198 
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Lewis’s recommendations would prove more difficult to implement than he 
had initially anticipated.  He encountered resistance from SSA section officers who 
were skeptical of the value added by this new approach, as well as from American 
traffic analysts who were reluctant to incorporate new information sources to which 
they were unaccustomed.  Nevertheless, by gaining and maintaining the attention of 
senior SSA leadership, Lewis ultimately helped to shape a more comprehensive and 
fused US intelligence effort against Japanese naval communications. 
The SLU exerted influence in more subtle ways as well.  This is seen in the 
efforts of BLOs to introduce and acquaint themselves with American SIGINT officers 
“who [could prove] useful to [GCCS] for various reasons”—both through interacting 
with them “in the ordinary course of work” and “meet[ing] them socially to get to 
know them well.”199   The US SIGINT agencies did very little to discourage these 
British attempts to curry influence.  This is seen indirectly in an observation by 
Britain’s senior SIGINT representative at Op-20-G, Mr. William Bodsworth, to the 
Director of GCCS: 
Your remark about the expansion of [US Navy Lt. Cmdr. G.C.] Manson’s 
[Atlantic Cryptanalysis] party after the German way is also noted.  Manson 
has recently acquired another room into which I have not been invited yet, but 
ways of getting in are not difficult to find and I shall report on it shortly.  I 
suspect it contains his machine people (Spanish ENIGMA and Italian 
Republican).200 
 
Bodsworth’s observation betrays a quiet confidence in the SLU’s ability to maneuver 
within the US military SIGINT establishment and gain access to certain (but by no 
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means all201) US intelligence resources—even those that had not yet been made 
available to the British.  There is considerable anecdotal evidence to support 
Bodsworth’s position.  In one notable instance, a BLO reported that he had personally 
“discovered about sixty captured documents concerning Japanese communications 
which had been stowed away and not translated” during a recent tour of Op-20-G’s 
Collateral Section—and subsequently obtained a summary of them for a fellow 
GCCS colleague.202  Such a degree of access to highly sensitive materials203 provides 
a marked contrast with the obstructive approach taken by the Soviet Otdel, which 
regularly blocked social exchanges and official meetings between the Soviet General 
Staff and their Moscow-based British counterparts. 
 Case Prediction #2: Where conflicts or disputes arise with the United States, 
Britain will seek to resolve them through mutual accommodation.  Notwithstanding 
the overall strength of the Anglo-American intelligence relationship, there were 
contentious episodes that threatened at various points to derail cooperation.  One of 
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the most well-known examples occurred during the winter months of 1942 to 1943, 
when the US Chief of Army Intelligence (G-2) accused GCCS of withholding 
cryptographic material from the United States and leveraging ‘back door’ methods to 
gain access for one of its most prominent cryptographers (Dr. Alan Turing) to a 
highly sensitive voice-scrambling project at Bell Laboratories in New Jersey.  These 
allegations ultimately led the Chief of the British Joint Staff Mission to warn General 
George Marshall of unspecified ‘unfortunate effect[s]’ that would occur, should 
Turing’s visit be blocked by the Americans (Benson 1997, 97-106; Gladwin 1999, 
130-132; Smith 1993, 136). A mutually acceptable resolution was eventually reached, 
but not until after the matter had been referred to the most senior levels of US and 
British military leadership.204   
To the extent that the secondary literature has addressed wartime conflicts 
between the British and US intelligence services, much of the focus has centered 
(understandably) on a handful of dramatic episodes involving significant historical 
figures, such as the Bell Laboratories/Alan Turing incident described above.  Less 
attention has been given to the far more numerous and lower-level disputes that 
occurred between members of the Washington-based SLU and their American 
counterparts at Op-20-G, Arlington Hall and the Pentagon. An examination of two of 
these incidents will help to establish whether, as predicted by the dyadic democratic 
peace argument, the British placed a greater emphasis on keeping the game going 
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with their US counterparts than in ‘keeping score’ and retaliating in response to 
perceived breaches of trust. 
Use of the BRUSA secure communications circuit. As noted above, the 1942 
Travis-Wenger Agreement outlined an explicit geographic division of labor between 
the Naval Section of GCCS and Op-20-G.  Travis-Wenger further established that 
Op-20-G, as the senior Allied partner responsible for Japan, would assume “general 
direction and control of the effort against Japanese communications” and supply the 
British with Japanese radio intelligence, code and cipher key recoveries, and “as 
much Japanese intercepted raw traffic as possible.”  Britain, for its part, agreed to 
suspend its naval cryptanalysis efforts against Japan whilst “maintain[ing] a research 
and intelligence unit at G.C.& C.S. so as not to lose touch with the Japanese 
problem.”  This research unit was to be supported by Britain’s Far East Combined 
Bureau (FECB), a mobile GCCS out-station that moved during the war between 
Colombo, Ceylon (later Sri Lanka) and Kilindini, Kenya (Erskine 1999, 193-194). 
Despite bringing unprecedented clarity to Anglo-American naval intelligence 
relations, Travis-Wenger was found wanting in several respects by the British.  To 
begin with, it did not allow for the direct and efficient transmission of Japanese radio 
intelligence between Op-20-G and the FECB.  According to the agreement, Op-20-G 
was to pass all such materials indirectly to the FECB via GCCS headquarters (Ibid., 
193).  This introduced costly delays into bilateral intelligence cooperation.  During its 
time in Kilindini, for example, the FECB had to wait for an average of 12 additional 
days to receive raw Japanese material from Op-20-G—thus ensuring that the 




2006, 2).  Another problem concerned the tightly circumscribed geographic 
parameters of Travis-Wenger.  The agreement authorized the British to receive only 
radio intelligence “bearing upon operations in the Indian Ocean,” which excluded 
much of the radio intelligence concerning the Pacific Theater (Erskine 1999, 193).   
These problems, coupled with Britain’s diminished collection posture against 
Japan, ultimately led GCCS to press for substantive modifications to Travis-Wenger. 
Instead of relying on slow and indirect long-haul transport of Japanese raw intercept, 
GCCS and the FECB preferred to receive this material directly via the US Navy’s 
secure radio circuit (known as both “COMB” and “TUNA”), which was utilized for 
the transmission of operational and non-operational intelligence.  This was a non-
starter the US Navy.  By order of the US Chief of Staff, the circuit in question 
leveraged a highly sensitive cipher that was “not to be shared with the British—or 
even seen by them” (Erskine 2006, 6).   
GCCS and the Navy ultimately reached an accommodation on this matter 
when they signed the January 1944 Naval BRUSA Agreement, which authorized the 
creation and use of a common circuit (called BRUSA) capable of reaching both 
British and US Navy SIGINT Units, as well as top military commands (Ibid., 7; 
Benson 1997, 120). The agreement further stipulated that OP-20-G and GCCS would 
utilize Combined Cipher Machines (CCMs) on the new BRUSA circuit, thus ensuring 
that each side could encrypt and decrypt traffic sent by the other. 
 In principle, both GCCS and Op-20-G were supposed to transmit all Japanese 
radio traffic via BRUSA.  Operationally relevant traffic was to be addressed to the 




British and US Navy units, as well as top command elements from both countries.  
The “DAZE” address (analogous in function to TUNA) was to be utilized for non-
operational messages, which were not transmitted to top commands.   
In practice, Op-20-G quickly discovered that the BRUSA circuit could not 
accommodate the high volumes of traffic being sent.  As a result, Op-20-G was 
forced to scale back its transmissions on the BRUSA circuit and revert to utilizing the 
US-only COMB circuit instead (Erskine 2006, 7).  This had the effect of reducing the 
total volume of operational intelligence received at GCCS and its outstations. 
 This development did not set well with GCCS, which began to vocalize its 
objections via the SLU with Op-20-G.  This became a point of contention between 
the two sides, as revealed in a BLO’s observation that his recent interactions with the 
Pacific Correlation and Dissemination (GI-P) section had gone “well until [he had] 
raised a question bearing on the DISC/COMB circuit, whereupon [Section 
Commander] Daisley hedged and the conversation became slightly sticky.”205 
By April the situation had worsened to the point that Colonel H.M. O’Connor, 
the senior GCCS representative in Washington, complained about the “rather 
niggardly interpretation” that the chief of GI-P was placing on his “orders for sending 
out decodes on DISC.”  This time there was concrete evidence of a breach by the 
Americans. According to O’Connor, “[t]hree signals of vital interest” had been sent 
by Op-20-G via COMB, but not via DISC as per the agreed-upon policy.  What made 
this information especially credible was its source:  Commander Leggatt, a 
sympathetic US naval officer assigned to the ONI’s SIGINT branch (F-22), who had 
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seen these items himself and wondered why they had not been transmitted to the 
British via DISC.206 
 Despite conceding that Britain could “hardly have a better case” of an 
American breach of the Naval BRUSA Agreement, O’Connor had reservations about 
pursuing the matter with senior US Naval leadership.  By his reasoning, Britain was 
already “getting all the stuff” it needed through other channels.  There was also strong 
reason to believe that this would continue, given Leggatt’s pledge to the SLU that he 
would continue monitoring COMB and forwarding any items that were not reaching 
GCCS as they should.  Rather than recommending a specific course of action, 
O’Connor put the decision back on the GCCS director: 
What do you feel about this?  I did not like to implicate Leggatt by taking this 
up myself with Op-20 but it is open for you to do so as soon as you see the 
items in the R.I. Summary.  … If on the other hand you are satisfied with 
things as they are, you may prefer not to make an issue of NEGAT’s failure to 
use of [sic] BRUSA for items which you think should be on it.  If you are 
doubtful I suggest you send me a signal of your views, referring to these 
items, for me to discuss with Director on his arrival here, when he can decide 
whether or not to take it up with Wenger.207   
 
While allowing that Britain would be within its rights to protest perceived US 
violations of the Travis-Wenger and Naval BRUSA Agreements, O’Connor seemed 
to favor dropping the matter and ‘keeping the game going’ with his American hosts, 
rather than pursuing it further and risk squandering his social capital with 
Commander Leggett. 
The under-classification of CB 4377.  As discussed in Chapter Two, the 
decision to cooperate with another country’s intelligence services is often predicated 
                                                 






upon a variety of risks and considerations.  Chief among these is the partner’s 
perceived ability and commitment to protect sensitive information, once it has been 
shared (Sims 2006, 205).  Protection in this case can refer to the partner’s ability to 
guard against leaks, its commitment to sound communications security practices, and 
its institution and adherence to strict ‘third-party’ rules.  During World War II, both 
the American and British military intelligence establishments expressed periodic 
reservations about the other’s bona fides in this regard.  This is particularly evident in 
the language of Travis-Wenger: 
• “The primary concern of the British over U.S. entry into the German field is 
on the question of security.  The British treat German Enigma matters on a 
much higher plane than any other which they handle.  They believe that…any 
disclosures [of Enigma] might defeat the entire effort in every field.  The 
British consider that, in going into the work, the U.S. should be prepared to 
accept British standards of security and insure compliance therewith” (Erskine 
1999, 194). 
 
• “As for security, the U.S. feels great concern over the treatment of intelligence 
obtained from Japanese naval communications and desires that it be handled 
on the same plane as the German.” (Ibid., 194). 
 
These concerns came to a head in June of 1945, following the British 
Admiralty’s accidental under-classification of a technical manual for UK intercept 
operators. The document, which came to be known by its serial number (CB 4377), 
had been derived in part from Top Secret SIGINT supplied by the United States.  
When the US Navy discovered that CB 4377 had been published at a lower 
classification (British Confidential) with a much broader distribution, it immediately 
instituted a “general freeze order, regarding relations with the British, to all sections” 
at Op-20-G.208   
                                                 





The SLU personnel at Op-20-G felt the effects of this freeze immediately.  
Some reported that their American colleagues had become suddenly reluctant to work 
and exchange information with them.  Others reported that the problem had expanded 
beyond Op-20-G.  In one notable incident, a US Army Lieutenant at Arlington Hall 
inexplicably retracted his offer to sponsor the visit of a BLO.209  The BLO 
subsequently learned that his American hosts were keeping “a careful check…on all 
his activities since his arrival” and producing “a weekly report on every request he 
had made” of the various sections within Op-20-G.210 
The British moved quickly to contain and minimize the potential fallout from 
this incident by imposing a week-long moratorium on “any requests from GCCS for 
material or information, even of a routine nature.”211  This helped to buy time for the 
Washington-based BLOs to focus on the problem at hand and identify a mutually 
acceptable solution for the Admiralty and Navy.   This was finally achieved in July, 
when the British agreed to upgrade the classification of CB 4377 to Top Secret.  The 
Americans, in response, “expressed satisfaction that the…incident was now closed 
and regret[ted] that [they] had to adopt the line taken.”212   
Despite creating a temporary crisis in bilateral naval intelligence liaison, the 
under-classification of CB 4377 did not have any permanent or long-lasting effects on 
Anglo-American intelligence cooperation writ large.  Consistent with the causal logic 
of the dyadic democratic peace argument, GCCS worked with Op-20-G to remove the 
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underlying issue from contention, rather than retaliating or escalating the dispute.  
From this point through the end of the war, all indications suggest that it was 
‘business as usual’ between Op-20-G and the GCCS Special Liaison Unit. 
* * * * * * * * * * * 
 In both of the above disputes, the British SLU personnel and their US 
counterparts placed a greater emphasis on ‘keeping the game going’ than in seeking 
to maximize their gains and retaliating when their unilateral aims could not be 
realized.  This appears to have been true for even the most contentious disputes, such 
as Turing’s controversial visit to Bell Laboratories.  This again provides a marked 
contrast with the Anglo-Soviet case study, in which 30 Mission argued for punishing 
their Soviet counterparts and “making them squeal” when the latter were perceived as 
having failed to deliver on their intelligence commitments. 
Case prediction #3: The United States will meet Britain’s minimum 
standards of expected behavior as an intelligence partner.  Comparatively speaking, 
Britain expected far more of the United States as a military ally and intelligence 
partner than it did of the Soviet Union.   These expectations—specifically concerning 
the types of information that would be shared, as well as the mechanisms by which it 
would be exchanged—had been spelled out in advance through formally negotiated 
agreements such as Travis-Wenger and BRUSA.  These differences notwithstanding, 
the BLOs in Washington and Moscow shared common professional backgrounds and 
therefore had very similar ‘bare minimum’ expectations of what would constitute 
acceptable behavior from their hosts:  direct access to their military service section 




enemy, and sufficient latitude to carry out their official liaison duties from within the 
host country.  I will now examine each of these expectations to determine whether 
they are borne out in the case. 
3 (a) British personnel will be afforded direct, working-level access to their 
American counterparts.  As noted in the previous chapter, there was a prevailing 
view within the larger British military establishment that foreign intelligence liaison 
worked most effectively when officers were permitted to engage in direct dialogue 
with their functional counterparts.  Evidence of this view is seen both in the private 
observations of 30 Mission personnel stationed in Moscow, as well as in the SLU’s 
monthly off-the-record notes from Washington.213   
One key difference should be noted, however, when comparing the 
intelligence functions of 30 Mission and the SLU.  Whereas 30 Mission personnel 
were responsible for exchanging finished intelligence with the Soviet General Staff 
(e.g., assessments of German military capabilities and Order of Battle on the Eastern 
Front), the SLU was responsible for sharing, exploiting and analyzing raw SIGINT 
traffic.214  Without the ability to engage directly and continuously with US SIGINT 
personnel at the working level, the SLU recognized that it would be unable to provide 
GCCS headquarters with a complete picture of the Americans’ evolving cryptologic 
posture against Japan—let alone augment, complement and guide these US efforts 
with meaningful contributions of its own.    
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Britain’s expectations came into greater focus during the winter months of 
1943 to 1944, when GCCS began implementing in earnest the geographic division of 
effort that had been negotiated in the May 1943 BRUSA Agreement.  Hugh Foss, 
representing the Naval Section of GCCS, arrived in January of 1944 with the explicit 
mandate of “conduct[ing] Japanese naval technical (cryptographic) liaison on the 
working level” at Op-20-G.215  In a similar fashion, Wing Commander F. H. Culpin 
wrote that his primary objective as an integrated member of G-2 Special Branch was 
to liaise with multiple US military organizations “in all intelligence matters 
concerning the Japanese Air Force.”  In order to carry out his assigned duties, Culpin 
noted that he would require direct “access to both the U.S. Army G-2 Air and A-2 
Sections and the U.S. Navy ONI.”216 
Evidence suggests that each of the SLU detachments was generally satisfied 
with the level of working-level access afforded by its US host agency.  At the G-2 
Special Branch, for example, Lieutenant Colonel Godley reported favorably on the 
manner in which he had been integrated into the operations of the Far Eastern Branch: 
…[S]ince my arrival everyone with whom I have been in contact has been 
most helpful, kind, and completely willing to allow me to participate fully in 
the work of the Branch.  In this way although I have not yet been at work in 
the Branch for 14 days I already feel an integral part of it and my work, 
suggestions and criticisms are accepted as from within.217  
 
Godley’s assistant Captain L. J. Burrows echoed these sentiments, asserting that his 
current working arrangements ensured that “no Ultra intelligence of value from U.S. 
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military sources is failing to reach G.C.C.S.”218  This level of access enabled both 
men to observe and provide highly detailed reports on the composition, structure, 
roles, personnel and performance of the American G-2 Special Branch.  It also gave 
them an opportunity to assess—through direct observation—the strengths and 
weaknesses of specific US SIGINT personnel with whom the British SLU was 
working during the war.   
 The Americans extended similar courtesies to the SLU detachments at Op-20-
G and SSA.  The aforementioned Mr. Foss, for example, was allowed to make 
frequent visits to “all the relevant parties in the [Naval Communications] Annex, 
getting to know the people and becoming acquainted with their methods.”219  Major J. 
R. Cheadle, who was part of the SLU detachment to Arlington Hall, noted that he felt 
“completely at liberty to go to talk to Heads of Sections without going through the 
Head of the Division or Branch Chief.”220   
 There were nevertheless instances in which SLU personnel encountered 
obstacles to meeting with their US counterparts.  This appears to have occurred 
primarily on the naval side, where Op-20-G adhered to a more protocol-conscious 
mindset than the other US SIGINT agencies.  One example of this occurred in 
February of 1944, when Wing Commander Culpin noted that Op-20-G was only 
allowing him to visit when he had "some specific point to raise" and had made an 
appointment in advance.221  Another example is seen in the unsuccessful efforts of 
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Lieutenant Chalkley and other British intelligence officers to gain access to the 
Combat Intelligence (GI) branch of the Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section (PSIS) 
from January through May of 1945.222    
The SLU ultimately decided against pursuing either of these matters any 
further.  In the case of Culpin, the SLU reached an agreement with Op-20-G provide 
him a desk in their new facility, along with the privilege of “full and daily access to 
all material” that he might need.223  In the case of Chalkley, the SLU chose to cut its 
losses and transfer him to the Shipping Section of MIS (previously known as G-2 
Special Branch), where he went on to serve as the Naval Section’s official 
representative. 
Consistent with the dyadic democratic peace proposition, the SLU appears to 
have been largely content with the level of access provided to its BLOs in 
Washington. In cases where the level of access was not fully satisfactory, the SLU 
was able to address the situation by negotiating for improved outcomes (as in the case 
of Culpin) or pursuing alternative arrangements (as in the case of Chalkley). 
 3 (b) Informational requests on matters concerning the common enemy will 
be answered in a prompt and satisfactory fashion.  As described above, a series of 
formal agreements proclaimed that Britain and the United States had been put on a 
firm path toward full exchange and collaborative exploitation of Axis-related 
SIGINT.   In practice, this vision proved more difficult to realize than initially 
expected.  The growing volume of daily SIGINT traffic, cryptographic recoveries and 
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intelligence reports put significant stress on an already overloaded secure 
communications circuit (i.e., the Washington-GCCS radio teletype link), as well as on 
the US personnel who were responsible for manually compiling all of this material 
(Erskine 2006, 7).  
These constraints were not always fully appreciated at GCCS headquarters in 
Bletchley Park.  For example, there seems to have been a perception that the US 
SIGINT agencies, with their ample technical resources and staffing, should have no 
difficulty providing prompt and satisfactory responses to routine British informational 
requests.  In response to an accusation from Bletchley Park that Op-20-G was failing 
to deliver on its commitments (and thus operating outside the boundaries of expected 
behavior), GCCS Naval Section representative Hugh Foss countered that the US 
Naval SIGINT organization was doing as much as could realistically be expected of it 
under the circumstances: 
I am very sorry you feel that way.  I think you are wrong.  … In B.P.  you may 
think of Op-20-G as so hopelessly over-staffed that they could easily cope 
with our very moderate requests but let me assure you that it is not so.  
…[T]hey rush this way and that so rapidly for their various processes that 
considerable ingenuity is required to catch them standing long enough to be 
photographed.  I have been spending a week chasing JN 11224 traffic so I can 
speak from personal experience. … I feel I must tell you about this to 
emphasize that such requests are not granted with a smile and wave of the 
hand nor refused from motives of avarice, jealousy or sheer cussedness.225 
  
 Foss was optimistic that Op-20-G would eventually become more responsive 
to British informational requests.  His successor, William Bodsworth, seemed to 
validate that prediction when he noted that Op-20-G was starting to come forward 
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with its own ideas for improving the overall handling of informational requests from 
GCCS.226   
An additional complicating factor was the lack of common, well-defined 
procedures for organizing and indexing the vast array of SIGINT-related material at 
Op-20-G.  The significance of this problem is seen in Bodsworth’s observation that 
“the main delay here in getting replies is not means of communications but in finding 
and checking the information if is not available at once.”227  Since most informational 
requests were retrospective in nature (e.g., addressing collection statistics over some 
period in the past), it was important that the necessary data be properly indexed and 
filed ahead of time for optimal retrieval.   When these conditions were not satisfied up 
front, answers had to be gathered and synthesized from scratch—a process that 
invariably resulted in further delays.228  
In spite of these complications, there was a perception within the British SLU 
that the US SIGINT host agencies were acting in good faith and doing a creditable 
job of addressing British informational requests.229  When delays occurred, the SLU 
detachments tended to rationalize them as the natural consequences of a highly taxed 
US SIGINT system or, alternatively, recast them as marginal improvements over the 
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liaison officers at Bletchley Park (From Bodsworth to Director, GCCS. “OP-20-G Notes for November 





previous year’s situation.  To the extent that the SLU representatives expressed 
disappointment with anyone on the US side, it was with the top levels of military 
leadership, where there was less enthusiasm for Anglo-American intelligence 
cooperation.  This viewpoint is reflected in the following post-war assessment 
provided by several members of the SLU detachment at Op-20-G: 
A small group of Annapolis men with pre-war experience in Sigint were in 
complete control of all policy, and with one exception, occupied all the 
important positions.  … As the organization expanded to take in a very large 
number of young, able and enthusiastic reserves, who were quick to learn and 
impatient of conservative methods, this oligarchy felt its position challenged, 
and was forced to defend itself by appealing to all the apparatus of naval 
hierarchy, rank, security regulations, insistence on the ‘correct channels,’ 
emphasis on experience, and conventional, time-approved methods.  The 
rigid, tightly compartmentalized, strictly hierarchical organization which had 
to be maintained by the U.S.N. group in order to defend its position presented 
a very formidable problem to the outsider, intent on establishing close 
relations with those who really did the work (HW 8/49, “History of Liaison 
with Op-20-G,” 26 March 1946, p. 50). 
 
It is difficult to determine conclusively whether US SIGINT agencies 
provided prompt and satisfactory responses to British informational requests.  While 
it is true that Britain did not receive everything they requested from the United States, 
it is also true that British expectations were gradually tempered as they came to 
appreciate the operational constraints facing Op-20-G, SSA and the G-2 Special 
Branch.   The SLU detachments thus came to take a more flexible view of what 
constituted acceptable behavior from their US counterparts in this area.  That 
flexibility was fueled by two factors:  an evolving understanding of what was 
technically and politically possible under very challenging circumstances, as well as a 




3(c) The US will afford British personnel sufficient latitude to carry out 
their official liaison duties at their assigned organizations.  In contrast to the 30 
Military Mission in Moscow, the SLU detachments operated in a much more open 
and tolerant environment.  A thorough examination of the detachments’ monthly off-
the-record notes suggests that the BLOs did not face many of the obstacles that 30 
Mission experienced, such as being placed under constant surveillance and facing the 
prospect of domestic prosecution.  At the same time, however, these BLOs were 
mindful of their status as guests in the national capital of a military ally.  They 
recognized that they did not have carte blanche to operate within their assigned US 
host organizations, and that certain protocols had to be respected within each of the 
military service branches.  The BLOs also understood that they would probably never 
obtain full and complete access to every item and resource that they requested of Op-
20-G, Arlington Hall and G-2 Special Branch.   
What, then, constituted ‘sufficient latitude’ for the SLU detachments to 
perform their official liaison and cryptanalytic duties?  A comprehensive examination 
of the monthly off-the-record notes reveals two overarching themes: 
• The ability to serve as fully integrated ‘participant-observers’ within 
their assigned organizations.  The BLOs sought to become involved directly 
in US cryptologic activities, as well as observe and report on these and related 
developments (e.g., leadership changes and intra-organizational politics) to 
GCCS Headquarters and Bletchley Park. 
 
• Reliable access to facilities and resources as required in the course of 
performing regular duties.  As guests of the US Government, the SLU 
detachments were largely dependent upon their hosts for facilities (e.g., office 
space), communications infrastructure (e.g., secure radio circuit) and 






A strong case can be made that the US SIGINT agencies went a long way 
toward satisfying both expectations.  To begin with, a number of SLU personnel 
appear to have been granted ‘participant-observer’ status within their US host 
organizations.  This is seen in glowing descriptions such as the one provided by 
Captain Burrows of his role within the Pacific Order of Battle Section of G-2 Special 
Branch: 
Every facility has been provided by Col. Perry and the Pacific O.B. Officers, 
who co-operated to the full in furthering the selection and passage of 
intelligence of value to G.C.C.S. and MI 2. I have been allotted a desk in the 
Current Intelligence Section, with the officers from the former Immediate 
Reports.  I am thus immediately informed of any important development in 
the O.B. field, and am able to compose cables to G.C.C.S. in the closest 
contact with the U.S. officers similarly serving their own overseas commands. 
On items of sufficient importance advance information can thus be sent, 
details following in a routine cable later.  Also easily available are the records 
and opinions of all other sections of Pacific O.B.  Contact is particularly close 
with the Pacific O.B. T.A. officers, with whom I have detailed discussion on 
the daily S.S.A. report before composing the daily signal of T.A. intelligence 
indications to G.C.C.S..230 
 
In addition to granting ‘participant-observer’ status to fully integrated liaison 
officers such as Captain Burrows, the US host organizations often extended similar 
privileges to temporary duty (TDY) personnel from Britain.  Two visiting members 
of the Naval Section of Bletchley Park, for example, were temporarily integrated into 
various sub-sections of Op-20-G to support ongoing US efforts against Japanese 
Naval ciphers and ‘Y’ traffic, respectively.231  Likewise, it was not uncommon for US 
SIGINT agencies to host SLU personnel from other Washington-area detachments for 
regular visits.  In one notable example, Major Cheadle (the senior BLO stationed at 
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Arlington Hall) visited Op-20-G three times per week in order to remain “abreast of 
the cryptographic problems” and “maintain useful contacts” with the leadership 
there.232 
The SLU detachments were generally less satisfied with the level of 
administrative support provided by their US host agencies.   This view seems to have 
been based upon a perception that the resource-rich Americans could afford to do 
more for the British in this area, but for unspecified reasons chose not to.  While not 
all of the SLU detachments shared this view,233 at least one of them did:  the unit 
assigned to Op-20-G.  In addition to expressing its frustration with the Navy’s limited 
use of the BRUSA circuit for transmitting secure communications (thus resulting in a 
diminished flow of raw traffic and operational cables to GCCS), the unit also accused 
Op-20-G of “providing facilities to the British [only] when no inconvenience…was 
involved” and seldom “provid[ing] the B.L.O. with more than part-time secretarial 
assistance, even when asked to do so.”  According to the official GCCS history of 
SIGINT intelligence liaison with Op-20-G, it was not until the senior GCCS 
representative in Washington delivered “a strong démarche” that “the status and 
quarters of the British representatives were improved.”234    
 Following the démarche, the senior BLO at Op-20-G noticed a qualitative 
improvement in the level of support provided by his US hosts:   
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News from here is good.  Last month I reported that Poeder and Braun had 
begun to note the needs of the British Liaison and yours … and to make a 
serious effort to meet them. … Roeder has further noticed that a full time 
secretary should be provided for the British Liaison.  Since the November 
move my part time typist has worked in another room. … If Roeder can 
persuade Ford to let me have this typist as full time secretary, it will lighten 
work considerably and help us to give you better service.235 
  
 While the SLU detachments did not get everything they sought from their 
American host organizations, they appear to have been sufficiently well-served to 
carry out their official duties.  There are likewise no indications that any of the US 
host agencies operated significantly outside the norms of bounded uncertainty.  When 
US support was found wanting in certain areas, the SLU detachments consistently 
worked within existing channels to compel improvements.  When that approach did 
not work, they selectively invoked predictable and time-honored measures (e.g., the 
démarche) to prompt desired changes in behavior.   
Testing the relational contracting argument 
Measuring the dependent variable 
Bindingness.  In contrast to the previous chapter’s case study, the Anglo-
American WCID exhibited a very high degree of bindingness.  During World War II 
Britain and the United States concluded a number of agreements addressing various 
aspects of intelligence cooperation.  As illustrated in Table 12, the clarity and 
formality of commitment of these agreements increased over time—beginning with 
general verbal agreements between senior military leadership and culminating with 
explicitly worded accords governing the mechanics of cryptanalytic exchange.   
                                                 





Table 12. Bindingness Matrix for the Anglo-American WCID, 1940-1945 
Table 12 does not provide an exhaustive listing of every Anglo-American 
intelligence-related commitment during World War II, but it does it contain 
representative examples of the different types of intelligence commitments reached 
between the British and American Governments during this period.  As in the 
previous chapter, each example is mapped to its appropriate position in the 
bindingness matrix presented in Chapter Three.  Based on these examples, the Anglo-




Measuring the independent variables 
I will next measure the observed values of the independent variables for the 
relational contracting perspective that are expected to shape the bindingness of the 
Anglo-American WCID.   
Level of external threat.  As discussed in the previous chapter, the presence 
of common background conditions in both cases—including a similar time period and 
common enemies—enables us to treat the level of external threat as an environmental 
constant.  For purposes of this study, I consider it a controlled variable whose value 
(extreme) does not affect relative variance over the dependent variable (bindingness) 
in the two cases. 
Transaction costs.  Consistent with the relational contacting perspective, the 
only remaining factor that could plausibly explain variance over the dependent 
variable is transaction costs.  Earlier I operationalized transaction costs as a function 
of two proxies:  asset specificity and heterogeneity of the participants.  I will now 
consider each of these in turn. 
Asset specificity.  In contrast to the closed and highly restricted operating 
environment that 30 Mission personnel faced in Moscow, Washington, D.C. offered 
precisely the opposite for the SLU detachments:  a relatively open atmosphere in 
which they were able to seek out and interact with their US counterparts at Op-20-G, 
the G-2 Special Branch and Arlington Hall.  These relationships emerged as a natural 
outgrowth of the Travis-Wenger and BRUSA Agreements, which paved the road for 
working-level SIGINT liaison in both countries.  From Britain’s perspective, the 
intrinsic value of these relationships hinged directly upon the active cooperation and 




principle to ‘share everything’ with their British counterparts, there was always a risk 
that they could renege on their commitments—for example, by refusing to grant 
GCCS access to certain information or US personnel.  Thus, similar to the Anglo-
Soviet military liaison channels described in the previous chapter, the SLU 
detachments at Op-20-G, G-2 Special Branch and Arlington Hall represent examples 
of highly co-specific social capital assets.   
A defining characteristic of a co-specific asset is that it cannot be easily 
removed from its current application and reallocated to some alternate use.  Co-
specific assets tend to exist solely within the unique context in which they were 
created.  Once this foundational context begins to collapse, the risks of asset 
forfeiture increase.  The Washington-based GCCS detachments understood this 
principle intuitively, as revealed in the following observation made by Captain 
Burrows of the G-2 Special Branch detachment in his first monthly letter to the 
Director of GCCS: 
[W]hile the goodwill so generally created by Lt Col. Godley within the branch 
greatly smoothes the path of co-operation, the best results are unlikely to 
accrue from such a frequent change of [GCCS] personnel.  Also in order to 
avoid dislocation in the smooth passage of intelligence to GCCS, an overlap 
of one month when a liaison officer is relieved is desirable.236 
 
Burrows understood further that any reservoirs of goodwill that had been cultivated 
with the Americans by his predecessor (Lt. Col. Godley) would not last indefinitely.  
If the SLU detachment at G-2 Special Branch wished to maintain the productive 
working-level relationships that it had cultivated during its first year in Washington, it 
would need to re-think its approach to managing personnel turnover—specifically by 
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giving the outgoing BLOs more time to introduce their replacements to the relevant 





What did the British 
gain from its 
investment of this 
asset? 































Access to US SIGINT 





Potential to influence 
and guide the structure, 
composition and 
management of US 
SIGNT organizations 
 










Reciprocal access to US 
solutions of other major 
Japanese cipher 
systems, along with 
solutions to German 
ciphers from Bletchley 
Park 
No N/A N/A N/A 
Labor GCCS personnel 
Ability to engage with 
US counterparts at OP-
20-G, G-2 Special 
Branch, and  
Arlington Hall 
Yes Easy Yes Less 
Table 13. Asset Inventory for the Anglo-American WCID:  British Investments 
 
In addition to social capital, Britain also invested substantial amounts of 
intellectual and labor capital in its wartime SIGINT relationship with the United 
States.  Table 13 depicts these investments in the context of a larger asset inventory 
for the Anglo-American WCID.  There are several observations worth noting in this 
table: 
• First, similar to the experience of 30 Mission, none of Britain’s social or 
intellectual capital assets could have been conceivably withdrawn and re-
applied to alternate uses.  This is illustrated in a simple counterfactual:  
assuming that the Anglo-American WCID had been nullified during the war, 
all of the social and intellectual capital assets which Britain had invested in 
the WCID up to that point (e.g., liaison relationships and Japanese cipher 





• Second, in contrast to 30 Mission, the SLU detachments did not share any 
weapons, equipment or matériel with their US SIGINT host agencies. There 
is, however, some evidence of the United States engaging in limited transfers 
of physical capital to GCCS throughout the war.237  
  
• Third and finally, Britain arguably could have withdrawn its labor assets more 
easily from the Anglo-American WCID than from the Anglo-Soviet WCID. 
From Britain’s perspective, there were fewer viable employment alternatives 
for the Russia specialists stationed at 30 Mission than for the more general 
purpose SLU personnel assigned to Washington (the latter of whom could 
have been easily withdrawn and assigned to work on any variety of SIGINT 
problems). 
 
Heterogeneity of states involved.  The Washington-based GCCS 
representatives and their US counterparts had much more in common with one 
another than did 30 Mission and the Soviet General Staff.  Most notably, they shared 
a common official language.  Since all of the Anglo-American bilateral intelligence 
interactions were conducted in English, the two sides were much less vulnerable to 
the technical translation difficulties that had plagued 30 Mission in its efforts to 
exchange highly complex Chemical Warfare information with the Soviet General 
Staff.  To be sure, there arose instances in which SLU personnel and their US 
counterparts were (to invoke a phrase commonly attributed to George Bernard Shaw) 
“separated by the same language,” as when the two sides utilized different 
terminology to describe the same technical concepts.  As these semantic 
inconsistencies became more apparent over time, GCCS and the US SIGINT agencies 
worked together to resolve them through the creation of new institutions such as the 
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combined Terminology Committee led by William Friedman of Arlington Hall, as 
well as through the publication of technical manuals in which analogous American 
and British terms were printed adjacent to one another.238 
The two parties also shared the distinction of serving fully democratic 
governments.  While this was seldom acknowledged explicitly by the participants 
themselves, there is implicit evidence that their common form of government may 
have helped to reduce the transaction costs of bilateral intelligence cooperation.  
Whereas the members of 30 Mission operated in a relatively mysterious and often 
frustrating political environment (as seen in its tense dealings with arcane institutions 
such as the Otdel and the Moscow civil government), the SLU detachments worked 
within an American military intelligence bureaucracy that was structurally and 
functionally similar to their own.  As a result, they tended to have a much sounder 
grasp and appreciation of what was happening around them.  This is revealed in the 
private writings of individuals such as Major J. R. Cheadle, who attended the 
inaugural Combined Signal Intelligence Meetings (CSIMs) at Arlington Hall towards 
the end of the war: 
I feel that these meetings are very useful in showing general policy trends and 
enabling S.S.A. to ‘get off their chests’ any points on which they are unhappy 
and thus should serve to prevent minor points from becoming major issues.  
Also, as the Americans sometimes discuss points among themselves at these 
meetings, the British representatives can sit back and watch how the wind is 
blowing.239 
 
As a representative of a fully liberal democratic government, Cheadle was already 
familiar with the role of such public forums in enabling participants to vent their 
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individual concerns and forge intra-organizational consensus.  Thanks in part to this 
familiarity, Cheadle and his GCCS colleagues had less difficulty operating within and 
making sense of their operating environment, compared to their 30 Mission 
counterparts. 
 On balance, the members of the Anglo-American WCID faced lower net 
transaction costs than those of the Anglo-Soviet WCID.   This is most evident from 
the standpoint of participant heterogeneity.  Whereas the members of 30 Mission and 
SGS struggled to overcome pronounced differences in language and political 
background, the SLU detachments encountered no such difficulties in their dealings 
with the US SIGINT agencies.  With regard to asset specificity, however, the 
distinction between the two cases is less clear-cut.  Both WCIDs were characterized 
by highly asset-specific investments of social and intellectual capital, neither of which 
could have been plausibly recouped in the event of defection by one or both 
members.  Nevertheless, in terms of relative labor capital investments, the general-
purpose SLU personnel were marginally less asset-specific (and thus more easily 
withdrawn and applied to other SIGINT activities) than the more specialized Russian 
subject matter experts of 30 Mission. 
* * * * * * * * * * * 
The relational contracting hypothesis posits a direct relationship between the 
level of threat and/or transaction costs incurred by a WCID and the degree of 
bindingness observed between its members.  Given the relatively higher levels of 
transaction costs faced by 30 Mission and the Soviet General Staff, we should expect 




American WCID.  That expectation is not supported empirically.  Whereas the 
Anglo-American WCID evolved into a highly binding relationship governed by 
explicitly worded agreements, the Anglo-Soviet WCID never evolved much beyond 
ad hoc intelligence cooperation.  Of the few understandings that were reached 
between the British and Soviet Governments, none exhibited anything approximating 
the formality or clarity of commitment of the Travis-Wenger and BRUSA 
agreements. 
The observed values of the dependent and independent variables are therefore 
inconsistent with the relational contracting hypothesis.  This casts some doubt on the 
ability of this perspective to explain variance in bilateral intelligence outcomes.  In an 
effort to extend this plausibility probe further, I will next consider some of the 
observable implications of the relational contracting perspective and test for evidence 
of their presence within the case. 
Testing for observable implications 
As noted in Chapter Three, Weber’s anarchic perspective does not account for 
the possibility of hierarchy as a bilateral cooperation outcome.  This becomes 
problematic when we attempt to extend her relational contracting argument to the 
study of intelligence cooperation, where hierarchical outcomes are more prevalent.  I 
suggested earlier that we could help to address this problem by incorporating aspects 
of Walsh’s willful hierarchy argument to generate observable implications of 
relational contracting within both cases.  
Walsh’s argument is a suitable choice because it makes highly specific and 
contingent predictions about how binding intelligence relationships will materialize, 




gains of intelligence cooperation, fears of defection and the presence of a power 
imbalance between the parties.  When all three conditions are satisfied, the parties are 
expected to forge a binding relationship in which the dominant party assumes a 
degree of control over the subordinate party’s intelligence activities.  Alternatively, 
when the parties’ fears of defection are negligible, they are expected to share 
intelligence through anarchic institutions that preserve their decision-making 
authority (e.g., bilateral governance structures).   
Before we can generate observable implications of relational contracting 
within the Anglo-American case, we must first determine whether each of the three 
aforementioned background conditions is present.  The answers to these questions 
will help to determine what outcomes we should expect to see in the case, assuming 
that the argument is true.  
(1) Did both parties believe that intelligence cooperation against the common 
enemy would be fruitful? While its primary goal was to bring the US military into the 
war on the Allied side, Britain also saw the United States as providing potentially 
complementary intelligence capabilities (e.g., collection accesses, high-speed 
decryption capabilities and sheer manpower) against Japan, which had become a 
proverbial blind spot for GCCS during the early years of the war.   
The United States, for its part, saw value in pursuing greater intelligence 
cooperation with Britain against Germany and Japan.  This is reflected in the early 
decisions of high-ranking US military officials such as General George Marshall, who 
in September of 1940 approved the G-2 Special Branch to serve as the War 




the British Technical Mission and authorized representatives of the British Armed 
Forces.240  Arlington Hall likewise saw significant benefits in closer cooperation with 
the British, such as sending junior Army personnel to work under senior cryptanalysts 
at Bletchley Park and drawing upon their extensive background knowledge on enemy 
cipher systems dating back to the Spanish Civil War.241 
(2) Did at least one of the parties have reason to suspect the other of 
defecting?  Comparatively speaking, 30 Mission and the Soviet General Staff were 
far more concerned about the possibility of defection than the SLU detachments and 
their US SIGINT counterpart agencies.  This is not to suggest, however, that the 
members of the Anglo-American WCID discounted the possibility of defection.  On 
the contrary, each side was clearly concerned about the possibility of defection and 
took measures to guard against it. 
This was certainly evident within the US SIGINT establishment.  Each 
American host agency kept close tabs on the comings, goings and activities of the 
SLU personnel assigned to it.  This included reading the senior BLOs’ on the record 
monthly liaison letters sent to Bletchley Park.  By mutual agreement, the BLOs were 
supposed to file copies of these outbound reports with their US host agency—
ostensibly to ensure that the latter’s leadership were kept apprised of by working-
level developments that might later catch them off guard.242  These reports also 
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provided the United States with continuous ‘on the record’ accounts of what British 
liaison officers were doing within their assigned host organizations—thus serving as a 
hedge, of sorts, against defection.243 
A similar vigilance against defection was evident within the SLU 
detachments.  As revealed in the monthly off-the-record notes, the BLOs were on a 
constant lookout for indications of their hosts failing to meet their obligations as an 
intelligence partner (e.g., as revealed in the dustup over the BRUSA secure 
communications circuit).  The off-the-record notes also contain numerous candid 
assessments of US intelligence personnel, as well as accounts of US inter-service 
disputes and their potential implications for Anglo-American intelligence 
cooperation.   
(3) Was there a clear dominant and subordinate entity in this relationship?  
Despite possessing certain relative advantages over the United States in terms of its 
intelligence capabilities and subject matter expertise, Britain had fewer aggregate 
material resources at its disposal than the United States, on which it had grown 
dependent for economic and military support vis-à-vis Germany since the late 1930s 
(Reynolds 1981, 117).  This trend of rising US dominance continued well into the 
war, to the point that Brigadier General Vivian Dykes of the BJSM in Washington 
felt compelled to observe in 1942 that ‘there are few things which we are in a position 
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to give to the United States; but we are dependent on them for a great many things” 
(Smith 1993, 116).  The United States was thus by any conventional measurement the 
dominant party in the Anglo-American WCID. 
* * * * * * * * * * * 
Observable implications of the relational contracting perspective 
 
(1) The dominant party will assume some measure of control over the 
subordinate party’s intelligence services. 
 
 
(2)  In exchange for its cooperation, the subordinate party will receive resources 
from the dominant party that exceed the value of shared intelligence 
 
 
(3) The dominant party will pursue any of the following measures in its dealings 
with the subordinate party to reduce the likelihood of defection: 
(a) limit intelligence sharing to specific topics of common interest; 
(b) clearly specify the types and/or topics of intelligence that will (and will 
not) be shared; 
(c) monitor the subordinate state’s compliance with sharing arrangements; 
(d) punish any reneging by the subordinate party; and 
(e) restructure and/or encourage reform of the subordinate state’s 
intelligence services, such that they are more inclined to cooperate. 
 
Table 14. Relational Contracting Argument:  Anglo-American Case Predictions 
 
Based on the answers to the above questions, we are once again presented 
with a set of observable implications favoring the creation of a binding hierarchical 
intelligence-sharing arrangement.   The predictions, which are displayed in Table 14 
above, are identical to those generated for the Anglo-Soviet WCID.  
Case prediction #1:  The dominant party will assume some measure of 
control over the subordinate party’s intelligence services.  Contrary to the 
expectations of this argument, there is no evidence of the United States attempting to 




communications.  Each of the formal agreements described above treated the 
signatories as autonomous, co-equal partners engaged in a mutually beneficial 
geographic division of effort.  These agreements did not contain any discussions of 
‘price’ or references to ‘quid pro quos’ (e.g., conferring certain privileges to the 
dominant party in exchange for risk premiums awarded to the subordinate member).  
Instead, they articulated the general security rules, principles, terminology and 
standards governing bilateral SIGINT cooperation, while at the same time entrusting 
the signatories to implement the provisions as they saw fit.    
The Anglo-American WCID thus did not assume the form of a willful 
hierarchy.  If anything, the case outcomes are far more consistent with anarchic 
sharing, given that the parties focused primarily on “developing efficient technical 
practices and standards for the exchange of information” rather than on curbing the 
risks of defection (Walsh 2010, 25).  The willful hierarchy argument thus fails to 
offer a persuasive and empirically valid claim of the conditions under which a 
dominant intelligence organization is expected to assume control over a subordinate. 
Case prediction #2:  In exchange for its cooperation, the subordinate party 
will receive resources from the dominant party that exceed the value of shared 
intelligence.  The United States supplied Britain with significant quantities of non-
intelligence resources in the lead up to and during the Second World War, beginning 
with such well-known initiatives as the Bases-for-Destroyers Deal and Lend-Lease.  
While collectively these transfers may have exceeded the value of intelligence shared 
within the Anglo-Soviet WCID, they were not conditioned explicitly upon 




argument predicts (Ibid., 23).  The Anglo-American WCID was therefore not a 
complex liaison arrangement, defined earlier as one “involving the bartering of 
intelligence collection assets for some mix of political, intelligence, economic, 
military, or operational goods provided through intelligence channels” (Sims 2006, 
197).   
Claim 





(a) Sharing is limited to 
specific topics of common 
interest and around which 
both parties’ interests align. 
True 
Intelligence cooperation was limited to 
topics concerning the common enemy, with 
a specific emphasis on the Axis powers of 
Germany and Japan. 
(b) The parties clearly 
specify the types and/or 
topics of intelligence that 
will be shared. 
True 
At its core, the Anglo-American WCID 
was an explicitly defined geographic 
division of effort between the US and UK 
military intelligence SIGINT services. 
(c) The dominant state 
monitors the subordinate 
state’s compliance with 
sharing arrangements. 
Unclear 
Implicit monitoring was observed on both 
sides, as seen in the examples of Britain 
tracking America’s compliance with the 
Naval BRUSA agreement and the United 
States counting the number of SLU ‘on the 
record’ reports filed with Arlington Hall. 
(d) The dominant state 
introduces explicit 
punishments for reneging. 
False 
None of the formal bilateral agreements 
specify how defection was to be punished.  
In a handful of cases such as the CB 4377 
incident, the United States appears to have 
taken a harder line against the British for 
perceived acts of defection.  Nevertheless, 
these sorts of retaliations were rare. 
(e) The dominant state 
restructures and/or 
encourages reform of the 
subordinate state’s 
intelligence services, such 
that they are more inclined to 
cooperate. 
False 
In fact, it was the subordinate party that 
sought to influence changes in the 
structure, composition and organization of 
the dominant party’s SIGINT 
organizations.  This is seen most notably in 
a series of recommendations made by Lt. 
Col. Lewis to the SSA leadership 
concerning a substantial reorganization of 
their agency.244 
Table 15. Expected Anglo-American Defection-Avoidance Strategies 
                                                 
244 From Lewis to Director, GCCS. “Report on Attachment to S.S.A. for July.” HW 




To the extent that bartering did occur between the SLU detachments and their 
US host agencies, it generally assumed the form of a ‘simple’ liaison arrangement in 
which all bargaining occurred within intelligence channels.  This is reflected further 
in the fact that the SLU detachments were created for the express purpose of 
facilitating bilateral intelligence exchange.  Unlike 30 Mission, they did not have the 
authority to barter in both intelligence and military matériel.   
Case prediction #3:  The dominant party will attempt to reduce the 
likelihood of the subordinate party’s defection through any of a variety of 
measures.  Similar to the previous chapter, we can test this prediction by considering 
Walsh’s list of “five ways [that dominant states can] minimize the chances and costs 
of defection by other participants” and determining whether any evidence of these 
appears in the case (Walsh 2007, 162).   These claims appear in Table 15 above, 
along with an assessment of whether they were observed within the relationship. 
Conclusion 
Following an initial period of limited and largely anarchic information sharing 
against Germany during World War I, the British and US intelligence services 
ultimately chose to go their separate ways, with each citing concerns about the other’s 
long-term suitability as an intelligence partner.  The two sides began to consider 
reactivating those ties in the late 1930s with the rise of Imperial Japan and Hitler’s 
Germany.  What subsequently emerged was the most ambitious and wide-ranging 
intelligence-sharing arrangement ever enacted:  an inter-service military intelligence 




detailed security guidelines concerning the handling, sharing and dissemination of 
high-grade SIGINT.  
The two exploratory hypotheses examined in this chapter addressed separate 
but related aspects of the dependent variable, depth of intelligence cooperation.   
Consistent with the expectations of the dyadic democratic peace argument and its 
regime recognition dynamic, we observed numerous examples of both sides adhering 
to the norms of contingent consent and bounded uncertainty.  In examining the 
observable implications of this theory from the vantage point of the SLU detachments 
in Washington, D.C., we saw consistent evidence of the parties ‘keeping the game 
going’ and eschewing defection—even amidst high-level disputes and mini-crises, 
such as the CB 4377 incident.  The BLOs also learned quickly what they could (and 
could not) reasonably expect from their US host agencies.  For the most part, those 
expectations were satisfied—and in those rare instances in which they were not, the 
two sides proved willing and capable of reaching a mutual accommodation. 
The relational contracting argument posited a direct and positive relationship 
between the level of external threat and transaction costs, on the one hand, and the 
degree of bindingness in the relationship, on the other.   The expected relationship 
was not borne out in this particular case.  Compared to the Anglo-Soviet WCID, the 
Anglo-American WCID exhibited slightly lower transaction costs but a much higher 
degree of bindingness, as seen in the creation of highly formalized and explicitly 
worded agreements such as Travis-Wenger and BRUSA.  Most of the willful 
hierarchy predictions for this case did not materialize either.  Contrary to 




attempt to assert direct control over the subordinate’s (Britain) intelligence activities.  
In some cases the subordinate power acted more like a dominant power, as seen in the 
efforts of GCCS liaison officers to influence fundamental reorganizations of US 
military SIGINT organizations. 
Of the two theories examined in this chapter, the dyadic democratic peace 
proposition once again appears to offer a more effective explanation of the case-
specific outcomes.  The relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables is largely consistent with our predictions, as are most of the observable 
implications.  The relational contracting perspective, by contrast, fails to predict or 




Chapter 6:  Conclusion   
Argument Summary 
The problem 
 Bilateral intelligence cooperation has received increased attention and public 
exposure in recent decades.   Interest in this ‘missing dimension’ of international 
politics has been fueled by a growing recognition of the role of intelligence-sharing in 
detecting and preventing imminent terrorist attacks, supporting multilateral military 
operations and enabling resource-constrained governments to leverage their finite 
intelligence capabilities more efficiently.  Until recently, much of the scholarship on 
bilateral intelligence cooperation has consisted of atheoretical case studies and 
detailed historical accounts.  Cases are often depicted as idiosyncratic events, rather 
than as instances of a larger phenomenon.  As a result, deeper conceptual and 
methodological questions—such as what constitutes bilateral intelligence cooperation 
and how it can be measured over time—have gone largely unexplored.  
More can be done within the academic literature to address these questions 
and, in the process, inform public understanding of this topic.  This presents an 
opportunity to political scientists and IR theorists.  As I argued in Chapter Two, 
International Relations offers a robust conceptual toolkit that, with subtle 
modifications, could yield new insights into intelligence-related research questions.  
To date, this toolkit has been underutilized due to four longstanding obstacles:  the 
conflicting value systems of the academy and the intelligence community, the 




source data, and methodological commitments favoring large-n statistical studies over 
small-n qualitative case studies.  I contend that these obstacles are beginning to 
recede, thanks in part to a more liberal US declassification regime, the gradual entry 
of Intelligence Studies into the academic mainstream, and the recent improvement 
and subsequent rehabilitation of qualitative research methods.  
Research question 
In this dissertation I have attempted to address the question of why certain 
pairs of states engage in greater degrees of intelligence cooperation than others.  I 
selected this question for several reasons.  First, it is representative of a larger class of 
intelligence-related questions that would benefit from the application of a 
theoretically informed case design. Second, it is a ‘policy-relevant’ question, as 
evidenced by recent debates and discussion within the United States concerning the 
relative merits (e.g., specialization) and drawbacks (e.g., the snowing effect) of 
cooperating with autocratic intelligence services.   Any prospective answers or 
insights generated in response to this question could hold implications for how 
democratic governments select and manage their bilateral intelligence relationships in 
the future.   
Two theories 
For this study I have drawn upon two mainstream IR theoretical traditions:  
the dyadic democratic peace argument and relational contracting.  In Chapter Three I 
considered how each perspective could be adapted to explain distinct but related 




as a function of three attributes:  frequency of intelligence exchange, granularity of 
information exchanged, and degree of structural commitment.   
My adaptation of the dyadic democratic peace argument draws upon the 
writings of Kant (1795), Doyle (1985, 1986 and 1989), Schmitter (2002) and Dixon 
(1994).  It predicts that the frequency and granularity of information exchanged 
should vary in accordance with the regime composition of the dyad.  Fully democratic 
dyads (i.e., those in which both members represent fully democratic regimes) are 
expected to engage in more frequent and granular exchange with one another, 
whereas mixed dyads (i.e., those in which the members consist of an autocracy and 
democracy) are expected to engage in less of both over time.  This occurs as the result 
of a Janus-faced regime recognition dynamic in which, via the causal mechanisms of 
contingent consent and bounded uncertainty, liberal democracies benefit from a 
presumption of amity whilst autocracies face a presumption of enmity when dealing 
with liberal democracies.   In sum, fully democratic dyads are expected to behave in a 
way that keeps the game of intelligence cooperation going to one another’s mutual 
benefit.  Mixed dyads, by contrast, are expected to be plagued by mutual concerns 
about defection, thus resulting in less frequent and granular levels of intelligence 
exchange. 
The relational contracting perspective is informed by the transaction cost 
economics literature and subsequent IR adaptations by Weber (1997, 2000).  It 
highlights the role of several exogenous factors in shaping the bindingness of an 
intelligence relationship:  transaction costs, the level of external threat and 




expected to abandon ad hoc modes of intelligence cooperation in favor of more 
binding arrangements (e.g., formal intelligence alliances) that they believe are less 
vulnerable to defection.  By contrast, states facing relatively lower values over these 
variables are expected to favor ad hoc modes of intelligence cooperation wherever 
possible. 
In an effort to identify the observable implications of the relational contracting 
perspective within my selected cases, I leveraged insights from Walsh’s willful 
hierarchy argument (Walsh 2007, 2010).  Walsh identifies three additional case 
conditions, in addition to those cited by Weber, that influence the type of binding 
arrangement that the parties will select:  high expected gains from intelligence 
cooperation, fears of defection on either side and the presence of a power imbalance.  
When all three conditions are satisfied, the parties are expected to form a willful 
hierarchy in which the dominant state assumes direct control of the subordinate’s 
intelligence services in exchange for side payments or rents.  Alternatively, when the 
parties’ fears of defection are negligible, they are expected to share intelligence 
through anarchic mechanisms (e.g., bilateral governance structures or ad hoc sharing) 
that preserve their decision-making authority. 
Methodology and case selection criteria 
 Having adapted these two theoretical perspectives to the study of bilateral 
intelligence cooperation, I next sought to clarify my research objectives and case 
selection criteria.  Here I faced several problems.  First, given the theoretically 
impoverished state of Intelligence Studies discussed in Chapter Two, I felt that it 




testing rival hypotheses that make mutually exclusive claims about so-called ‘crucial 
cases’ (e.g., in a ‘most similar’ or ‘least similar’ research design).  I concluded that it 
would be more sensible to draw upon a combination of theory-development and 
theory-testing research designs.  This hybrid approach allowed me to determine 
whether my selected theories could be suitably extended to a new problem domain, 
while at the same time enabling me to construct and implement preliminary tests (i.e., 
plausibility probes) of these arguments against some initial cases. 
 A second problem concerned case selection.  As noted earlier, a key limitation 
of any intelligence-focused study is the dearth of readily available primary source 
data.  In order to compensate for these limitations and implement my envisioned 
hybrid research design, I sought to identify two historical case studies for which 
available data was known to exist.  Additionally, in an effort to mitigate against some 
of the more well-known problems associated with qualitative small-n studies (e.g., 
confounding and omitted variable bias), I identified and attempted to satisfy five 
additional case selection criteria:  strive to hold constant as many competing 
independent variables as possible, incorporate war as a stress condition, control for 
realism, select cases in which the primary units of analysis perform similar 
intelligence functions, and select cases exhibiting extreme variance over the 
dependent variable.  
 The Anglo-Soviet and Anglo-American wartime cooperative intelligence 
dyads (WCIDs) came close to satisfying all five case conditions.  Each involved a 
British military intelligence liaison unit operating in the capital city of an Allied 




exchange relationship against a common enemy.  For each case I was able to identify 
a robust body of primary source information—the war diaries of the British inter-
service 30 Military Mission to Moscow, for the former, and the off-the-record 
monthly notes of the Washington, D.C.-based Signals Intelligence Liaison Unit 
(SLU), for the latter.  Through an in-depth examination of both data sets, I was able 
to measure and compare the posited relationships of the dependent and independent 
variables identified in Chapter Three, as well as test for the presence of observable 
implications of both theories.  
Case findings and theoretical implications 
 In Chapters Four and Five I placed the Anglo-Soviet and Anglo-American 
WCIDs in their respective historical contexts and tested my adaptations of the dyadic 
democratic peace and relational contracting arguments against them.  In this section I 
highlight the key findings from these cases, along with some of their potential 
theoretical implications. 
(1) The dyadic democratic peace hypothesis (H1) was largely corroborated in both 
cases, thus suggesting that it warrants further consideration as a possible 
explanation of bilateral intelligence cooperation.   
In the case of the Anglo-Soviet WCID, the values of the independent variables 
(extremely high and low polity values for Britain and the USSR, respectively) and 
dependent variables (diminishing levels of frequency and granularity) were consistent 
with my expectations of a highly heterogeneous (read:  mixed) dyad.  The observable 
implications of this argument in this case were similarly consistent with my 




to ‘keep the game going’ with its 30 Mission counterparts. In addition, the highly 
erratic and unpredictable behavior of the Soviet Otdel most certainly did not meet 30 
Mission’s minimum standards of acceptable behavior for an intelligence liaison 
partner.  As the war progressed, both of these factors contributed to an increasingly 
poisoned atmosphere of rapidly diminishing intelligence cooperation. 
The only unexpected finding was the failure of 30 Mission to pursue 
retaliatory measures against the SGS and Otdel, as predicted by the theory.  As I 
noted in Chapter Four, this discrepancy had nothing to do with the attitudes and 
preferences of 30 Mission, which was keen to invoke such measures throughout its 
tenure in Moscow.  Rather, it reflects the realities of complex liaison within a bilateral 
intelligence relationship.  The British Government’s refusal to endorse 30 Mission’s 
proposed retaliations can be explained as a result of overriding strategic 
calculations—namely, its desire to minimize and pre-empt any distractions that might 
detract from the Red Army’s strong fighting performance against Hitler’s forces on 
the Eastern Front. 
In the case of the Anglo-American WCID, the expected values of the 
independent and dependent variables were also consistent with my expectations of a 
fully democratic dyad.   Following the signing of the 1943 BRUSA Agreement, 
representatives from the primary British and American military SIGINT agencies 
moved quickly to establish integrated intelligence operations in Britain and the 
United States.  By late December, senior representatives from Britain’s General Code 
and Cypher School (GCCS) had arrived in Washington, D.C. to form the SLU and 




G-2 Special Branch and Signal Security Agency (SSA) at Arlington Hall.  From that 
point through the end of the war, a senior British liaison officer (BLO) and 
complementary cryptologic personnel were present at all three agencies, where they 
had largely uninterrupted access to their American counterparts and US SIGINT 
facilities.  This constituted a marked contrast with the Anglo-Soviet WCID, in which 
the members of 30 Mission were only authorized to meet with their SGS counterparts 
in pre-arranged meetings to discuss pre-determined topics under the watchful eyes of 
Soviet minders. 
The observable implications of the dyadic democratic peace argument were 
also borne out in the Anglo-American WCID. To the extent that disputes arose in the 
course of day-to-day intelligence interactions, the SLU personnel and their US 
counterparts reached mutual accommodations that ‘kept the game going’ without 
jeopardizing any of the benefits of intelligence cooperation.  Likewise, when certain 
intelligence agreements or outcomes favored the US SIGINT agencies, the SLU 
remained secure in its belief that it could continue to influence the dynamics of the 
overall relationship without fear of retaliation from their US hosts..   
In sum, the modified version of the dyadic democratic peace argument was 
found to provide accurate predictions of the outcomes and mechanics of bilateral 
intelligence cooperation in two distinctly different cases occurring under the highly 
stressful background conditions of total war against a common enemy. The ability of 
the argument to perform effectively under these circumstances suggests that there is 
merit in extending the dyadic democratic peace perspective to explain other known 




(2) Scholars can further test the strength, scope and applications of the dyadic 
democratic peace perspective by selecting new cases that control for the effects of 
potentially confounding variables (e.g., official language utilized by the parties), as 
well as those that vary in terms of their background conditions. 
The cases selected for this study were admittedly imperfect, in the sense that 
both contained at least one potentially confounding variable (official language) that 
may have influenced the outcomes.  It is possible, for example, that the shared 
English language of the British and US Governments may have contributed 
disproportionately to the deeper levels of cooperation observed in the Anglo-
American WCID.  Conversely, the lack of a shared official language between the 
British and Soviet Governments may have contributed to the lower levels of 
cooperation seen in that relationship.  This problem could be addressed by selecting 
fully democratic intelligence relationships in which the participants do not share a 
common official language (e.g., Germany and the United States since 2001) and 
mixed dyads that do (e.g., the United States-Pakistan dyad of more recent years).  
Scholars may also wish to explore whether the dyadic democratic peace 
perspective can successfully explain variation in the depth of bilateral intelligence 
cooperation under less stressful conditions short of world war.  For example, the 
regime composition of a dyad may prove less important as an explanatory variable 
when the stakes of cooperation are lower and the background conditions of the cases 
are allowed to vary.  As new cases meeting these criteria are identified and examined, 
it will also be important to consider the possibility of complex interaction dynamics 




outcomes. The development and creation of the large-n USIIB statistical dataset could 
help to facilitate this sort of controlled testing, as one scholar has recently 
demonstrated (Tuzuner 2009). 
 (3) The relational contracting hypothesis (H2) was not well supported in either 
case, thus suggesting that the argument and its purported causal mechanism of 
hierarchy may be overstated. 
In the case of the Anglo-Soviet WCID, the values of the independent variables 
(extreme level of external threat, high uncertainty and high transaction costs) and 
dependent variable (low bindingness of intelligence cooperation) were inconsistent 
with my expectations of a highly heterogeneous dyad.  The observable implications 
of the relational contracting argument also did not unfold as expected.  Contrary to 
the posited case predictions of the relational contracting argument, the high 
transaction costs of intelligence cooperation facing Britain (e.g., 30 Mission’s 
difficulties operating within an autocratic environment and its need for translation 
services) along with its inability to recoup highly asset-specific investments in the 
relationship (e.g., the topic-specific meeting channels) did not lead to the 
development of a willful hierarchy.  This failed to occur in spite of considerable side 
payments made by the British to the Soviet Union in the form of military materiel and 
logistical support. 
In the case of the Anglo-American WCID, the values of the independent 
variables (extreme level of external threat, high uncertainty and relatively high 
transaction costs) and dependent variable (high bindingness) were consistent with the 




American case outcomes with those of the Anglo-Soviet WCID suggests the 
possibility of omitted variable bias.  Recall that two of the independent variables in 
the relational contracting argument—level of external threat and uncertainty—were 
treated as environmental constants because their values were more or less identical 
for the duration of both cases.   Transaction costs thus served as the only remaining 
explanatory variable for the relational contracting argument.  Given that transaction 
costs were lower for the Anglo-American WCID than for the Anglo-Soviet WCID, it 
does not make sense (per the logic of relational contracting) that the level of 
bindingness proved to be so much higher for the former than in the latter.  This leaves 
open the possibility of another variable—one not accounted for explicitly in the 
relational contracting argument—doing the proverbial heavy lifting. 
While several of the willful hierarchy case predictions for the Anglo-
American WCID were borne out in the case, the most important one was not.  At no 
point in their wartime intelligence relationship did the United States (the dominant 
party) attempt to assume direct control of Britain’s (the subordinate state) intelligence 
activities. Moreover, in contrast to the Anglo-Soviet case, there does not appear to 
have been any pressure for such a take-over to occur from within the US military 
intelligence establishment—nor pressure to stop it from senior US leadership. 
(4) Future scholarship will benefit from a broader consideration of the conditions 
under which hierarchical intelligence relationships (willful or not) emerge. 
Walsh’s hierarchical extension of the relational contracting perspective is 
predicated on the notion of a less powerful state submitting willfully into an 




payments and other assurances against defection (Walsh 2007, 164).   It is 
nevertheless conceivable that the decision to enter into a hierarchical intelligence 
relationship is not always a willful choice on the part of the weaker party. Some of 
the best-known cases of bilateral intelligence hierarchies involve dyads in which the 
weakest member was already subordinate to the dominant party (i.e., well before the 
onset of intelligence cooperation).  Two of the examples cited by Walsh in his 2010 
book—the United States and West Germany during the 1950s and the United States 
and South Vietnam during the 1960s and early 1970s—certainly seem to fit this mold 
(Walsh 2010, 31-33 and 59-78). 
The Anglo-Soviet case study does not fit this mold, however.  Despite the 
presence of a power imbalance between the two countries, the weaker party (the 
Soviet Union) did not submit to the dominant party (Great Britain) at the time they 
initiated intelligence cooperation. As scholars seek to extend and build upon the 
relational contracting perspective as an explanation of intelligence outcomes, they 
may wish to consider how often—and under what conditions—a less powerful state 
that is not currently subordinate to the more powerful state will enter willfully into a 
hierarchical intelligence relationship.   
Conclusion 
 The theoretical arguments and cases considered in this study do not constitute 
a sufficient basis upon which to make broader generalizations about the role of 
regime composition or transaction costs in shaping the depth of cooperation in 
contemporary bilateral intelligence relationships.  As of this writing, the state of 




ground—and our knowledge of the larger universe of cases remains too limited—to 
entertain such ambitions. I have attempted to make a modest contribution to this 
literature by joining an emerging group of scholars that is attempting to bring 
Intelligence Studies—for decades a ‘missing dimension’ and ‘neglected colony’—
back into the mainstream of International Relations.  I have done so specifically by: 
• Developing a novel extension of a well-established IR theoretical tradition 
(the dyadic democratic peace argument) and applying it directly to the study 
of bilateral intelligence cooperation. 
 
• Exploring the plausibility of this argument, alongside another theoretical 
tradition (relational contracting) that has previously been applied to the study 
of intelligence, by ‘going deep’ into the details of two historical cases and 
determining whether the expected relationships and outcomes were present. 
 
• Suggesting concrete ways in which both arguments could be fruitfully 










Appendix II: Twenty-Year Mutual Assistance Agreement 
Between the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (1942)245 
 
London, May 26, 1942 
 
HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF GREAT BRITAIN, IRELAND AND BRITISH 
DOMINIONS BEYOND THE SEAS, EMPEROR OF INDIA, AND THE 
PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE UNION OF SOVIET 
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS: 
 
Desiring to confirm the stipulations of the agreement between His Majesty's 
Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics for joint action in the war against Germany signed at Moscow, 
July 12, 1941, and to replace them by formal treaty; 
 
Desiring to contribute after the war to the maintenance of peace and to the prevention 
of further aggression by Germany or the States associated with her in acts of 
aggression in Europe; 
 
Desiring, moreover, to give expression to their intention to collaborate closely with 
one another as well as with the other United Nations at the peace settlement and 
during the ensuing period of reconstruction on a basis of the principles enunciated in 
the declaration made Aug. 14, 1941, by the President of the United States of America 
and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, to which the Government of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics has adhered; 
 
Desiring finally to provide for mutual assistance in the event of attack upon either 
high contracting party by Germany or any of the States associated with her in acts of 
aggression in Europe; 
 
Have decided to conclude a treaty for that purpose and have appointed as their 
plenipotentiaries: 
 
His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions Beyond 
Seas, Emperor of India, for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland: 
 
The Right Hon. Anthony Eden, M. P., His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs; 
 
The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: 
                                                 





M. Vyacheslaff Mikhailovitch Molotoff, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, 
 
Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have 






In virtue of the alliance established between the United Kingdom and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, the high contracting parties mutually undertake to afford 
one another military and other assistance and support of all kinds in war against 





The high contracting parties undertake not to enter into any negotiations with the 
Hitlerite Government or any other government in Germany that does not clearly 
renounce all aggression intentions, and not to negotiate or conclude, except by mutual 
consent, any armistice or peace treaty with Germany or any other State associated 






1. The high contracting parties declare their desire to unite with other like-minded 
States in adopting proposals for common action to preserve peace and resist 
aggression in the post-war period. 
 
2. Pending adoption of such proposals, they will after termination of hostilities take 
all measures in their power to render impossible the repetition of aggression and 
violation of peace by Germany or any of the States associated with her in acts of 




Should either of the high contracting parties during the postwar period become 
involved in hostilities with Germany or any of the States mentioned in Article III, 
Section 2, in consequence of the attack by that State against that party, the other high 
contracting party will at once give to the contracting party so involved in hostilities 





This article shall remain in force until the high contracting parties, by mutual 
agreement, shall recognize that it is superseded by adoption of proposals 
contemplated in Article III, Section 1. In default of adoption of such proposals, it 
shall remain in force for a period of twenty years and thereafter until terminated by 




The high contracting parties, having regard to the interests of security of each of 
them, agree to work together in close and friendly collaboration after re-establishment 
of peace for the organization of security and economic prosperity in Europe. 
 
They will take into account the interests of the United Nations in these objects and 
they will act in accordance with the two principles of not seeking territorial 





The high contracting parties agree to render one another all possible economic 




Each contracting party undertakes not to conclude any alliance and not to take part in 




The present treaty is subject to ratification in the shortest possible time and 
instruments of ratification shall be exchanged in Moscow as soon as possible. 
 
It comes into force immediately on the exchange of instruments of ratification and 
shall thereupon replace the agreement between the Government of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom 
signed at Moscow July 12, 1941. 
 
Part One of the present treaty shall remain in force until the re-establishment of peace 
between the high contracting parties and Germany and the powers associated with her 
in acts of aggression in Europe. 
 
Part Two of the present treaty shall remain in force for a period of twenty years. 
Thereafter, unless twelve months' notice has been given by either party to terminate 
the treaty at the end of the said period of twenty years, it shall continue in force until 
twelve months after either high contracting party shall have given notice to the other 





In witness whereof the above-named plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty 
and have affixed thereto their seals. 
 
Done in duplicate in London on the twenty-sixth day of May, 1942, in the Russian 










October 2, 1942 
 
MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER E. W. R. TRAVIS. R.N.: 
 
Subject: Collaboration of U.S. and British radio intelligence organizations on 
Japanese and German projects. 
 
As a result of discussions of U.S. and British intelligence problems in the Pacific and 





(a) The British to abandon naval cryptanalysis at Kilindini and retain there only 
an exploitation unit which will read traffic from recoveries supplied by other 
units, and supply to these other units any code or other recoveries obtained in 
the course of this reading. 
(b) The British to disband the British-Australian naval unit at Melbourne and turn 
over to the U.S. unit there such personnel as the U.S. may desire, except 
Commander Nave, who is to be recalled. Requests by the U.S. for any 
particular individuals from Kilindini or Melbourne will be entertained by the 
British. The future status of the diplomatic party at Melbourne will depend 
upon wishes of the Australian Government and the senior naval and military 
authorities in that area, which the Admiralty will ascertain. 
(c) Upon execution of the foregoing, OPNAV to assume responsibility for naval 
recoveries and pertinent naval information to the Admiralty (G.C. & C.S.) for 
transmittal to C. in C. Eastern Fleet and Kilindini. 
(d) Pursuant to (c) above, OPNAV to pass to the Admiralty (G.C. & C.S.) (1) 
radio intelligence from Japanese naval communications, indicating, major 
strategic moves in any area and any details bearing upon operations in the 
Indian Ocean Area; (2) All Japanese naval code and cipher key recoveries. 
(e) In addition to the foregoing, OPNAV to pass to G.C. & C.S. by pouch all 




(a) The British to provide technical assistance, if desired, in the development of 
analytical machinery required. 
(b) The British agree in principle to full collaboration upon the German submarine 
and naval cryptanalysis problems, including exchange of intercepted traffic, 
keys, menus, cribs, and such other pertinent technical information as may be 
necessary. 
                                                 







(a) The U.S. to undertake certain work on Italian naval systems; traffic, and 
such pertinent information as may be available to be supplied by the British. 
(b) British to obtain certain items of special analytical equipment 
developed by the U.S. 
 (c) The British to send certain technical personnel to OP-20-G to obtain 
information concerning new U.S. high-speed analytical equipment and the 
technique employed in certain phases of U.S. work. 
(d) Direct cable communications to be provided by the U.S, and British between 
G.C. & C.S. and OP-20-G with each party making its own terminal 
arrangements. 
 
The results of the foregoing will be that the British will withdraw from active 
cryptanalytical work in the Pacific Area but will continue to intercept and read 
Japanese traffic at Kilindini. To the U.S. will be left the general direction and control 
of the effort against Japanese communications. The British plan, however, to maintain 
a research and intelligence unit at G.C. & C.S. so as not to lose touch with the 
Japanese problem. With regard to German communications, the British accede to 
U.S. desires to attack the submarine and naval problems. 
 
The primary concern of the British over U.S. entry into the German field is on the 
question of security. The British treat German Enigma matters on a higher plane than 
any other which they handle. They believe that the situation with regard to German 
communications is quite different from that which is found in the Japanese in that the 
ramifications of the major cryptographic system used are very great and any 
disclosures made might defeat the entire effort in every field. The British consider 
that, in going into the work, the U.S. should be prepared to accept British standards of 
security and insure compliance therewith. 
 
It would appear that the foregoing proposals if accepted, would result in a logical set-
up for the reason that the U.S. has the primary facilities and experience in the Pacific 
and is in a position to intercept traffic there with greater success; whereas, the British 
occupy the corresponding position in the Atlantic. While providing for a logical 
division of labor on this basis, it would appear, moreover, that this plan will, at the 
same time, provide a necessary back-up for the safety of each party concerned. 
 
Intelligence, communications, and operational authorities concerned in the Navy 
Department have considered these proposals and find them acceptable, subject to the 
following reservations: 
(a)  As for security, the U.S. feels great concern over the treatment of intelligence 
obtained from Japanese naval communications and desires that it be handled 
on the same plane as the German. It is felt that there should be a definite 
agreement as to the dissemination to be given any recoveries and information 
supplied; and that the instructions for handling this material be as uniform as 
possible. 
(b) The extent to which information, recoveries and raw material can be supplied 
will naturally depend upon communications and other facilities available. 
(c) The proposals concerning the Melbourne unit have been referred to the 
Commander, Southwest Pacific Force, for comment, and decision thereon is 
withheld pending his reply. 
(d) Any agreement made at this time must be subject to such change as 




any change, effort will be made to notify you in advance, or, if this is not 
possible, at the earliest practicable time, thereafter. 
(e) The question of supplying special analytical equipment will have to be 
investigated, due to the production problems involved and the possibility of 
material shortages. A memorandum on this matter will be sent to the British at 
a later date. 
 
C. F. HOLDEN 
Captain U.S. Navy 




Appendix IV:  The BRUSA Agreement of 1943247 
 
May 17, 1943 
 
Agreement between British Government Code and Cipher School and U.S. War 
Department concerning cooperation in matters relating to: 
 
U.S. British 
Special Intelligence A Special Intelligence 
Special Intelligence B Y Intelligence 
TA Intelligence Y Inference 
 
A distinction is made in nomenclature and procedure in handling intelligence 
derived from the solution of enemy high grade and that obtained from low grade 
codes and ciphers.  The preservation of secrecy in regard to either category is a matter 
of great concern to both countries and if the highest degree of security is to be 
maintained, it is essential that the same methods should be pursued by both countries 
at every level and in every area concerned, since a leakage at any one point would 
jeopardize intelligence from these sources not in one area only but in all theaters of 
war and for all services. 
  
 This agreement is limited to the traffic specifically designated herein.  It does 
not cover traffic emanating from non-service enemy or neutral sources.  These 
subjects will be covered by future negotiations between Director, G.C.C.S. and A.C. 
of S., G-2, War Department. 
 
(1) Both the U.S. and British agree to exchange completely all information 
concerning the detection, identification and interception of signals from, and the 
solutions of codes and ciphers used by, the Military and Air forces of the Axis 
powers, including secret services (Abwehr). 
(2) The U.S. will assume as a main responsibility the reading of Japanese Military 
and Air codes and ciphers. 
(3) The British will assume as a main responsibility the reading of German and 
Italian Military and Air codes and ciphers. 
(4) Both countries agree that special security regulations shall apply to Intelligence 
obtained from decoding telegrams in enemy high grade codes and ciphers. 
(5) Both countries agree to use their most secure codes and ciphers for transmission 
of the decodes of enemy signals and transmission of technical cryptanalytic 
data. 
(6) British or U.S. Commanders-in-Chief, Military or Air, will receive all Special 
Intelligence necessary to them for the conduct of their operations from either 
British or U.S. centers as may be mutually agreed. Liaison officers will be 
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appointed as desired for facilitating this.  They will be given full access to all 
decodes. 
(7) The distribution of intelligence form the sources in question will be governed by 
the fundamental principle that distribution will be restricted to the minimum and 
will therefore be confined solely to those who require to receive the intelligence 
for the proper discharge of their duties. 
(8) All recipients of Special Intelligence A, whether British or American officers, 
shall be bound by the same regulations, the regulations (Appendix B) now in 
force in the theaters of war where British forces are operating to be accepted at 
the present time. If at a later date either country wishes to modify them in the 
light of further experience then this may be done by mutual agreement. 
(9) The extension to officers of a knowledge of the existence of such intelligence 
shall be confined to as limited a number as possible and restricted to the levels 
of command in conformity with the above mentioned regulations. Great stress is 
laid on the principle that Special Intelligence A should not be intermingled in 
reports with general intelligence from other sources. If, however, it becomes 
imperative to do so, the whole must be treated as Special Intelligence A and 
given the same strictly limited distribution. Under no circumstances is it 
permissible to pass Special Intelligence A in a code or cipher which can be read 
by other than the authorized recipients. 
(10) Although Special Intelligence B is not subject to the same stringent regulations 
as Special Intelligence A, since the two are closely connected, it is essential to 
maintain a high degree of secrecy in the handling of Special Intelligence B also. 
In any action taken upon such intelligence and in any documents or telegrams 
based upon it, it is essential that its origin be disguised and that the codes or 
ciphers used for its dissemination be absolutely secure. 
(11) All intelligence available from decodes shall be made available to Liaison 
officers, and if they deem necessary it will be exchanged between London and 
Washington. These Liaison officers will be specifically appointed and given full 
facilities for this purpose. 
(12) British and U.S. will notify one another without delay, giving full particular, 
when either has information from any source indicating the compromise of any 
code or cipher used by the other. Action on such information will be most 
carefully considered in order not to compromise the source and if possible 
mutual agreement in such action will be sought. 
(13) Cooperation between and coordination of U.S. Signal Intelligence Service and 
British ‘Y’ Service must take place at all levels, technical information being 
exchanged mutually at the same level and each country to agree not to lower the 
classification of such information or the intelligence derived from it below that 
level without mutual agreement. 
(14) Each country shall inform the other of the employment and scope in each joint 
theater of war of their Signal Intelligence (Y) units in the field. 
(15) This agreement or the appendices thereto may be supplemented or modified 
from time to time governing any special feature for which either party wishes to 





a. Y Service or Signal Intelligence Service.  The British, U.S. Army, and 
U.S. Navy services concerned with intercepting, decoding, intercepting, 
classifying and dissemination of enemy (and neutral) communications, 
and the use of D/F and other specialized apparatus for establishing 
locations and identities of enemy transmitters. 
b. Special Intelligence A.  Certain ciphers are placed in a special category, 
owing to their importance and difficulty of solution. The intelligence 
derived from these ciphers is known as Special Intelligence A. Such 
material is treated with most stringent security measures. Special 
Intelligence A is confined to a very strictly limited number of the most 
highly placed officers and is mainly of strategical [sic] importance. 
c. Special Intelligence B.  Intelligence derived from the solution of lower 
grade ciphers. Such ciphers may under certain circumstances be 
upgraded to the “Special A” class.  The dissemination of Special 
Intelligence B is wider though always treated as British Most Secret—
U.S. Secret. Special Intelligence B may be used tactically. 
 
Appendix (A) 
Special Provisions Regarding Work on German Machine Ciphers 
 
Since it is believed unnecessary and impracticable to duplicate work on 
German machine ciphers and in view of the large number of personnel required and 
the unavoidable extra risk to the security of the source involved, agreement which 
follows has been arrived at. This agreement provides that: 
 
a.  All desired intelligence from this source will be made available to the 
War Department in Washington. 
b.  U.S. personnel will obtain experience by engaging in the solution of this 
type of cipher in Great Britain. 
c. Research into new methods of attack will be made in Washington. 
d. Transmission of Intelligence to Commanders-in-Chief in the field will 
be accomplished by special routes and staffs who will maintain a watch 
over the use of the intelligence to guard against compromise of the 
source. 
1.  U.S. liaison officers will be appointed at G. C. & C.S. to examine 
messages and summaries and select those desired for transmittal to 
Washington for G-2 or the Theater Commanders.  All decoded 
material will be made available to those officers. Decodes giving 
information regarding Order of Battle will be handled as at present, 
i.e., through U.S. liaison officers in War Office and Air Ministry, 
respectively. 
2. Decodes or summaries to be passed to Washington through existing 
British channels. 
3. U.S. party to effect independent solution of keys will be established 
in Great Britain, but so coordinated by mutual agreement to avoid 




tasks and will be given every assistance for instruction of personnel. 
They will be furnished British machines. Decodes from this section 
will be passed to Bletchley Park for emendation, translation and 
distribution, but U.S. party will conduct complete processing, 
including emendation and translation to such an extent as they 
desire. 
4. Formulas will be supplied by Great Britain for use on machines now 
at Arlington Hall. 
5. U.S. to undertake research for finding a new method for solution and 
to be rendered every assistance by the British for this purpose. 
6. In conformity with British policy, U.S. personnel engaged in 
solution work in Great Britain will not be transferred elsewhere 
except for very urgent reasons. 
7. Special Intelligence from this source will be passed to Commanders-
in-Chief in the field through the Special British units provided for 
this purpose. The officer in command of these units will have direct 
access to the Commander-in-Chief and advise as necessary on the 
security aspect of handling and using this intelligence. Where an 
American officer s Commander-in-Chief, an American officer, 
properly trained and indoctrinated at Bletchly [sic] Park, will be 
attached to the unit to advise and act as liaison officer to overcome 
difficulties that may arise in regard to differences in language. 
8. The Director of the G. C. & C. S. will have the final decision when 
matters of security are involved in intelligence items (gossip) and as 
to what is passed to Commanders-in-Chief in the field. 
 
Appendix (B) 
British Security Regulations for Special Intelligence 




1) SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE is the agreed name for the highly secret 
information obtained by cryptographic means from enemy high grade ciphers. 
2) Lower grade cryptographic material classed in general as “Y” Intelligence, is 
not included in the definition of SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE. 
 
PART I TO BE DESTROYED BY FIRE WHEN READ 
 
Part II 
1) ALL SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE emanating from the United Kingdom and 
transmitted to Commands abroad will receive the prefix ‘Ultra’. 
2) ALL SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE emanating from centres other than the 
United Kingdom and transmitted either to the United Kingdom or to another 
Command abroad, is to receive the prefix specially allotted to each producing 






DELHI Prefix SIRDAR 
WASHINGTON Prefix ZYMOTIC 
MELBOURNE Prefix ZYMOTIC 
KILINDINI Prefix ZYMOTIC 
MIDDLE EAST Prefix SWELL 
 
3) SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE produced by U.S.A. centres either in U.S.A. or 
elsewhere if transmitted over British routes either to the United Kingdom or to 
British Commands overseas, is to receive the prefix of the Command or centre 
through which it is distributed. 
4) Where it is necessary for SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE to be transmitted 
between Commands or centres other than the United Kingdom, special routes 




ULTRA (see Para. 1 above) information can be regarded as reliable and action 
can be taken on it, but experience has shown that the following security regulations 
are vital to the preservation of this source.  The Commander-in-Chief is held 
personally responsible for ensuring that they are scrupulously adhered to: - 
 
1) The utmost secrecy is to be used in dealing with ULTRA information. 
Attention is called to the fact that if from any document that might fall into the 
hands of the enemy or from any message that the enemy might intercept, from 
any word that might be revealed by a prisoner of war, or from any ill-
considered action based upon it, the enemy were to suspect the existence of 
the ULTRA source, that source would probably forever be lost to our cause. 
2) This loss would vitally affect operations on all fronts, not only the particular 
front on which the source had been compromised. 
3) Commanding Officers of those Commands authorized to receive ULTRA 
information, i.e., normally only General and Air Officers commanding Armies 
and Air Forces, are to be instructed that ULTRA messages are for them, their 
personal representative, and their Senior Intelligence and Operations Staff 
Officer only, and are not to be seen by, read to, or discussed with any other 
person. ULTRA messages are to be destroyed by fire immediately [sic] action 
has been taken on them. No record of Intelligence based on ULTRA 
information may be kept, except at the H.Q. of the Commander-in-Chief. 
4) When ULTRA information is to be used by the Commander of an Army or an 
Air Force as a basis for action to be taken by a subordinate command, the 
information must be translated, when passed to the subordinate command, into 
terms of an operational order, so worded that if captured or intercepted by the 
enemy the origin of the information could not be traced back to the ULTRA 
source, e.g., orders must never contain the precise time, date or place of an 




information if transmitted by W/T must be encoded only in authorized 
ciphers. Under no circumstances whatever is it permissible to transmit 
ULTRA information as such to lower formations. 
5) In general, if any action is to be taken based upon ULTRA information, the 
local Commander is to ensure that such action cannot be traced back by the 
enemy to the reception of ULTRA Intelligence alone. A momentary tactical 
advantage is not sufficient ground for taking any risk of compromising the 
source. No action may be taken against specific sea or land targets revealed by 
ULTRA unless appropriate air or land reconnaissance has also been 
undertaken. Names of enemy ships revealed by ULTRA source may never be 
quoted. 
6) The utmost care is to be taken in briefing pilots for an operation based on 
ULTRA information that only such details are given them as might have been 
obtained by other means, such as air reconnaissance, and only such as are 
essential to the success of the operations. 
7) No reference to ULTRA information is to be made in any summary 
whatsoever, however limited the circulation. No discussion of it is permissible 
except between the senior officers who are immediately concerned with the 
action to be taken upon it. 
8) If it is necessary to ask questions, or make comments on ULTRA material, 
whether on matters of Intelligence, Operations, Routing or Security, such 
messages are to be transmitted only over the special channel and in the special 
ciphers provided for ULTRA traffic. 
9) Recipients of ULTRA may not under any circumstances carry on their persons 
outside their Headquarters, ULTRA messages which have been delivered to 
them. 
 
1st March 1943 
 
(Signed) 
GEO. V. STRONG 
Major General 
A.C. of S., G-2 
 




15 June 1943 
 
Approved for the U.S. War Department. 
By order of the Secretary of War. 
(Signed) 
JOSEPH T. McNARNEY 
Lieut. General, U.S. Army 
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